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Foreword 
MARTIN CAVE 
Director, Centre for Management under Regulation 
Warwick Business School 
 
The issue of the relative merits of infrastructure and service competition has 
been a feature of debate in telecommunications regulation for decades.  
There are risks for a regulator pursuing either policy. 
Infrastructure competitors may prove to be weak and ineffectual, and a failed 
reliance on this form of competition can consign end users to the mercies of 
an inadequately regulated incumbent in an environment of high prices and 
little choice. 
Alternatively, by making service competition easy and profitable, regulators 
may deter investment in competing infrastructures which could offer 
customers a genuine choice among differentiated services. 
The mistake here is to neglect the Janus-faced relationship between 
regulatory intervention and market structure. Regulation must respond to 
market power. But regulatory interventions also affect investment incentives, 
which influence market structure. A regulator which underestimates the 
scope for infrastructure competition is often making a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
To some degree, the dilemma was ‘solved’ by reference to the so-called 
'ladder of investment’, with which my name is associated. This saw 
infrastructure competition as a progressive process, in which a competitor 
could begin by reselling the historic monopolist’s service and then gradually 
move nearer the customer by making its own investments in a core network, 
in backhaul, and ultimately by installing electronics in the local exchange and 
relying on the access provider solely for a rented copper loop. In this 
framework, the regulator would seek to move competitors up the ladder, as 
they acquired more customers and could make profitable investments in less 
easily replicated assets. 
A ladder is a powerful aspirational metaphor, and many European regulators 
have adopted the approach. Unfortunately, it is difficult to test a complex 
dynamic hypothesis such as the ladder of investment, but it is noteworthy 
that in the countries in the EU in 2003, broadband (DSL) competitors relied 
predominantly on resale. By 2007, unbundled local loops provided most of 
their connections and resale was much less important. 
But this prospect of a comfortable progression to infrastructure competition 
has been shaken by new fibre-based next generation access (NGA) 
technologies which adopt a different architecture than existing networks. In 
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many cases, the competitor’s potential access point at the local loop 
disappears, leaving access competitors the option of either taking their fibre 
to the sub-loop which is even closer to the customer (a strategy which may 
not be technically or commercially viable) or of withdrawing to a wholesale 
broadband access or bitstream product which requires them to rely more 
heavily than in the past on the incumbent. 
In my view, regulators should not resign themselves to the view that a next 
generation access network is necessarily a monopoly, and that the best we 
can aspire to in future is service competition or a very attenuated version of 
infrastructure competition. To the contrary, regulators should first promote 
end-to-end competition between fibre networks and the alternative NGA 
networks represented by upgraded cable companies, and consider opening 
up passive assets such as ducts to promote competition. The growing 
potential for broadband delivery of wireless networks, which are inherently 
naturally competitive) should also be taken into account. If these forms of 
end-to-end competition are deployed, the need for regulation may even 
disappear. 
In this panorama, this collective volume is a useful contribution as is it 
focused on the specific case of mobile telecommunications. In the 
aforementioned debate, mobile markets are indeed singular: since their 
inception, they have been characterized by facility-based competition, 
contrary to the fixed broadband market that was frequently based on a 
monopoly in local access. From that viewpoint, mobile markets raise original 
empirical and theoretical questions. The issue is not that of “climbing the 
ladder” to create progressive infrastructure competition (that exists by 
construction), but that of introducing a degree of service competition without 
deterring future investment in network infrastructures (that would weaken 
infrastructure competition).  
In addressing specifically the mobile markets in the classical “infrastructure 
vs service” competition debate, the present volume is both relevant and 
timely. I commend these interesting contributions to policy makers, to 
regulators, to those working in the industry, and to those who, like me, study 
it. 
 
Martin Cave 
23 July 2008 
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Introduction  
LAURENT BENZONI 
University of Paris II (Panthéon-Assas) 
PATRICE GEOFFRON 
University of Paris-Dauphine 
 
In network industries, two regulatory means can be chosen to introduce 
competition:  
 Infrastructure-based competition, whereby operators are incited to 
invest in infrastructure and fully compete on both the infrastructure 
access market (upstream or wholesale market) and on services 
delivered through infrastructure (downstream or retail market). 
 Service-based competition, whereby service providers have an 
equal and non discriminatory access to a unique monopolized 
infrastructure, is considered an essential facility and required to 
offer services in competition on the retail market. 
 
Infrastructure-based competition is obviously preferred because all 
monopolies disappear. As a result, the optimal regulation process manages 
the transition from service-based competition to sustainable infrastructure-
based competition.  
Both of these regulatory means have been experimented across Europe’s 
telecommunications sector. Indeed, the initial “service based competition” 
regulatory framework was implemented for fixed communications (voice and 
data), whereas mobile communications implemented “infrastructure based 
competition”.    
The right balance between competition via infrastructures or services is an 
ongoing and controversial debate among academics, as well as regulators. 
The exchange of ideas has induced innovative concepts, as the “ladder of 
investment” developed by Pr. Martin Cave. But, if discussions have led to 
useful guidelines in selecting relevant regulatory schemes, fixed broadband 
has been primarily addressed (especially around the “ladder of investment” 
theory). This book is, therefore, a collection of essays assembled to highlight 
the specific dimensions of these issues within the field of mobile 
telecommunications.  
Indeed, considering competition in mobile telecommunications through this 
“lens” is particularly relevant today, for both theoretical and regulatory 
reasons:  
 First of all, the mobile industry is a singular example of pure 
competition via infrastructure, and has been since the very 
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beginning with very few other comparable cases, be it in telecoms, 
energy, railroad, postal services, air transport, … 
 This basically means that mobile infrastructures have been 
duplicated along the entire value chain, without any element 
considered as an “essential facility”, the number of operators only 
being limited by the scarcity of spectrum (leading to national 
markets from 2 to 5 players in Europe, for example). 
 Whereas the national markets where oligopolies, by construction, 
the aim to increase the competitive intensity in the retail markets, 
via the introduction of service competition, arose through the 
regulatory authorities, conducing to the development of radio-less 
operators1. 
 And, from this viewpoint, we are here in front of the “uniqueness” of 
the mobile case, as the ongoing process means introducing service 
competition in an arena where players compete in infrastructures, 
contrary to the case of fixed broadband where the matter was to 
erode the power of monopolies. 
  
These evolutions are at the origin of the present project, as they lead to the 
following questions: 
 Is service-based competition relevant to address the (potential) 
problems of the mobile retail markets? 
 Can the introduction of service competition be efficient to cope with 
oligopolistic infrastructures as well as monopolistic infrastructures? 
 To what extent can introducing service-based competition in the 
mobile markets not disrupt the deployment of future network 
infrastructures? 
 
European and non-European scholars have been invited to present their 
works to be widely circulated amongst regulatory authorities, as well as 
industrial players and the telecommunications research community. By 
gathering essays addressing the aforementioned interrogations, we seek to 
propose academic contributions for future regulatory choices. The aim of this 
collection is that regulatory choices will be consistent with such academic 
contributions.  
These essays are organised in two parts. 
                                                           
1  Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs). 
Infrastructure versus Service-based Competition: the Case of Mobile Telecommunications 
- 9 – 
 
 Part I: Theoretical Framework and Regulatory Schemes 
The first part presents the main economic mechanisms related to the 
alternative “infrastructure/service”, the theoretical basis on which these 
mechanisms rely and the related regulatory schemes. 
M.A.Bergman discusses the trade-offs between competition in the entire 
value chain that comes from infrastructure-based competition and the 
economies of scale from access-based competition, as well as how balance 
is affected by the choice of a specific regulatory model. He demonstrates 
that while Infrastructure-based competition potentially offers less regulation-
induced inefficiencies, service-based competition allows the industry to 
realize greater returns to scale (including network effects). He reviews a 
number of regulatory options, such as vertical separation, government 
ownership and access regulation, and analyses their implications in terms of 
desirability of competition on infrastructure.  
A.Henten and K.E.Skouby discuss the theory of ‘the ladder of investment’ 
in broadband access. This theory states that the entry of players on the 
market occurs on a step-by-step basis (‘rung-wise’). Players enter the 
market in areas where barriers to entry are low and, later in the process, 
enter areas with higher barriers. A frame-setting discussion on both the 
theory and the environment in which it has developed is proposed, 
highlighted via three country cases (the UK, the US, and Denmark) and 
emphasises how these countries approached the facility-based vs. service-
based competition issue. 
J.Kittl, M.Lundborg and E.O.Ruhle propose a panorama of the 
implementation of unbundling by National Regulatory Agencies across 
Europe and the related impact in terms of economic welfare. This study 
points out the importance of a balanced approach: it seems that there is no 
single way towards competition, but that markets need a healthy mixture of 
both service-based and infrastructure-based competition. They also show 
that, with convergence and new technologies like broadband and VoIP, 
access at the levels of networks, services, applications and devices and own 
infrastructure and thus LLU will become increasingly important for operators 
to be able to differentiate their products.  
U.Blum, N.Krap and C.Growitsch starting point is the announcement, in 
summer 2005, of Deutsche Telekom to precondition a 3 billion euro 
investment in a fibre optic network not to be regulated with respect to pricing 
and third party access. Unless the new technologically-leading infrastructure 
was exempted from regulation, Telekom threatened the investment to be 
made in other areas or countries. On that basis, to develop a regulator’s 
strategy that allows investments to occur but prevents monopolistic prices, 
the authors model an investor’s decision problem under threat of regulation 
and show that the mere threat of a regulator’s intervention may prevent 
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supernormal profits without actual price regulation. They demonstrate that 
the regulator can influence both the investment decision and the investor’s 
price via signals on regulation probability and that the concept of “regulating 
by threat of intervention” is not only applicable to existing infrastructure, but 
also to new investments as well. 
Finally, K.Hori and K.Mizuno compare service-based and infrastructure-
based competition by focusing on a firm's incentive to invest in network 
infrastructure. They show that when monopoly rent is large, infrastructure-
based competition means the initial introduction of infrastructure is 
undertaken earlier than under service-based competition. However, when 
both monopoly rent and the degree of uncertainty are small, service-based 
competition brings about the earlier initial introduction of infrastructure than 
under infrastructure-based competition. The paper includes discussion of the 
policy implications of these findings. 
 Part II: Focusing on Mobile Issues 
The second part proposes various analyses centred on mobile 
telecommunications and addressing their singularities as regards the 
infrastructure/service debate.  
M.Bourreau, J.Drouard and L.Ferrali examine the relevancy of the “ladder 
of investment” for the mobile industry, and discuss whether the concept 
could be applied to encourage the development of alternative mobile 
facilities. They show that the ladder of investment for the fixed broadband 
market constitutes a regulatory response to a different situation than in the 
mobile market: unlike the fixed broadband market that was characterised by 
a monopoly on the local infrastructure, in the mobile market, facility-based 
competition has been intense since market inception. Therefore, their main 
conclusion is that social desirability of a ladder of investment in the mobile 
market does not appear as clear-cut as for the fixed broadband market. 
J.P.Fuhr and S.Pociask challenge the conventional wisdom that the U.S. 
wireless market somehow lags behind the European wireless market, 
concerns that have fuelled a debate over the need to correct the U.S. 
wireless market, including proposals to add regulations, mimicking a 
European-style model. Based on data from the OECD and FCC, their 
analyses show that, in fact, European wireless markets have higher 
concentration, higher prices and lower usage. Thus the contention that the 
U.S. wireless market lags its international counterparts is not supported by 
economic data and no further regulation is needed to address this issue. The 
authors conclude that a higher degree of facility-based competition may be 
one key explanation of these to the market’s success, as increased facility-
based competition in the U.S. market has made wireless providers very 
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responsive to changes in consumer preferences and led to continual 
improvement in service quality.  
L.Benzoni and P.Geoffron propose a comparative analysis of structures (in 
terms of number of operators) and performances (price, volume, penetration) 
in the European mobile markets in order to reveal an “optimal structure”. It 
has been shown that markets with three players are those that have the 
most success in relation to these criteria (or, at least, that markets with four 
and five operators does not present obvious advantages for consumers). 
Without concluding that three is a “golden number”, these results suggest to 
authorities that there is not necessarily an economic rationale to add more 
operators (MNOs as well as MVNOs) that will have to face the persistent first 
movers advantages of the incumbents. It also indicates that granting an 
additional license does not lead, in any circumstance, to an increase in the 
consumers’ surplus. 
C.H.Vuong discusses the reasoning favouring infrastructure over service-
based competition in the context of the European mobile telephony sector. 
Using principally basic economics and finance toolkits, the author argues 
that, because of the characteristics of mobile industry (a fast changing 
industry with high initial irreversible investments) and the complex nature of 
competition in the European mobile industry, infrastructure-based 
competition presents more “guarantees” as regards innovation dynamics 
over the long term. He shows that there is no need to intervene in 
relationships between MNOs and MVNOs and credible regulatory threats 
should be sufficient for optimal market outcome, and avoid regulatory costs.  
S.Ansari and R.Garud analyse the dynamics of the mobile “ecosystem” in 
the presence of successive technological generations, especially in the case 
of the 2G/3G “transition”. They find that different parts of the ecosystem 
evolved at different rates with “collateral technologies” influencing the 
transition path that unfolded. They suggest that, rather than a distinct or 
unitary shift from an old to a new technology, transitions proceed in a zigzag 
manner resulting in the emergence of hybrid technologies. Gaining a deeper 
understanding of the processes and dynamics whereby transitions between 
generations occur holds important implications for policy and strategy, as to 
avoid, for the future, the uncertainties that surrounded the path from 2G to 
3G.  
S.Ulset describes and analyses critical conditions for achieving net benefit 
from opening the value-chain in mobile communications by introducing 
mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs). The author reminds us that 
preliminary experience from the early development phase suggested that 
MVNOs offering complex bundles of innovative value-added services would 
not be competitively sustainable as separate firms. The main reason was 
that achieving both higher revenue and lower transaction costs under simple 
market contracts proved difficult, however, since increasing sales of 
Infrastructure versus Service-based Competition: the Case of Mobile Telecommunications 
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innovative value-added services did not only increase revenue, but also 
required more complex and less standardised interfaces that increased 
transaction costs. Even if this “equation” is still relevant (more sophisticated 
services mean more complexity in contracts), the author indicates that the 
MVNO market recently entered into more mature phases, supported by more 
entry-friendly regulatory, technical and contractual practices, increasing the 
sustainability of the virtual operators. 
Finally, F.Maiorano and J.Stern study the relationship between regulation 
and performance in the mobile telecommunications sector, taking account of 
the economic impact of telecommunications infrastructure on aggregate 
income and of the role of country institutions in promoting economic growth. 
They address these questions by estimating a system of equations for a 
panel of 30 low and middle-income countries over the 1990 - 2004 period. 
The evidence they present confirms the positive effect of regulatory 
institutions on telecommunications penetration and also highlights the 
contribution of a more widespread mobile telecommunications infrastructure 
to higher levels of GDP per capita.  
***** 
At the end of this introduction, the editors may give their own precise views 
on the issues addressed in this collective book2. This view in consistent with 
the conclusions of the previous book presented in the same collection and 
entitled «Competition and Regulation with Asymmetries in Mobile Markets»3. 
The works included in this book analysed the situation of asymmetries in the 
mobile markets due to staggered assignment of licenses and the related 
structural imbalance between first movers and later challengers because of 
the advantages and/or behaviours of the actors in place (brand-loyalty or 
recognition, club effects, …). And this is, from our viewpoint, in the same 
context that the appropriate degree of service competition in mobile markets 
shall be analysed and determined: 
 Since, at least in Europe, the infrastructure-based competition in 
biased by these persistent first movers advantages, it must be 
proven that more service-based competition would really mean 
more welfare instead of more fragilisation of the smaller MNOs that 
were, mostly, the later entrants. 
                                                           
2  View that is not necessarily shared by all the authors, as the diversity was the 
rule in inviting scholars to join the present project. 
3  Benzoni L., Geoffron P. (eds.) (2007), “Competition and Regulation with 
Asymmetries in Mobile Markets”, Quantifica, 2007.  
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 In other words, regulatory authorities shall carefully analyse the 
risks of paradoxical effects of service competition in mobile 
markets, as it may limit the capacity of the smaller network 
operators to still really challenge the incumbents, then reinforcing 
the later ones and restricting the intensity of infrastructure 
competition. 
Thus, the risk is present that more “service-based competition” would mean 
less “infrastructure-based competition” in mobile markets, with a regulatory 
answer to this threat that is not trivial. We hope that the studies presented in 
this book may shed light on future regulatory decisions and help to “fine 
tune” the regulation, so as to preserve the cycles of investment in the mobile 
networks infrastructures.  
 
Laurent Benzoni            Patrice Geoffron  
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Part I 
Theoretical Framework 
and  
Regulatory Schemes
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Competition in Services or Infrastructure-
based Competition? A Review of the 
Regulatory Schemes4 
MATS A. BERGMAN 
Uppsala University and Södertörn University College 
__________________________________ 
Abstract: It is often proposed that competition in infrastructure is better than access-
based competition. This article argues that the benefits from competition in 
infrastructure must be balanced against the returns to scale – including network 
effects – that an access-based regime permits. It discusses returns to scale, 
regulatory costs and benefits from competition in telecom markets. A number of 
regulatory options, such as vertical separation, government ownership and access 
regulation, are introduced and their implications for desirability of competition in 
infrastructure is analysed. Some more advanced regulatory schemes that have been 
proposed specifically for the telecom sector are also briefly mentioned.  
INTRODUCTION 
An often repeated mantra among those who are concerned with telecom 
regulation is that ex-ante regulation should give way to ex-post regulation. In 
other words, telecom-specific regulation will eventually have done its work 
and general commercial legislation, including competition law, will suffice to 
ensure vigorous competition. “Where telecoms markets tend towards 
effective competition, we no longer need sector-specific regulation”, as the 
responsible EU commissioner said when the telecom reform package was 
released on November 13, 20075. 
This “sunset vision” of telecom regulation is based, to a large extent, on the 
view that competition in infrastructure is both possible and preferable to 
                                                           
4  This article is based on a report commissioned from the author by the Swedish 
National Post and Telecom Agency (PTS) for a conference in 2004. The report 
was subsequently published in “An anthology on the foundations for competition 
and development in electronic communications markets”, PTS, 2005, available at 
http://www.pts.se/Dokument/dokument.asp?ItemID=4721. 
A revised version is available at www.sh.se/matsbergman and 
www.nek.uu.se/faculty/bergman/index.html. 
All opinions expressed in this article are my own and do not necessarily reflect 
those of any institution to which I am or have been associated. 
5  Commissioner Viviane Reding in the EU Commission’s press release IP/07/1678 
on November 13, 2007. 
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access-based competition. It is possible, according to this view, because 
new technology has reduced scale economies and it is preferable because 
regulation distorts investment incentives. The theme of this article is to 
discuss the trade-offs between competition in the whole value-chain that 
comes from infrastructure-based competition and the economies of scale 
that comes from access-based competition – and how this trade-off is 
affected by the choice of a specific regulatory model. I will question the 
received wisdom that competition in infrastructure is always preferable. 
However, for the trade-off to exist, there must exist some kind of bottleneck 
in the industry; some critical stage in the production process where there are 
large returns to scale. In the telecom industry, the bottleneck is some part of 
the physical network, such as the local loop or the ducts at the periphery of 
the network, or else the network effects that comes from being able to make 
calls to a large number of subscribers on the same network or on 
interconnected networks. An operator that does not have access to the 
bottleneck on reasonable terms will not be able to compete effectively – or 
not at all. 
For the trade-off to exist, there must also be costs associated with 
regulation. Otherwise there would be no reason not to rely on access 
regulation. An ideal regulation in a market with perfect information and well-
informed and benevolent regulators would certainly be able to perform as 
well as a perfectly competitive market, or even better. In practice, however, 
regulation will always give rise to inefficiencies. Since the conditions for the 
ideal regulation will never be satisfied, regulation will always come at a cost, 
no matter what regulatory model is chosen. Depending on how well an 
unregulated market would function and on how efficient regulation would be, 
the best course of action may either be to accept a certain degree of 
inefficiency in an unregulated market – or to introduce regulation.  
Similarly, (unregulated) perfect competition requires ideal circumstances, 
such as perfect information and price taking by every firm and every 
consumer. At best, some markets can be approximately perfectly 
competitive. In practice, most markets, including many telecom markets, 
deviate quite substantially from the perfectly competitive ideal. The presence 
of bottlenecks, for example, will give market power to the firm that controls 
the bottleneck. Market power, in turn, creates distortions and inefficiencies in 
the market that are costly and that hurt consumers. In telecom, policy-
makers have opted to introduce regulation to minimize those inefficiencies, 
while holding out the unregulated market as the ideal.  
This brings us back to the cost of regulation. There are many ways to make 
regulatory mistakes, some more costly than others. The regulator’s situation 
is asymmetric in an unrewarding way: it is easy to make mistakes that will be 
immensely costly, as exemplified by the crisis in the Californian electricity 
market in 2000-2001, while it is difficult to make improvements that will have 
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even relatively modest payoffs. All regulatory model have disadvantages. 
Therefore, sometimes the best course of action is to accept a certain degree 
of inefficiency and make do without regulation. 
THE SOURCES OF MARKET POWER AND THE BOTTLENECK 
PROBLEM 
Since regulation comes at a cost, there must be a reason to introduce 
regulation. In telecom markets, the fundamental reason is that otherwise 
some firms would be able to exert market power. In other markets, regulation 
may be introduced because of negative external effects (environmental 
concerns, for example) or because of asymmetric information between 
consumers and producers. 
There are two main sources of market power in the industry, both of which 
are related to returns to scale. First, there are traditional, cost-side returns to 
scale. Telecommunication is dependent on infrastructure and some of this is 
so costly that it cannot reasonably be duplicated. Second, there are demand-
side returns to scale. These are more commonly known as network effects. 
 Returns to scale and returns to density 
In network industries, it makes sense to distinguish between returns to 
density and other types of scale economies. Returns to density exists when 
it is more economical for a single firm (or network) to serve a certain 
segment, area or route. For example, if a single mobile telephony network 
has the capacity to serve all customers in a rural area, it will inevitably be 
more costly to set up two networks that cover the same area. Similarly, costs 
are likely to be larger if two or more networks provide cable-TV or fixed-
telephony services in the same area, compared to a single-network 
configuration. 
However, the existence of economies of density does not necessarily imply 
that (other) economies of scale are large. Absent economies of scale, each 
operator could be the monopoly provider in a relatively small area, such as a 
city, and still be fully efficiency. With scale economies, each operator has to 
serve a large area (a large number of customers) in order to be efficient. 
With scale economies but no economies of density, the customers of all 
operators could be spread out over the same total area and the operators 
would still be efficient. In other words, it would not be inefficient to build 
overlapping networks.  
There exist relatively few systematic studies of scale economies in the 
literature. A simple way to test for scale economies would be to investigate 
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whether mobile operators in small countries have higher costs, while the 
extent of the returns to density could perhaps be investigated by comparing 
costs in densely and sparsely populated countries. The available evidence 
suggests that returns to density are high in the provision of infrastructure for 
fixed telephony and for mobile telephony in rural areas, while not particularly 
high for mobile telephony in large cities. The evidence also suggests that 
returns to scale are small or possibly even non-existing at relevant scales. 
A final point on returns to scale from the cost side is that the importance of 
these can diminish not only because of technological developments, but also 
because of demand growth. Mobile telephony provides a good example. In 
rural areas, where demand is low, mobile telephony is a natural monopoly. In 
high-density urban areas, mobile telephony is probably not a natural 
monopoly. But the technology is the same in both types of regions! It is just 
that there is so much more demand in the cities. To see this, think about the 
situation when demand for mobile telephony services was low also in city 
areas, because so few individuals had handsets. 
 Network effects 
In a market without network effects, the consumer cares only about his or 
her own level of consumption (and, of course, for the price, the quality of the 
product et cetera). In a market with network effects, the consumer cares - 
directly or indirectly - also for other consumers' levels of consumption. The 
benefit each person derives from his or her consumption increases as the 
number of other consumers increases, i.e., with the size of the market or 
with the number of consumers that are connected to the same network. 
In the simplest setting, the number of other consumers of the same product 
has a direct effect on the (marginal) utility of consuming a unit of the product. 
An example would be telephones or faxes: a given consumer's utility from 
having a phone or a fax increases with the number of other consumers that 
also have phones and faxes, respectively. This type of network effect can be 
called “one-sided”. 
Sometimes consumers may only benefit from other consumers connected to 
the same network. This would be the case in a telephony market where off-
net calls are impossible. Another example would be products with 
incompatible standards, for example personal computers that cannot 
exchange files with computers of another brand. It is also possible that a 
consumer derives some benefit from consumers on other networks, but less 
than if the consumers were on the same network. This would be the case if, 
for example, it is more costly to make off-net than on-net calls, or if the 
quality of the former is lower (for example, if interruptions are more frequent). 
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A somewhat more complex situation arises when there are two types of 
agents that interact on one “platform”. Either type cares for the number of 
agents of the other type that uses the platform, but not (directly) about the 
number of agents of its own type that does so. Some examples are buyers 
and sellers in advertising markets and marketplaces for trading (e.g., stock 
markets), as well as matchmaking markets (such as dating agencies, real 
estate agents and business-to-business websites). The internet has some 
features of two-sided markets: most users of interest are mainly interested in 
accessing web pages, while some (firms and organizations, mostly) are 
mainly interested in making web pages available to the general public. 
Sometimes it makes sense to view callers as one type of agent and call 
receivers as the other type, even though all individuals sometimes make 
calls and sometimes receive calls. 
A new entrant into a telecom market that cannot interconnect with existing 
operators would face almost insurmountable entry barriers, exactly because 
its customers would not be able to benefit from network effects in this 
market. It follows that the right to terminate calls at a reasonable cost is 
essential for an operator’s ability to compete. 
 The bottleneck problem 
The telecom industry has a production structure with several vertically 
related production stages. Because economies of scale and scope vary 
between the stages, competition is more viable in some stages than in 
others. This is often illustrated as in the next figure, where only one firm can 
be active in the upstream infrastructure market, “the bottleneck”, while 
several firms can be active in the downstream market for service provision. 
For example, the upstream market can be establishing and maintaining a 
local telecom network (the local loop). The downstream market would then 
be the retail telecom services market. 
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Figure 1. The bottleneck problem 
 
 
Because of returns to scale from the cost side or from the demand side, 
there will be market power in the bottleneck stage6. By itself, this market 
power gives rise to a number of negative consequences, such as higher 
prices for consumers and too little production. However, control of the 
bottleneck can give rise to market power also in the potentially competitive 
downstream market. In many instances, turnover in the bottleneck stage is 
relatively small, compared to total turnover. For example, a third of total 
revenues from fixed telephony in Sweden come from fixed fees (subscription 
fees)7. 
According to the so-called law of one profit and given that all other 
production stages are competitive, a company that controls a key stage in 
the vertical supply chain holds as much market power and can extract as 
much profit as a firm that has monopolized all production stages of the whole 
                                                           
6  Returns to scale on the demand side are mainly related to the number of 
customers already connected to the operator, while returns to scale on the cost 
side are due to the cost of the physical infrastructure. 
7  PTS (2003). Arguably, at least some of the interconnection fees could also be 
seen as payments for the bottleneck controlled by the incumbent operator, 
TeliaSonera. For comparison, airport costs only constitute about a tenth of the 
total costs for air travel and the turnover of the central payment systems (e.g., the 
central giro and card transaction systems) is only a small fraction of total turnover 
in the retail banking market. Excluding taxes, the distribution and transmission 
costs account for more than half of the production costs for the electricity bought 
by a typical household, while this share is lower for large industrial consumers. 
See Bergman (2002). 
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industry. Depending on one’s point of reference, this is a good thing or a bad 
thing. From the consumer’s point of view, not much can be gained by 
introducing competition in the downstream stages (service provision), as 
long as the network itself is monopolized and as long as the market power of 
the owner of the bottleneck is not constrained. On the other hand, it is better 
to have a single-stage monopoly than to have a successive chain of 
monopolies and highly concentrated oligopolies, since the so-called double-
marginalization effect would result in prices even higher than the monopoly 
price. 
REGULATORY REGIMES FOR DEALING WITH BOTTLENECK 
PROBLEMS 
A number of methods have been used in industries with bottleneck problems 
(“natural monopolies”), all with their respective pros and cons, including the 
following8: 
 Unregulated monopoly. If competition from substitutes outside of 
the markets is strong or if demand for other reasons is very elastic, 
if returns to scale are large and if regulation is likely to be costly, 
then it may be a reasonable alternative to let a natural monopoly to 
be unregulated. 
 Regulated monopoly. If an unregulated monopoly is likely to result 
in an inefficient outcome (e.g., high prices), if regulation can be 
relatively efficient and if returns to scale are large – so that 
duplication is costly – then (consumer-price) regulation of a 
monopoly provider may be an alternative. 
 Government ownership. A government-owned monopoly may be an 
alternative to a privately owned regulated monopoly, in particular if 
regulation is likely to be inefficient. 
 Franchise bidding9. If an unregulated monopoly is again likely to 
result in inefficiency (high prices) and if returns to scale are large, 
then franchise bidding may be an alternative to government 
ownership or a private monopoly under traditional regulation. In 
some situations, franchise bidding is informationally less demanding 
than regulation, since the price is set in a competitive bidding 
process, rather than by a regulator. An important disadvantage, 
                                                           
8  Other alternatives are horizontal separation and infrastructural clubs; see 
Bergman, 2008, for a more extensive discussion. 
9  I.e., the government auctions the right to serve as the monopoly provider. 
Payments could go either from the government to the monopoly provider, if the 
market is unprofitable, or in the opposite direction, if the market is profitable. 
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however, is that the bidding for the franchise must be repeated 
regularly and that the limited franchise tenure will weaken the 
incentives for investments. 
 Vertical separation. Sometimes one stage of production where the 
returns to scale are particularly large can be singled out. If this is 
the case, and if at the same time an unregulated monopoly would 
result in inefficiencies, vertically (ownership) separation of that 
production stage may be a good alternative. The infrastructural 
stage can either be government owned – or privately owned and 
regulated. In fact, vertical separation may be useful to limit the 
negative consequences of regulation or government ownership. 
 Infrastructural access. If one stage of production has large returns 
to scale, but if there are also large vertical synergies, then an 
alternative to vertical separation is to require the firm that controls 
that production stage to provide access to its rivals. The drawback 
is that regulation is likely to be more costly than under vertical 
separation. 
Since all of the methods listed in this section have drawbacks, it might seem 
attractive to try to come as close as possible to the ideal competitive market. 
That means competition in infrastructure (and services). According to the 
sunset vision, infrastructure-based competition is the best long-term solution 
for the telecom industry. If returns to scale are relatively small in all 
production stages, compared to the costs of regulation, it is easy to agree. 
However, if returns to scale are substantial, matters are more complicated. 
REGULATION AND THE TELECOM MARKET 
The telecom market is, and has for a long time been, quite extensively 
regulated, although the nature of the regulation has changed dramatically. 
Government ownership of national telecom monopolies was the predominant 
regime in Western Europe before the 1990s, while in the US consumer 
prices were regulated. In recent years, the trend in most industrialized 
countries has been towards access price regulation. In some respect, this 
so-called deregulation has substantially increased the apparent quantity of 
regulation as measured, for example, by the number of paragraphs of legal 
text. However, the telecom firms’ latitude to make business decisions has 
increased, so there is some justification for using the term “deregulation”. 
Recently, we have also seen an intensification of competition in almost all 
telecom markets, driven by the entry of a large number of new firms and by a 
technological development that has lowered entry barriers and created new 
services that compete with the established ones. Against this background, it 
is perhaps natural to view the market for telecommunications as developing 
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into an “ordinary” market, where general competition rules (and other 
general legislation) will be enough to maintain competition.  
In several areas of the telecommunication market, competition in 
infrastructure has indeed developed. Due to technological progress, long-
distance connection, that used to be a natural monopoly, is now 
competitively provided. The evolution of mobile telephony has resulted in 
competing networks and there is even some competition for fixed access, in 
particular in business districts, but also more generally for broadband 
access. What does this tell us about the need for regulation? 
If the technological progress in combination with demand growth lead to a 
situation where returns to scale are no longer big enough to confer 
significant market power to the largest firms, then it may in fact be justified to 
repeal the sector-specific regulation. 
Is the conclusion, then, that infrastructure-based competition is both feasible 
and preferable to access-based competition? I argue that the conclusion is 
premature, since there still exists infrastructure that it would be inefficient to 
duplicate. One or two sets of assets have enough capacity to serve the 
whole market, for example in fixed broadband services. This suggests that 
policy makers will face a trade-off between competition and returns to scale.  
In addition, because of the special nature of the telecom market, sector-
specific regulation may be necessary even if there are multiple 
infrastructures. For example, under the 2003 EU Electronic Communication 
directive as well as under the revised recommendations for which markets 
that should be subject to ex ante regulation10, telecom operators are required 
to provide termination access at cost-based prices, no matter the number of 
competing networks. This has more to do with demand-side returns to scale 
(network effects) than the traditional supply-side returns to scale, but it still 
means that regulation is useful. 
                                                           
10 November 13, 2007, available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/proposals/rec_
markets_en.pdf 
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THE DYNAMIC EVOLUTION OF THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND 
ITS REGULATION 
While some telecom services are still characterized by returns to scale from 
the cost side or from the demand side, it is also true that the industry has 
become much more competitive over the years and that many infrastructural 
services are now competitively provided. Two prominent examples are 
mobile telephony network and long-distance voice and data traffic. 
When an industry such as the telecom industry is de-monopolised, 
competition will develop at different speeds in different segments. In most 
instances, the dynamic development of a market is best handled by the 
market itself. However, since the development in a bottleneck industry is 
dependent on the regulatory framework, the policymaker cannot completely 
sidestep the issue of where competition should first be introduced. 
For at least two reasons, it seems natural to introduce competition in service 
provision before competition is introduced in the provision of infrastructure. 
Typically, returns to scale (or density) will be larger in the provision of 
infrastructure than in service provision. Consequently, duplication will be 
more expensive in infrastructure and, relative to its costs, the returns to 
introducing competition will be smaller. Furthermore, entry into services 
market will typically be associated with smaller sunk costs. This means that if 
one or several competitors enter the market, but competition turns out not to 
be viable, much less will be lost than had they entered with their own 
infrastructure. 
The “sunset vision” presumes that competition will develop – and regulation 
will be dismantled – successively. From the start as a regulated or state-
owned monopoly, the first stage will be entry into services markets. Because 
of the bottleneck problem, the entrants need to be assisted by the 
introduction of access regulation. In the second stage, the entrants will begin 
building their own infrastructure, but the market structure will still be 
asymmetric (one firm will be dominant). In this stage, there must still be 
regulation, but it need not be as stringent as before. In the third stage, the 
market has become more symmetric and the industry is no longer dominated 
by a single firm. In this stage, sector-specific regulation can – or so it is 
presumed – be dismantled11. 
                                                           
11  This is perhaps a “telecom-centric” view of regulation. Entry into the tv market has 
typically been associated with the development of competing infrastructure, while 
nobody expects entrants into the markets for electricity or railway traffic to build 
their own infrastructure. 
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Full-blown facilities-based competition, the third and final stage, potentially 
has the advantage that no regulation is needed and, consequently, that the 
otherwise inevitable costs of regulation can be avoided. These costs include 
regulatory capture (the risk that the regulators favour the industry, rather 
than consumers or welfare), regulatory risk (the risk that the regulators over-
emphasize short-run competition and therefore reduces access prices so 
that investment costs cannot be recovered) and bureaucracy costs. 
However, there are at least four problems with the above view. The first and 
most obvious problem is that when there are substantial returns to scale, 
facilities-based competition means wasteful duplication. Sometimes, 
technological development or demand growth leads to a situation where 
duplication is feasible or perhaps even necessary. Sometimes the extra cost 
of duplication is worth incurring, because the benefits of competition 
throughout the whole “value chain” are so large. But sometimes economies 
of scale are large enough for them to be the primary concern, even if that 
means that one has to live with a less-than-perfect regulation of the 
monopoly bottleneck. This is likely to be the case for some infrastructural 
services, such as the local loop or fibre-to-the-household, for the foreseeable 
future. 
The second problem is that in industries where interconnection is essential, 
such as the telecom industry, it is not necessarily true that regulation can be 
dismantled when returns to scale from the cost side are no longer important. 
In order to realise network benefits, subscribers must be able to make off-net 
calls. If the infrastructure is owned by two or more firms, this means that 
there must be two-way access – and probably also two-way access 
regulation. In markets with relatively symmetric firms, two-way access will 
tend to arise spontaneously, but there is a risk that the access agreements 
will be anticompetitive, so that they create incentives for high retail prices. In 
less symmetric markets, large firms may have incentives to foreclose – i.e., 
not interconnect with – smaller rivals. It should also be noted that 
interconnection for termination is more problematic than interconnection for 
origination. There is direct competition between firms that offer origination – 
i.e., phone services. The customer can chose between operators on the 
basis of price and quality of service. On the other hand, the active (calling 
and paying) party cannot chose on which network a given call should be 
terminated. Unless the receiving party cares for the welfare of the calling 
party – or fears receiving few calls – there is no incentive for the receiving 
party to be concerned with the termination fees. This means that competition 
will not be effective in reducing termination charges. The asymmetry 
between interconnection for termination and interconnection for origination is 
reflected in the E-com directive, where the obligations laid on an operator 
are independent of the operator’s market share in the termination market, 
but proportionate to the origination market shares. 
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The third problem with the “sunset proposal” is that the process towards 
balanced facilities-based competition is not an automatic one. Clearly, the 
choice of access regimes in the first two stages referred to above will 
influence the development of competitive infrastructure. If the (one-way) 
access regime is “stringent” (favourable for the entrants), they will have little 
incentives to build their own infrastructure. If, on the other hand, the access 
regime is not stringent, there may be no entry at all. Possibly, a well-
balanced regulation will result in a situation where facilities-based 
competition develops over time, but it is likely that for this to happen, the 
regulator must make active decisions. One example would be access prices 
that rise over time. Then, it would initially be advantageous to enter the 
services market. With time, however, it will become more and more 
advantageous also to invest in infrastructure and less and less 
advantageous to be active in the services markets only. Obviously, this kind 
of active policies requires the policy maker to be informed about the 
desirability of duplication, which in turn requires explicit or implicit estimates 
of scale economies, of the benefits of competition and of regulatory costs. A 
policy that that leans too much in favour of competition in infrastructure may 
result in too much duplication or, alternatively, in too little entry and too high 
prices. Conversely, a policy that unduly favours competition in services may 
result in too little facilities-based entry and too little investment by the 
incumbent. 
The fourth problem with the “sunset proposal” is that free-entry facilities-
based competition may conflict with concerns for universal service. The new 
entrants will focus on low-cost high-demand customers, such as densely 
populated areas and big commercial customers. The incumbent will then be 
left with high-cost low-demand customers, with an associated access deficit. 
There are methods to address the USO problem, but since all regulation will 
inevitably result in some distortions of incentives, there will be costs 
associated with these methods too. 
In the economic literature, a number of regulatory schemes have been 
proposed to deal with at least some of these concerns. For a more extensive 
discussion of these, the reader is referred to the report on which this article 
is based, but a few aspects of four of the most prominent schemes will be 
mentioned here. 
According to the Efficient Component Pricing (or ECP) scheme, the access 
price should be set so that it is equally profitable for the incumbent to sell 
access services as to provide the final customers directly. This is achieved – 
in the simple case – by setting an access price equal to the retail price minus 
the incumbent’s retail costs. The scheme gives the entrant correct incentives 
to enter the retail market and it gives the incumbent correct incentives to 
provide access. However, it can create incentives for excessive duplication 
of the infrastructure and it does not necessarily lower retail prices much 
below the monopoly level. 
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To address these shortcomings, Laffont & Tirole (2000) argue in favour of 
Global Price Caps. The idea is to subject the incumbent to an average price 
cap that applies to wholesale (infrastructural) services as well as to retail 
services. The task of the regulator will be to set the price cap, but subject to 
the price cap, all prices will be set by the incumbent. Free to set prices, the 
incumbent will have incentives to implement a socially optimal price 
structure, although the level may be too high. If the price cap as set at the 
appropriate level, however, the incumbent will have the power to extract 
enough profits to cover the access deficit and meet possible Universal 
Service Obligations, while at the same time the price cap will prevent it from 
setting prices higher than necessary. Hence, in contrast to the ECP scheme, 
global price caps can provide substantial gains to the consumers. Just as 
under the ECP scheme, the incumbent has the correct incentives to provide 
access to rivals, at least in the short run, but a potential problem is that the 
incumbent is given the possibility (if not the incentive) to eliminate rivals via a 
price squeeze. 
Armstrong (2002) argues strongly that policy makers should make greater 
use of output taxes, levied on incumbents and entrants alike, in order to 
increase efficiency. The main difference between an output tax and an 
access fee is that the former has to be paid irrespective of whether the 
operator uses its own infrastructure or infrastructure owned by someone 
else, while access fees will only have to be paid in the latter case. The main 
advantage of introducing output taxes is that they give the regulator one 
more “instrument” to achieve efficiency, in particular when the regulator (or 
the legislator) simultaneously pursues other objectives than pure efficiency, 
such as universal service. Output taxes will then, in fact, be fees to fund 
universal-service obligations. 
Finally, Cave & Vogelsang (2003) have proposed the use of an escalating 
access price scheme. The idea is that access prices should rise over time, in 
order to stimulate competition in infrastructure. Initially, entrants are likely to 
rely on access, but competitive investments in infrastructure will become 
successively more profitable. Although the scheme has its merits and in 
some respects conforms with the sunset vision, it may seem like a 
theoretical notion, given that regulated access prices have historically 
declined. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The choice between competition in services and infrastructure-based 
competition is a complex one. At the bottom lies the choice between the 
benefits of free competition and the benefits of returns to scale. 
Infrastructure-based competition potentially offers less regulation and, 
hence, less regulation-induced inefficiencies. Service-based competition, on 
the other hand, allows the industry to realize greater returns to scale. The 
technological development has reduced returns to scale in infrastructure, but 
some infrastructural services are still natural monopolies. In addition, 
regulation is sometimes needed because of returns to scale on the demand 
side (network effects); one example is regulation of call termination. Which 
choice is the optimal cannot be deduced in the abstract.  
One conclusion of this paper is that the vision of a “sunset” for telecom 
regulation may be at least partially misleading. According to this vision, to 
which the EU Commission has alluded in the process of launching the E-
com directive, sector-specific telecom regulation will eventually become 
unnecessary: when facilities-based competition has evolved, general 
competition rules will be sufficient. However, it seems likely that some 
supply-side returns to scale will persist and even more likely that demand-
side effects will continue to require regulation. For example, regulation of call 
origination is still recommended by the EU Commission for the fixed network 
(presumably because of supply-side returns to scale) and there is no sign of 
the regulation of call termination being repealed, presumably because of the 
large network effects. Consistent with the sunset vision, while the 2003 
package recommended ex-ante regulation of access for origination on all 
networks, also mobile networks, the 2007 recommendation no longer 
suggests access regulation for origination on networks for mobile telephony. 
This represents an important shift in policy, from a focus on short-run 
competition towards a focus on investment incentives. 
This brings us to another conclusion, by no ways novel: regulation must be 
designed so as not to distort investment incentives. In particular, this 
suggests that while strict access regimes to old monopoly networks may be 
warranted, one must be careful not to impose too strict access regimes on 
networks that have been built under competition. In the on-going revisions, a 
major challenge will be in balancing these two concerns for next-generation 
fixed networks for broadband services. To what extent should incumbent 
operators be given strong incentives to upgrade their networks – perhaps by 
being given “regulatory holidays” – and to what extent should regulation be 
used to limit the advantage these operators still have from their legacy 
networks? There is no obvious answer to this question – and no simple 
answer is provided in the regulatory reform proposal. Instead, the proposal 
recognises that a good answer requires a careful balancing of the benefits of 
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good investment incentives and appropriate measures to control the market 
power that legacy networks create. 
More generally, there is no regulatory panacea for natural monopolies. 
Regulation will always lead to inefficiencies and all regulatory schemes have 
their weaknesses. In the presence of market power, abstaining from 
regulation is not a solution either, since the absence of regulation will result 
in other inefficiencies. There is never a perfect policy, only a “least bad” one, 
and even that may be elusive. At first glance, facilities-based competition 
may appear to be the Columbi egg of natural monopolies. A closer look, 
however, reveals that this method is also imperfect, for the simple reason 
that duplication is sometimes just too costly, but also because of more 
complex reasons related to the substantial network effects that exist in the 
telecom market. But it is important to remember that regulation is the 
exception and that often the cost of duplication is worth incurring, because it 
makes competition more intense and because it reduces the regulatory 
burden. 
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Abstract: During the past few years, a debate has erupted on the theory of ‘the ladder 
of investment’ in the broadband access area. The ladder of investment theory says 
that the entry of players onto the market takes place step-wise (‘rung-wise’) and that 
players will enter the market in the areas where barriers to entry are low and then, 
later in the process, will enter areas with higher barriers. In the telecommunications 
field, this means that new operators will first enter as service providers, who do not 
need to make as substantial up-front investments as infrastructure providers, and then 
later on move to infrastructure investments. The question is whether this is right or 
whether the theory put into practice in regulatory policy is counterproductive to the 
development of infrastructure and infrastructure competition. This is the topic of the 
present paper discussing the theory and its applicability and consequences. First, 
there is a frame-setting discussion on the theory and the environment in which it has 
developed. After this, three country cases (the UK, the US, and Denmark) are briefly 
presented with an emphasis on how these countries have approached the issue of 
facility based vs. service based competition. Third, there is an analysis and conclusion 
putting together the outcome of these case stories and the analytical framework.  
INTRODUCTION 
In Europe, during the past few years, a debate has erupted on the theory of 
‘the ladder of investment’ in the broadband access area. Not that the theory 
is confined to the broadband access area; but being an area subject to much 
focus lately and with a continued dominant position of the incumbent fixed 
line operators, the discussion has centered on broadband access. 
The ladder of investment theory says that the entry of players onto the 
market takes place step-wise (‘rung-wise’) and that players will enter the 
market in the areas where barriers to entry are low and then, later in the 
process – when they have established themselves on the market – will enter 
areas with higher barriers. In the telecommunications field, this means that 
new operators will first enter as service providers, who do not need to make 
                                                           
12  This paper is an edited and shortened version of a paper presented at the 16th 
Biennial ITS conference in Beijing, China, on 12-16 June 2006. 
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as substantial up-front investments as infrastructure providers, and then later 
on move to infrastructure investments.  
This constitutes the general aspect of the theory and applies to markets in 
general: it is based on the concept of barriers to entry and can empirically be 
witnessed in a great deal of markets. The more special aspect regarding 
telecommunications is that telecommunications has come from a situation 
with legal monopolies: that the incumbents still dominate after the 
liberalization of markets and that there is a political sentiment that this is 
counterproductive to the development of telecommunications and, therefore, 
not acceptable – even though quasi-monopolies also are known from other 
markets. Especially the access networks constitute a problem, as they are 
difficult to replicate in a competitive manner. Therefore, regulation is 
necessary – is the argument. Regulation thus becomes part of the ladder 
concept in the sense that regulation must help alternative operators to enter 
the market so that they can start climbing ‘the ladder of investment’. 
There are basically two camps in the discussion. In the one camp, one finds 
the incumbent fixed line operators and their European organization, ETNO 
(European Telecommunications Network Operators’ Association). They 
believe that the theory of the ladder of investment is harmful, that there 
should be less network access regulation (and regulation in general), and 
that facility- (infrastructure)13 based competition should be given priority over 
service-based competition. In the other camp, one finds the operators that 
use the networks of the incumbents to get access to end users and their 
European organisation, ECTA (European Competitive Telecommunications 
Association). They believe that the ladder of investment theory is useful, that 
network access regulation is necessary to secure competition, and that 
service-based competition is one of the ways to stimulate alternative access. 
The fact that the arguments put forward are somnambulistically predictable 
does, however, not means that they are unreasonable and not worth 
discussing. But it is important to note the vested interests in the different 
positions, and the question is whether there is a ‘right’ position from a 
societal point of view. 
Can it be determined whether the ladder of investment theory is helpful from 
a societal viewpoint? This is the topic of the present paper discussing the 
theory and its applicability and consequences. First, there is a frame-setting 
discussion on the theory and the environment in which it has developed. 
After this, three country cases (the UK, the US, and Denmark) are briefly 
presented with an emphasis on how these countries have approached the 
issue of facility based vs. service-based competition. Third, there is an 
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analysis and conclusion putting together the outcome of these case stories 
and the analytical framework.  
THEORY FRAMEWORK 
The texts most often referred to when discussing the theory of the ladder of 
investment are written by Martin Cave (and co-authors)14. The basic idea is 
that entry of alternative operators is easier in some parts of the value 
networks of supply than in others, i.e. there is a difference in the degree of 
replicability – or barriers to entry. As stated by Cave: ‘replicability is not a 
simple binary variable’15, and a differentiation must be made between more 
or less replicable assets. It is, for instance, easier to replicate access to an 
IP network than replicating a local loop. And, to illustrate the matter, Cave 
presents a ladder of replicability of assets, going from retailing, IP network, 
backhaul, DSLAM and ending with local loop16. 
The concept of the ladder of investment is strongly supported by the 
European organisation for competitive telecommunications operators, ECTA. 
In a document from 2005, ‘ECTA concludes that if action is taken by 
regulators to promote competition by providing certainty about the ladder of 
investment, improving the product offerings available to competitors and 
combating discrimination by the incumbents in favour of their own broadband 
retail offers, there should be further scope to increase choice for consumers 
and boost broadband penetration’17. In their mind, there is no doubt that the 
implementation of the ladder of investment in regulatory provisions is 
beneficial to society – not to mention their own interests. ECTA emphasises 
the promotion of competition, the choice for consumers between operators, 
and broadband penetration. 
ETNO, the European organisation for incumbent fixed line network 
operators, on the other hand, is convinced that ‘the ladder concept does not 
create the prospect for increased investment in next generation access 
infrastructures and inter-platform competition in Europe’18. Again, there is no 
doubt that the critique of the ladder concept serves the interests of the fixed 
line incumbent network operators. But they also have an argument viewing 
the matter from a societal point of view, namely that the ladder concept, in 
their opinion, is counterproductive for investments and for the establishment 
                                                           
14 For instance, Cave & Prosperetti (2001), Cave & Vogelsang (2003), Cave (2004). 
15  Cave (2004) p. 8. 
16  Ibid. p. 20. 
17  ECTA (2005). p. 2. 
18  ETNO (2005), p.1. 
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of inter-modal competition. Who wants to make costly and risky investments 
if the new access infrastructures are accessible for all other operators, is the 
argument. 
From the regulatory side, the theory of the ladder of investment concept 
largely finds support. The European Regulators Group for electronic 
communication networks and services (ERG) has in different documents 
expressed a positive attitude towards using the concept19. In the same vein 
of cynicism as with respect to the ECTA and ETNO positions, one could see 
this as an expression of the potentially many regulatory activities involved in 
using the ladder of investment concept. However, it is much more productive 
to see it as part of the larger regulatory legacy and concept of 
telecommunications regulation in Europe. The Open Network Provision 
(ONP) policy, which was developed, at first, when liberalising the 
telecommunications markets in Europe, was largely based on a competitive 
model with service competition as the primary form of competition – which 
was quite understandable taking into consideration that the European 
telecommunications markets (as elsewhere) came from a monopoly situation 
and that the incumbents were in possession of almost all access paths. 
As compared to the former ONP based regulation, the present EU regulatory 
framework implemented in 2003 is more focused on infrastructure 
competition, and the tendency is, furthermore, to limit sector specific 
regulation where it is considered possible. The trend is thus towards 
infrastructure-based competition, and the position of the incumbent fixed line 
network operators can best be understood as a further pressure in this 
direction and a concern that the process is not moving fast enough. It would 
be difficult to defend the position that regulation in the EU with the existing 
regulatory framework is heading in direction of more service competition and 
that the ladder concept is an expression of such a direction. The whole idea 
in the ladder concept is to move competition towards infrastructure-based 
competition – maybe not fast enough, but the direction is clear. 
With the latest propositions (2007) from the European Commission20 to 
change the regulatory framework, the concept of functional separation is 
introduced. As opposed to structural separation, functional separation does 
not mean an ownership separation of incumbent operators. It means that the 
infrastructure part and the service part are separated accounting-wise and 
management-wise. Such a separation can be seen to promote service 
competition, as the purpose would be to help create a level playing field for 
all operators offering services on the basis of the infrastructure of the 
                                                           
19  ERG (2004), ERG (2005). 
20 See European Commission, “Legislative proposals”  
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/proposals/index:en.h
tm  
Infrastructure versus Service-based Competition: the Case of Mobile Telecommunications 
- 37 – 
 
incumbent including the incumbent itself. From the part of the European 
Commission, however, functional separation is only foreseen to be a last-
resort regulatory tool – if nothing else works. 
In a paper from 200421, Alison Oldale and A. Jorge Padilla strongly oppose 
the investment ladder theory and their major claim is that the proponents of 
the ladder theory do not see any contradiction between service and 
infrastructure competition: the ladder reconciles the trade-off between 
service and infrastructure competition – as they state it22. Their point of view 
is that if service competition is made attractive for alternative operators, they 
will not invest in their own infrastructure, and the incentive for existing 
operators to upgrade their networks will be lowered. They, therefore, believe 
that service-based competition leads to a kind of static efficiency while 
infrastructure competition leads to dynamic efficiency. 
Their major contention, though, is related to the regulatory presumptions that 
they see behind the ladder of investment theory. As the regulatory idea in 
the ladder theory is that regulators should create incentives for operators to 
climb up the ladder, Oldale & Padilla state that this must hinge on, first, a 
presumption of regulatory omnipotence and, secondly, a presumption 
regarding the sustainability of a fragmented market. With respect to 
regulatory omnipotence, their point is that intervention in the market, if it is to 
have positive effects, requires an optimistic view of the resources, 
information and competence available to regulators23. Regarding sustainable 
fragmentation, the issue is that they believe access based competition will 
lead to a fragmented market and that this will require perpetual regulation24. 
The question is whether these alleged presumptions really characterise the 
ladder theory. One will hardly find any proponent of the ladder concept who 
will subscribe to the opinion that regulators are omnipotent. The point of view 
is that there are problems in the markets (e.g. dominance) that need to be 
rectified by means of regulatory intervention in spite of regulatory failures 
partly caused by lack of resources, information and competence. The point 
regarding perpetual regulation as a result of fragmented markets is only valid 
if it is accepted that there will not be a move towards forms of competition 
involving an increasing degree of infrastructure assets and that the 
implementation of the ladder concept fixates the market in a service-based 
competition mode. This is one of the main controversies in the debates on 
the ladder of investment. On the one hand – Oldale & Padilla, for instance – 
take the position that there is a clear trade-off between access based entry 
                                                           
21  Oldale & Padilla (2004). 
22  Ibid. p. 69. 
23  Ibid. p. 71. 
24  Ibid. p. 73. 
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and a sustainable facility based competition. Cave, on the other hand, 
makes the point that it is not a binary choice, but that there are intermediary 
stages between pure service-based competition and pure infrastructure-
based competition. This controversy, however, cannot be finally settled at a 
purely theoretical level. The following section will, therefore, look into the 
actual developments in three national markets, the UK, the US, and 
Denmark. 
COUNTRY CASES 
 United Kingdom 
The UK was among the first of countries to embark on a policy of 
liberalisation in the telecommunications area. There was a duopoly period 
from 1984 to 1991, which was followed by a period up to 1997, where the 
market was opened to further competition. Both periods can be seen as 
having an emphasis on infrastructure competition. Since 1997, there has 
been more focus on service competition and a more balanced approach to 
encouraging infrastructure as well as service competition25. The UK has thus 
been seen as the country in Europe with most focus on infrastructure 
competition but has moved towards the European ‘mid-field’ trying to 
promote different kinds of competition on the market at the same time. 
In the ‘Strategic review of telecommunications – phase 2 consultation 
document’ from 2004, OFCOM suggested 7 regulatory principles26:  
 Promote competition at the deepest levels of infrastructure where it 
will be effective and sustainable. 
 Focus regulation to deliver equality of access beyond those levels 
 As soon as competitive conditions allow, withdraw from regulation 
at other levels. 
 Promote a favourable climate for efficient and timely investment and 
stimulate innovation. 
 Accommodate varying regulatory solutions for different products 
 Create scope for market entry which could, over time, remove 
economic bottlenecks. 
                                                           
25  Whalley (2005), p. 136. 
26  Whalley (2005), p. 138. 
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 Adopt light-touch economic regulation based on competition law 
and the promotion of interoperability, unless there are enduring 
economic bottlenecks. 
 
These seven principles very well exemplify the balanced ‘mid-field’ approach 
that OFCOM has chosen to take regarding promoting broadband 
competition: Encouraging infrastructure competition where possible and 
creating a level playing field with equality of access. 
 USA 
In 1996, the Telecommunications Act was introduced in the US with the clear 
aim to enhance and introduce new competition in telecommunications 
provision. Three forms of competition were envisioned: facility-based 
competition, service-based competition, and unbundling as a hybrid, where 
operators purchase components from the incumbents and combine them 
with own their facilities. The latter two forms were seen as transitory and the 
first as representing the real competitive situation. From this, it is quite clear 
that the intention of the 1996 Act was to stimulate facility based competition 
as the long term solution and enable the two other forms through regulatory 
measures on a market with high barriers to entry.  
From 1999, as competitive conditions in the US became more difficult as a 
result of the telecommunications collapse, the FCC expanded the 
unbundling to include leasing by competitors of the incumbents’ entire local 
service - known as UNE-P (Unbundled Network Elements Platform) - based 
on TELRIC (Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost) prices. The result 
was that infrastructure-based competition stagnated while the proportion of 
lines based on UNE-P came to account for nearly half the total27. 
UNE-P thus became the preferred market entry method, but there seems to 
be general agreement that the system influenced unfavourably the 
development of broadband and advanced networks in the US compared to, 
e.g., countries in Europe and Korea and Japan that have taken the lead in 
this development28. The argument is that TELRIC has disadvantaged the 
incumbents and, therefore, weakened them as potential investors in 
advanced infrastructures. 
In 2005, an Order was released by the FCC that redefined the unbundling 
obligations of the incumbents and drastically reduced these obligations 
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especially in relation to advanced networks. Also, the incumbents were to a 
great extent allowed to charge market prices for the network elements 
leading to prices typically 300-500 % above the TELRIC prices29.  
 Denmark 
While Denmark in the first phases of the telecommunications liberalisation 
processes in Europe was not to be found among the first-movers, the Danish 
government and parliament made a turn in 1994/1995 and decided to 
liberalise the Danish telecommunications sector one and a half year ahead 
of the EU 1998 deadline, i.e. in the summer of 1996. The slogan and title of 
the policy document constituting the basis for the Danish liberalisation 
process was ‘Best and cheapest by way of real competition’30. Focus was on 
promoting competition as fast as possible, and service competition was seen 
as the most feasible way to get started. 
In 1999, a policy agreement was made in parliament with the most important 
goal being to ‘promote access to the network society’ and the most important 
means being to ‘increase competition in the access market’31. 
Simultaneously, the Danish NRA started promoting the idea of ‘several pipes 
to the home’, pointing not only to the variety of different technologies, which 
can be used for accessing telecommunications services, but also to the 
importance of access infrastructure competition.  
It would be a misinterpretation to conclude that priority has been given to 
infrastructure access competition since 1999. It is more correct to say that 
both kinds of access competition have been promoted and that the policy 
has been to ‘walk on two legs’ - although this expression has never been 
used.  
In a status on the development of broadband access in Denmark it is 
emphasized that ‘the national broadband strategy is based on a market-
driven infrastructure development, facilitated by an opening of access to 
competitors through interconnection agreements and by encouraging rollout 
of several, open and competing broadband access “pipes to the home”’ (our 
italics)32.  
                                                           
29  Bauer (2005), p. 157. 
30  Ministry of Research (1995), “Best and cheapest by way of real competition”.  
31  Telepolitisk aftale (1999). 
32  National IT and Telecom Agency (2004) “Mapping of Broadband Access Services 
in Denmark –Status by mid-2004”, December, p. 2. 
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An overall strategy in the field of infrastructure vs. service competition has 
never been explicitly formulated by the political and regulatory authorities in 
Denmark. Statements concerning the necessity of supporting competition in 
the infrastructure as well as the service fields are common and the 
importance of infrastructure competition as a more sustainable form of 
competition in the long run, decreasing the need for sector specific 
regulation, is recognised. But there is no overall priority given to 
infrastructure competition, and positions have not been taken on the issue, 
e.g., as to whether the promotion of service competition is a barrier to 
infrastructure competition or can be seen as a stepping stone towards 
infrastructure competition. The Danish policy and regulatory approach in the 
field can be characterised as pragmatic, promoting infrastructure competition 
when this is seen as possible and advantageous but also seeking to support 
service competition, making it possible for competitive suppliers to gain 
market shares.  
ANALYSIS 
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence presented in this paper – the three 
case stories – is not more conclusive than the theoretical discussion33. The 
development in the UK is a case story of a country that moved from a strict 
focus on infrastructure competition towards putting more emphasis on 
service competition. The US, on the other hand, has moved in the opposite 
direction. Whilst the Telecommunications Act from 1996, indeed, had a 
primary emphasis on infrastructure competition, the focus changed around 
the turn of the century as a result of the crisis in the telecommunications 
industry and the FCC decision to include the leasing of the incumbents’ 
entire local service into the unbundling requirements. This tipped the marked 
in favour of service-based competition, and the FCC has lately changed the 
unbundling policy in order to promote infrastructure-based competition. 
Denmark, finally, is an example of a country which has tried to balance the 
promotion of service and infrastructure-based competition – as the UK also 
has done in recent years.  
One obvious conclusion is that there are many different ways to expand 
broadband take-up. It depends on the specific national contexts including the 
stage and kind of development hitherto experienced. In the UK, the policy 
had to be adjusted, as the strong focus on infrastructure competition had led 
to a slower broadband diffusion than in comparable countries. In the US, the 
policy had to be adjusted in the other direction taking into consideration that 
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at documenting the advantages of implementing a ladder of investment approach, 
but the evidence presented is not conclusive. 
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the UNE-P policy had led to a halt in infrastructure competition. There is, 
therefore, no one correct broadband access policy and countries that 
canonise one kind of policy will be likely to encounter serious problems if 
policies are not adjusted to the specific circumstances.  
For a period of time, it was mostly the ladder concept being canonised. It has 
a strong appeal, as it is easily understandable and seems to promise a 
simple formula for success. This, in itself, must lead to scepticism. However, 
there is no doubt that a ‘ladder-driven’ policy starting from the lowest rungs 
of the ladder with an emphasis on service competition, in most cases, gives 
a faster growth in competitors’ market shares. In all probability, it therefore 
also provides a faster take-up of broadband access, as there will be a 
pressure on reaching customers and on lowering prices.  
What is the problem in this? One problem can be lower investments in new 
infrastructure - as stated by the opponents of the ladder theory. There will be 
operators considering investing in alternative infrastructures who will hold 
back their investments if they cannot recoup their investments sufficiently 
fast when prices are low because of service competition. On the other hand, 
if there is no immediate likelihood that alternative infrastructure investments 
will be made, it is better to kick-start the market by introducing attractive 
offers for alternative service providers.  
This is the balance that has to be struck, and if one has no trust in the 
potential positive outcomes of regulatory intervention (as in the case of 
Oldale and Padilla 2004), the obvious conclusion is not to promote service-
based competition, as it cannot, in this understanding, be determined when it 
is right to adjust the policy. Even if it is admitted that regulators may have 
understood correctly when to intervene in order to move the market to higher 
rungs of the ladder of investment, it creates an uncertainty for service 
providers if they cannot count on the continued existence of the market 
conditions on which they made their market entry – which is why ECTA 
emphasises ‘providing certainty about the ladder of investment’ (out italics).  
It, therefore, comes down to trust or lack of trust in the positive outcomes of 
regulatory interventions. If there is no trust in regulatory intervention in 
general, there can be no trust either in regulatory interventions based on a 
ladder of investment concept. But there are two other aspects that have to 
be considered when determining the usefulness of the ladder concept. The 
first thing is that even though a simple interpretation of the ladder concept 
assumes that operators, as time goes by and as they are led in an upwards 
direction, will climb up the ladder, there will in fact often be operators staring 
from all ‘rungs of the ladder’. Some companies will, at any rate, focus on 
infrastructure competition and will not consider being service providers. This 
applies, for instance, to electricity utilities. Other companies will only very 
reluctantly move up the ladder, as their whole market strategy is service-
based. A too simplistic view on the market, which does not consider the 
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fundamental differences in strategies of companies, will fail to understand 
the possibilities in a multi-tiered (multi-rung) regulatory policy. It is, as 
emphasised by Cave, not a binary choice. 
Secondly, and from a different perspective than merely a competition based 
discussion, the infrastructures of the incumbents can also be considered as 
societal infrastructures that should be at some kind of disposal of different 
service providers in society. From this perspective, the discussion on access 
to network infrastructures resembles a number of other similar discussions 
on the advantages of private property vs. the benefits of shared access to 
societal resources. A case in point deals with software patents. Should 
software patents and the kind of private property rules that they entail be 
promoted or should software patents be disallowed and a greater degree of 
shared use of software be supported? Just as inconclusive as this 
discussion, is the discussion in the present paper regarding the societal 
benefits of the promotion of service competition and the ladder of investment 
concept. The interest of the different market players is clear. However, the 
societal level is less obvious. 
CONCLUSION 
The paper examines the issue of service and/or infrastructure competition in 
light of the ‘ladder of investment’ concept. Emphasis is on the arguments in 
favour of service and/or infrastructure competition when discussing the 
development of access competition. Furthermore, country cases are 
included as illustrations of differences in development paths.  
The opponents of the ladder concept have taken a very fundamentalist view 
on service and infrastructure competition: Service competition is seen as a 
substitute for infrastructure competition and not as a complement. The 
proponents of the theory, on the other hand, recognise that infrastructure 
competition is more sustainable than service competition, but believe that 
ways into building up competition must be established in a situation where it 
is difficult for alternative operators to enter the market in direct infrastructure 
competition with the incumbents.  
The incumbent operators have the strongest case with respect to new 
infrastructures. Even if incumbents get their costs covered (using appropriate 
costing methods), there will still be an investment risk, which is not taken into 
consideration and which may hold back investments if the potential 
competitive advantages cannot be retained. The case is much weaker 
regarding legacy networks, which can be considered as societal 
infrastructures which should be open to all service operators. When 
differentiating the regulation of new and old infrastructures, there will also be 
an incentive for incumbent operators to invest in new infrastructures. The 
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intentions of promoting competition and penetration as well as investment 
and innovation can thus, to some extent, be reconciled.  
The other argument against the ladder concept is that it presupposes a level 
of information and competencies at the regulatory institutions that does not 
exist. The twists and turns of the regulatory policies, having been witnessed 
in the UK and the US, could be taken as proof of the impossibility of 
consistent regulatory interventions. However, they can also be seen as 
evidence of the ability to adjust to the ever changing developments. Not that 
the UNE-P policy in the US and the former one-sided focus on infrastructure 
competition in the UK should be seen as appropriate policies in their specific 
situations. They are most likely cases of regulatory failures. Furthermore, 
they are a warning against canonising a specific policy and establishing it as 
an eternal ‘truth’. It is, for instance, difficult to see how an entirely 
infrastructure-based competition policy would have led to a situation in the 
broadband access markets with more competition, higher penetration, more 
investments, and more innovation. And, it is also difficult to see that this will 
be the case in the immediately coming years.  
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Abstract: Unbundling of the local loop (ULL) has seen different "success stories" 
across Europe. Although the obligation for the provision of ULL was early implemented 
in the regulatory framework national, implementation has been heterogeneous. 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) wondered whether to foster service-based or 
infrastructure-based competition. This paper analyses whether the strategies of NRAs 
have had any effect on the economic welfare. It indicates that infrastructure-based 
competition is important for business customers and has a positive effect on 
innovation. Service-based competition lowers call prices and is more important for 
residential markets. The study points out the importance of a balanced approach to 
both types of policies. 
INTRODUCTION AND TYPES OF COMPETITION  
The issue researched in this paper goes back to the questions discussed 
when markets for telecommunications services were opened up, namely 
what kind of competition delivers more favourable results: infrastructure or 
service-based competition?  
Regulatory policies in numerous countries have developed in very different 
ways. The US started with unbundling local loops (ULL)34 rather early and 
introduced also service-based competition35. European countries followed an 
almost joint approach to market opening with the 1998 framework36. Many 
                                                           
34  Crandall (2005), p. 7. 
35  Vogelsang (2002, 2005). 
36 See the implementation reports from the EU Commission:  
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/implementation/ 
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incumbents criticized market opening with service-based competition as 
arbitraging37. Access competition through ULL was compulsory only after the 
year 200038. With that step, further business models have arisen39. The 
move towards all-IP/NGN networks extends the debate today to net 
neutrality40. 
According to the European framework efficient investment in infrastructure 
shall be encouraged and innovation promoted41. This regulatory framework 
already offers several ways of fostering competition (toolbox) and regulators 
have chosen different strategies. The main point in discussions has been 
whether infrastructure or service-based competition would lead to lower 
prices, more differentiated and innovative products and improved services 
for consumers. The cost of regulation is an additional point42. 
A frequently discussed concept is the ladder of infrastructure competition, 
which argues that new entrants may enter the market based on a wholesale 
product where they only cover minor elements of the value chain (such as 
resale) and then move on to "higher rungs" of the ladder. Hence, by 
implementing this ladder, both infrastructure and service-based competition 
are promoted43. 
                                                           
37 Piepenbrock & Schuster 2003 (eds.), Anreize für Infrastrukturinvestitionen bei der 
Zusammenschaltung in der Telekommunikation. 
38 Regulation No. 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Unbundled Access to the Local Loop:  
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/regullfin-en.pdf. 
39  Cave (2004). It seems that some countries are following the approach of the 
ladder of investment. See ERG (05)23, 2005, Annex A "Country Studies":  
http://erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_05_23_broadbd_mrkt_comp_annex_a_p.pdf 
40 See Nicholls (2006), Von Schewick (2007). 
41 See, Art.8 §.2 of the Framework Directive: Directive 2002/21/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of March 7th 2002 on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework 
Directive), Official Gazette, no. L 108/33 of April 24th 2002. 
42  Ellig (2005). 
43  Vogelsang (2005), p. 58. 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In order to answer the question of the study, we first examined which 
countries followed which type of policy. This paper focuses on the EU-15 
countries (belonging to EU before May 1st, 2004) since they all had the same 
regulatory framework for a longer period of time. The categorization between 
service and infrastructure-based competition in this paper is based on the 
principle that the replication of the local loop does not make sense44 and 
therefore the last mile is a relevant differentiating factor between service and 
infrastructure-based competition45. 
We divided the countries into two different clusters based on statistics 
regarding the success of the different regulated products and the date of 
introduction for these products. 
 Group 1: infrastructure-based competition has been the main 
objective of the NRA visible in its policy and decisions. 
 Group 2: the NRA has focused on service-based competition to a 
greater extent. 
 Market development indicators 
For clustering, we look at main indicators describing the performance of 
competition in order to identify the type of policy NRAs have pursued. For 
the empirical study, it is assumed that NRA have followed intentions 
regarding service-based and infrastructure-based competition and that these 
intentions have had an impact on market development. 
The first indicator for the clustering assesses how successful infrastructure-
based competition has been by describing the competitors' markets shares 
with respect to access line competition and the proportion of service-based 
competition (resale and bit-stream access) of all wholesale products. 
                                                           
44  Cave (2004) p.8. This assumption may be debated in light of the NGN discussion 
(see Von Schewick 2007) and the development of competition in the USA in 
recent years after major parts of the unbundling regime was abolished (see 
Crandall 2005). 
45  This demarcation is often contested. The Danish regulator, considers only the full 
replication of the whole infrastructure including the last mile as infrastructure-
based competition. See: Henten & Skouby (2005), p. 2. 
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The second indicator uses the competitors' market shares of local loops 
(both, line sharing and fully unbundled loops) and the market shares of all 
competitors in broadband markets (measuring the success of competitors).  
The third indicator measures the success of competitors in broadband 
markets in relation to their share of the retail market. By looking at the 
proportion of infrastructure-based competition and thereby excluding CATV, 
the same analysis can be conducted for the DSL-market only, which gives 
us the fourth indicator. 
 Regulatory policy indicators 
Secondly, we examined the date at which different wholesale products were 
introduced. We used the dates of introduction of ULL and carrier 
(pre)selection services as the fifth indicator.  
 Results of the quantitative clustering 
Summing up the different indicators described above gives the following 
clustering of the countries (see also Annex I for detailed figures)46. 
 
Table 1. Topology of national regimes 
Infrastructure-based policy Service-based policy 
Germany Austria 
Denmark Spain 
France Italy 
Netherlands Ireland 
Sweden UK 
Finland  
 
                                                           
46  Four countries (Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece) had to be excluded 
as the outcome was not clear. 
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THE EFFECTS OF REGULATORY POLICY ON THE 
COMPETITION SITUATION 
 Price and penetration as measurements of competition and 
innovation 
The main aim of liberalization in the EU was to increase overall welfare 
through lower prices, enhanced consumer choice, innovative products, 
etc.47. Therefore, we examined the welfare effects measured by the state of 
competition, which is defined through the price situation. This is based on 
the assumption that more competition reduces prices in the market.  
Competition can also increase consumer welfare without reducing prices. 
This is achieved by innovation. We assume that innovation and penetration 
rates of new services and technologies correlate48. Therefore, we measured 
innovation by the penetration rates of broadband uptake, as well as the 
uptake of ISDN49.  
The statistical method chosen is the heteroscedastic t-test50, as the variance 
of the two clusters have different values for the variances.  
 Effects on competition and innovation 
Based on the indicators for penetration rates, price competition, price 
development from 2000-2004, the outcomes on competition and innovation 
were calculated. The results are shown in the tables in Annex.  
We conclude that prices are lower in those countries with predominantly 
infrastructure-based competition51. Furthermore, there are higher penetration 
rates on average in countries with infrastructure-based regulatory policies. 
                                                           
47  Commission Staff Working Document, "Europe's Liberalised Telecommunications 
Market - A Guide to the Rules of the Game", from October 18th 2000.  
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/info-soc/telecompolicy/en/userguide-en.pdf 
48  See, for example, McNary (2001), ERG (2005b). 
49  See, for example, Von Schewick with respect to different forms of innovation and 
their assessment with regard to the discussion on network neutrality. 
50  Confer to http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/stathome.html.  
51  Remark: the variances are relatively large due to the small sample. However, by 
comparing the means and the variances, the results are strong and, in several 
cases, achieve a confidence interval of 95%. So, the results are to be seen as 
significant. 
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These results are only significant for broadband markets, but not for ISDN52. 
In addition, the pricing effects are more significant for the business 
customers in countries with infrastructure-based competition. 
With regard to price levels in 2004, these are lower in countries with 
infrastructure-based policies. The results, however, are not significant for the 
residential baskets. The differences between the clusters are especially high 
for business customers. 
 
Result 1:  Countries with predominantly infrastructure-based competition 
have lower overall prices and thereby more innovation.  
Result 2:  Analysis of penetration rates tends to indicate that infrastructure-
based policies foster higher penetration rates.  
Result 3:  There is an indication that infrastructure-based competition is of 
greater importance to business customers than to residential 
customers. 
 
When looking at the prices in 2005, however, the results are no longer 
significant. Prices do level off, especially for residential customers, but also 
for business customers. The changes that took place between 2004 and 
2005 are elements of a long-term process. Hence, a trend towards price 
harmonization did emerge between the two clusters during the period 2000 
to 2005 – although not all results are significant.  
 
Result 4:  Price differences between countries are diminishing in Europe – 
irrespective of the main competition form. 
 
In the period 2000 to 2004, the monthly rental went up by almost 30% on 
average in countries with service-based competition, while prices in 
countries with regulation focusing on infrastructure-based competition 
increased by only 3.9% (business customer) and 8.8% (residential 
customers). The increase in monthly rental prices was over-compensated by 
far in those countries with service-based competition. In fact, the prices for 
OECD baskets (which also include monthly rental) decreased by 12-16% 
over the same period in countries with service-based competition. In those 
countries with more infrastructure-based competition, OECD baskets 
                                                           
52  There is a risk of auto-correlation in this case, since the countries were clustered 
partially by the penetration rates, but as other factors were considered as well, 
this risk has been reduced. 
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decreased only slightly. This indicates that service-based competition is 
more important for residential clients, while infrastructure-based competition 
is more important for business customers.  
 
Result 5:  There are clear indications that tariff rebalancing has gone further 
in the countries with service-based competition than in those with 
infrastructure-based competition. 
 Critical remarks 
A critical remark has to be made regarding the problem derived from the role 
of CATV, which has existed all of the time and has had a positive impact on 
competition, but has hardly been influenced or promoted by regulation. 
Therefore, assessing the impact of this alternative infrastructure with 
intermodal competition correctly is difficult.  
Moreover, the sample sizes are rather small and the variances in several 
cases are large. The results in this study consequently need to be 
considered with care and it is advisable to verify the results in future 
research. 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
 Types of competition 
The empirical study has shown that infrastructure-based competition has led 
to significantly lower access costs and call tariffs for business customers 
and, to a slightly lesser extent, for residential customers in its early stages. 
However, call tariffs, as well as access costs for fixed line services (monthly 
line rental) have risen after a decrease for both customer groups slightly 
again over time in countries with infrastructure-based competition. 
On the other hand, where service-based competition is fostered, 
infrastructure-based operators had compensated the loss in turnover from 
call prices by sharply increasing line rental prices (either by tariff rebalancing 
and/or by including call prices in the price of the rental - bundling). Sharply 
reduced call tariffs mostly overcompensated for the line rental increases. 
Compared to infrastructure-based countries, call prices saw an overall 
steeper decline in service-based countries. 
In recent periods, differences in the overall price structures in service-based 
and infrastructure-based countries tend to diminish. This can be traced back 
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to the fact that NRAs started to implement the ladder of investment step by 
step. The benefits of both strategies are now beginning to evolve and 
compensate for the negative aspects of the other – reduced access costs 
are linked to low call tariffs.  
 
Conclusion:  With a stepwise introduction of the ladder of investment NRAs 
can focus on a specific liberalization strategy. But only 
complete implementation of the ladder of investment will bring 
positive welfare effects. 
 
Competitors will undertake investment in their own infrastructure only if the 
return justifies that investment. Therefore, business customers with a high 
impact on return on investment are those entities that benefited most from 
infrastructure-based competition. Due to sunk costs and economies of scale, 
only a limited number of ULL-operators is able to survive in a market place 
(oligopoly). In such a situation, ULL operators have strong incentives to 
collude and raise prices, as the locking effects for consumers are 
significant53. 
In this situation, service-based competition could help to keep prices low if 
introduced as a complement. 
 
Conclusion:  The complementary introduction of service and infrastructure-
based competition limits the negative outcomes of either and 
supports the development of the positive elements of both 
liberalization strategies. 
 
Although, intramodal competition is not reflected in this study, one has to 
bear in mind the effects of such competition. Especially the different cost 
structures and the different technologies involved create some room in which 
competition can develop. NRAs need to be aware of the regulatory 
interdependence created by intermodal and intramodal competition. If one 
side of competition is regulated, but the other side is not, the question arises 
whether this leads to a distortion of competition (such as the non-regulation 
of CATV-networks or non regulated mobile access networks)54. 
 
                                                           
53  On the issue of complementary products and foreclosure in the NGN world see 
Von Schewick (2007). 
54  A similar question was raised in a decision by the Dutch Competition Court, which 
annulled an NRA decision on mobile termination market analysis and remedies. 
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Conclusion:  Technology neutral regulation is a means of limiting the risks 
of distortions of intermodal and intramodal competition. 
 Management decisions and their influence on investment  
As far as the influence of the NRA's decisions on how to open up the market 
to competition is concerned, the influence of operators must not be 
overlooked, as it is them who decide on the investments. The following list 
contains key factors that influence management decisions. 
The liberalization period was rather short, making time to market a key 
factor. In countries like the UK, France or Germany it was evident that once 
a clear decision was taken by the NRA on a specific access product, market 
players focused on that product immediately55. From this, we can derive the 
importance of the first decisions made by NRAs regarding access products 
for the market. 
During the liberalization process, the first goal of a company was to gain 
market share. The easiest way of achieving this was to duplicate the 
incumbent's products and offer similar products at a reduced price. 
Therefore, it is sometimes proposed to set lower prices for products at lower 
rungs of the ladder of investment. NRAs then raise prices for low rung 
products of the ladder over time to incentivise investments in access 
products of higher rungs and to "force" competitors to invest in infrastructure. 
Yet one has to bear in mind that this proposal may distort competition for late 
entrants. Climbing the ladder of investment should be a possibility at all 
times as competition may not necessarily be carried out via pricing, but also 
via product differentiation. 
In telecommunications, mainly new technologies enable innovative services. 
Infrastructure based operators form the basis of such innovations as they 
have control over the development and use of the infrastructure. Wholesale 
obligations may even foster competition, penetration rates and the 
introduction of innovative services and technologies. Investments in 
innovative services will be made when the access obligations and thus the 
returns on investment of the wholesale business are neutral (economically) 
compared to the retail business.  
 
                                                           
55  Bergman (2004). 
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Conclusion:  Market liberalization follows the clear path of a product life 
cycle in competitive markets. Regulation paves the way for 
investors to enter markets and the products they intend to 
introduce.  
 Pricing 
To be able to make the ladder of investment operational it is necessary that 
prices in wholesale markets for the different products are consistent but also 
that there are clear rules for migration from one product to another56. 
“The imposition by national regulatory authorities of mandated 
access that increases competition in the short-term should not 
reduce incentives for competitors to invest in alternative 
facilities that will secure more competition in the long-term”57. 
This means that NRAs need a long-term view of their decisions. Disruptive 
changes in prices of products or conditions belonging to the ladder of 
infrastructure would automatically lead to a distortion of competition and 
discrimination either against first movers or late entrants58. 
Only under consistent wholesale conditions, investments are allocated 
efficiently. If companies see any additional profit in climbing the ladder of 
investment, they will do so. Therefore, the ladder of investment shall also 
allow for possible migration processes from one rung of the ladder to the 
next59. 
 
Conclusion:  A consistent pricing structure with regard to the ladder of 
investment is a prerequisite. To incentivise operators to climb 
the ladder, prices have to be set so that higher profit margins 
are possible for investments higher up on the ladder of 
investment. It is also necessary to implement effective 
migration rules. 
 
                                                           
56  ERG (2005a), exec. summary. 
57  Recital 19 of Access Directive. 
58  Ellig (2005). 
59  On the aspect of static versus dynamic competition and the last mile problem 
involved see also Banerjee & Dippon (2006) 
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With more competition law-based instead of sector-specific regulation, the 
consistent pricing within the ladder of investment may not be upheld. This 
will automatically cause some distortions within the ladder of investment. It 
has to be clearly stated that, under competition law, prices may include 
additional cost components compared to pure cost oriented prices and thus, 
can lead to significantly higher access prices. 
 
Conclusion:  The trend towards more competition law instead of sector-
specific regulation could distort the consistency of prices within 
the ladder of investment. This, in turn, may have a significant 
economic impact on the business models of alternative 
operators.  
 Impact of new investments on new infrastructure (access holidays) 
Another issue is the topic of access holidays and (closely related) emerging 
markets. Following the idea of the 2002 framework operators investing in 
new infrastructure have argued in favour of granting access holidays for 
these investments (especially for FTTH or UMTS). The basis for this 
argument is laid down in recital no. 15 of the recommendation on relevant 
product and service markets60. 
The idea behind that argumentation is best described by Joseph 
Schumpeter61, where the interplay of invention as creative destruction and 
imitation leads to more competition. The aim is to foster innovation and to 
allow these companies to have some first mover advantages. A more flexible 
approach than today's policy needs to be implemented. Otherwise, 
regulation will be too rigid to cope with the rapid technological changes of the 
future62.  
The EU commission has initiated a discussion of a revision of the current 
framework to become effective by 2009-201063. It is clear that access 
holidays will reduce competitors' ability to offer products and services to 
consumers. This study clearly shows that this would have negative effects 
                                                           
60  European Commission (2003), recital 15. 
61  Schumpeter (1918). 
62 For an overview see:  
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/ index_en.htm 
and on emerging markets 
 http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/info_centre/public_con
sult/review/130706reviewpresentation.pdf, pp. 17-27. 
63  http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/index_en.htm 
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on prices and penetration rates, if neither infrastructure nor service-based 
competition is in place. In order to financially consider the high risk of 
investment undertaken, this is best achieved by allowing an appropriate 
return on investment. 
 
Conclusion:  Access holidays will reduce consumer benefits and have 
negative welfare effects. In order to create incentives for 
operators with significant market power, NRAs must consider 
the specific risks related to the investments in emerging 
markets in making their decisions.  
CONCLUSION 
With the European Information society "i2010" initiative64 Europe has started 
an ambitious project. A recent study has shown the positive impact of the 
European regulatory framework on the new member states65. The present 
study considers EU15 member states. The results describe that the different 
modes of infrastructure and service-based competition strategies harmonize 
as a growing number of countries enable competition on all rungs of the 
ladder of investment and market players diversify their market strategies. 
With this, prices tend to harmonize and Europe is stepwise developing 
towards a single market.  
As infrastructure-based competition leads to higher innovation and 
penetration rates, NRAs should foster inter- and intra-modal infrastructure-
based competition when applying the framework. With convergence and new 
technologies like broadband and VoIP emerging, access at the levels of 
networks, services, applications and devices and own infrastructure and thus 
ULL will become increasingly important for operators to be able to 
differentiate their products.  
There are clear signs that infrastructure-based competition is more important 
to business customers and service-based competition is more important for 
residential customers. Therefore, if the majority of consumers are also to be 
able to benefit from competition then both liberalization strategies will have 
to be in place – in a balanced approach.  
The study has also shown that infrastructure-based competition does have 
an immediate (downward) effect on prices, which tend to remain stable 
afterwards. Under such circumstances, less tariff rebalancing will occur and 
                                                           
64 European Commission (2005). 
65  Haberfehlner et al. (2006). 
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alternative operators could refrain from investment in new infrastructure. On 
the other hand, service-based competition leads to significant tariff 
rebalancing in those parts of the value chain that are exposed to competition 
to a lesser extent. So these markets end up with higher access prices. In 
order to be competitive with infrastructure-based competition service-based 
competition needs much higher decreases in call prices to compensate for 
the increase in access costs.  
On the other hand, if infrastructure-based competition alone is introduced, 
the risk of collusion remains in the sense that competitors only compete in 
the access market while increasing prices for other services. Hence both 
regulatory strategies are required. These results are consistent with the 
theory that price competition will take place in those parts of the value chain 
that are exposed to competition. 
In most countries all rungs of the ladder of investment are now in place as 
regards the traditional network topologies. It seems that there is no pure and 
single way towards competition, but that markets need a healthy mixture of 
both, service-based and infrastructure-based competition. NRAs should 
consequently act in a stringent way regarding all rungs of the ladder in their 
pricing decisions. The market will react according to the strategic impact of 
the decisions made by NRAs, thus still relying on sector-specific regulation. 
ADDENDUM  
The results of this study with respect to infrastructure versus service-based 
competition rely on figures from the “old”, i.e. the circuit switched PSTN 
environment with data until 2005. Since the conclusion of our study new 
technologies have been introduced. This has led to a change of the markets 
especially with respect to broadband services.  
The approach for serving broadband services relying most intensively on 
(own) infrastructure implying the requirement for the highest amount of 
investment is fiber to the home (FTTH), respectively fiber to the building 
(FTTB). Where operators go for this approach, it leads to a duplication of the 
network if such investment is undertaken by an ANO. ANOs may rely also 
still on regulatory decisions and wholesale products. For example, if 
alternative network try to mirror a fiber to the curb (FTTC) approach of the 
incumbent.  
The Netherlands is a good example to see how a migration from a copper 
based network to a “all-IP” network is about to be implemented. Due to the 
fact that KPN dismantles their main distribution frames, carriers – which 
have worked on the basis of unbundled local loops today – have to make the 
choice of either moving up in the value chain (bit-stream) or down (FTTC). 
This means, they have to move into the direction of more or less investment. 
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Depending on how the carriers will react, we will also see a different degree 
of infrastructure versus service-based competition.  
In the area of service-based competition, we additionally can see the 
developments with respect to resale. Resale is a vulnerable business model, 
due to the fact that the increase in bandwidth and the decrease in prices for 
end-users may put resellers at a certain risk in terms of price cost squeezes.  
The demand from the customer side being based on the request for high 
bandwidths cannot necessarily be supplied by the existing wholesale 
products. Altogether, the demand for high bandwidths moves the market in 
total to the request for access products instead of conveyance products. This 
can be seen from the high increase in flat-rate products for Internet access 
as well as for call conveyance. Moving competition into the area of access 
competition therefore also implies that the access itself becomes more 
important. This is one of the reasons that trigger investments into access as 
the access line being the connection between the operator and the customer 
being more and more important.  
The tendency that alternative operators conduct investments in terms of 
addressing the customers with their own infrastructure either by FTTC, FTTB 
or FTTH is therefore an interesting development. It seems to indicate (at 
least for some of the European countries) that competition is now moving 
really into infrastructure-based competition by a duplication of the last mile. It 
is, however, an open question whether this is rooted basically in the 
regulatory policy, a logical development of technology or a market driven 
necessity. 
Market developments suggest that access competition is becoming 
increasingly more important. However, still a healthy mixture of service-
based and infrastructure-based competition may remain important, 
especially for (rural) regions and markets where infrastructure-based 
competition is less likely. 
Infrastructure versus Service-based Competition: the Case of Mobile Telecommunications 
- 61 – 
 
REFERENCES 
Banerjee A., Dippon C. (2006), "Communications Regulation and Policy Under 
Convergence: Advancing the State of the Debate", Paper presented at the 16th 
biannual ITS conference Beijing, June. 
Bergman M. (2004), “Competition in services or infrastructure-based competition?”, 
Swedish Competition Authority and Stockholm University, September. 
Cave M. (2003), “Remedies for broadband services”, www.itst.dk/static/. 
Konferencer%20og%20seminarer/EC-Experts%20Broadband%20_cave.pdf. 
Cave M. (2004), "Making the ladder of investment operational”, Paper presented to the 
European Commission, November. 
Crandall R.W. (2005), “Competition and Chaos”, Brookings Institution Press, 2005. 
ECTA (2005), “ECTA Broadband Scorecard”, Q2/2005. 
Ellig J. (2005), "Costs and Consequences of Federal Telecommunications and 
Broadband Regulations”, Working Paper in Regulatory Studies, George Mason 
University, February. 
ERG (2005a), “Broadband market competition report”, ERG (05) 23, May. 
ERG (2005b), "Revised ERG Working paper on the SMP concept for the new 
regulatory framework", ERG (03) 09rev3, September. 
European Commission (2000), “Commission Staff Working Document, "Europe's 
Liberalised Telecommunications Market - A Guide to the Rules of the Game”, October 
18th. 
European Commission (2002), “Commission guidelines on market analysis and the 
assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework 
for electronic communications networks and services” (2002/C 165/03), 11 July 11th. 
European Commission (2003), “Recommendation on relevant product and service 
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation” 
(C(2003) 497), 11 February 11th. 
European Commission (2005), “Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, "i2010 – A European Information Society for growth and 
employment”, SEC(2005) 717. 
European Parliament (2000), “Regulation no. 2887/2000 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop”. 
European Parliament (2002), “Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the council of 7 March on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services” (Framework Directive), Official Gazette, no. 
L108/33, April 24th. 
Flamm K. (2005), “An analysis of the determinants of broadband access”, 
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, October. 
Haberfehlner K., Lundborg M., Pötzl J., Ruhle, E.O., Lichtenberger E. (2006), "Central 
and Eastern European countries way towards the Lisbon targets – ICT as driver for 
economic and social development", in Piepenbrock Schuster Consulting (ed.), 
“Telecommunications Markets in Central and South Eastern Europe - Market 
Developments and Regulatory Frameworks”. 
Infrastructure versus Service-based Competition: the Case of Mobile Telecommunications 
- 62 – 
 
Henten A., Skouby K.E. (2005), “Regulation of local loop access”, ITS Europe 
Conference, September 4-6th, Porto. 
ITU (2001), “Italian Case Study", April 26th. 
ITU (2001), “ITU regulatory implications of broadband workshop – ITU new initiatives 
programme”, May 2-4th. 
McNary R. (2001), “The Network Penetration Effects of Telecommunications 
Privatization and Competition”, Stanford University. 
Nicholls R. (2006), “Interconnection of next generation networks – a regulatory 
perspective”, Paper presented at the 16th biannual ITS conference Beijing, June. 
OECD (2003), “Developments in local loop unbundling”, DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2002)5/ 
FINAL, 10th September 10th. 
Piepenbrock Schuster Consulting (eds.) (2003), Anreize für Infrastrukturinvestitionen 
bei der Zusammenschaltung in der Telekommunikation. 
Schumpeter J.A. (1918), The Theory of Economic Development: an Inquiry into 
Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle, Oxford Press, New York 
(1961). 
Vogelsang I. (2002), "Theorie und Praxis des Resale-Prinzips in der amerikanischen 
Telekommunkationsregulierung", WIK Diskussionsbeitrag, no. 231, January. 
Vogelsang I. (2005), "Resale und konsistente Entgeltregulierung", WIK 
Diskussionsbeitrag, no. 269, October. 
Von Schewick B.  (2007), "Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality 
Regulation", Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, Vol. 5, pp. 
329-391. 
Infrastructure versus Service-based Competition: the Case of Mobile Telecommunications 
- 63 – 
 
ANNEX 
 
Table 2. Decomposition of national analyses (1) 
 
○ = Service-based policy; ● = Infrastructure-based policy; --- = Indecisive 
(1)  The status is based on four categories of indirect access: carrier selection for local calls, 
carrier preselection for local calls, carrier selection for national calls, carrier preselection for 
national calls. Each category is weighted by 25%. 
(2)  Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal were excluded as no allocation could be made. 
(3)  Completion for local calls in November 2000. 
(4)  The categorisation of Italy is due to the delay of the introduction of a standard offer for ULL 
and the early introduction of indirect access. In addition, the Italian NRA has focused on the 
introduction of a wholesale broadband product. Source: OECD (2003), pp. 22 and 45; ITU 
(2001), p.15. 
(5)  The categorisation of France is due to the aim of the NRA to foster infrastructure competition, 
as well as the success of line sharing. Source: OECD (2003), p.39; ERG (2005a). 
(6) The results for UK are very significant. This may seem astonishing as the UK has fostered 
infrastructure competition in earlier years. These results are based on the situation in the new 
millennium, indicating that UK's regulatory policy has evolved from infrastructure-based to 
service-based competition. 
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Table 3. Decomposition of national analyses (2) 
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Abstract: Recently, investments in new generation networks in Germany have been 
curtailed, since potential investors required this new network be unregulated. To 
develop a regulator’s strategy that allows investments to occur but prevents 
monopolistic prices, we model an investor’s decision problem under a threat of 
regulation. We show that the mere threat of a regulator’s intervention may prevent 
supernormal profits without actual price regulation. The regulator, on the other hand, 
can influence both the investment decision and the investor’s price via her signals on 
regulation probability and price. 
INTRODUCTION 
In summer 2005, Deutsche Telekom announced its plans to build a new 
generation broadband fiber optics network. The initial investment was said to 
be around 3 billion Euros. However, Deutsche Telekom decided as a 
precondition for this new network not to be regulated with respect to pricing 
and third party access. 
German regulation authorities announced their refusal to concede to 
Telekom’s pressure. They suggested that Telekom and its competitors, 
mostly service providers that rent capacity from the dominant incumbent, 
agree on rules as how to manage access to the new infrastructure. Following 
this, Telekom let it be known that they were unwilling to share the new 
capacities with competitors, claiming that competitors should undertake the 
irreversible network investments (sunk costs) by themselves. Unless the new 
technologically-leading infrastructure was exempted from regulation, 
                                                           
66  Partial reprint from Blum U., Growitsch C. & Niels Krap (2007), “Broadband 
Investment and the Threat of Regulation: Preventing Monopoly Exploitation or 
Infrastructure Construction?,” Review of Network Economics, Vol. 6(3), pages 
342-354, September with the permission of CRA International. 
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Telekom threatened the investment to be made in other areas or countries. 
Hence, the German regulator faced a difficult situation: allowing Telekom to 
have its way may endanger future competition on next generation networks 
in telecommunication in Germany. However, if the regulator decided access 
regulation to hold, the infrastructure would not be set up. 
In summary, the regulatory agency faced an issue of first and second degree 
errors: if she regulated an area which – from the economic point of view – 
should be left unregulated, such an over-regulation may foreclose welfare 
enhancing investments. If, however, she did not regulate an area which 
required regulation, under-regulation could inhibit competition and facilitate 
market power exploitation. 
In this paper, we analyze investment decisions on new generation networks. 
Therefore, we discuss a firm’s decision problem under a threat of regulation 
from a game-theoretic perspective. The decision whether to invest or not 
depends on the probability of regulation and its assumed impact on 
investment returns. Depending on the investor’s expectation on these 
parameters, he will decide whether the investment is favorable or not, and 
which price is optimal. This price can be expected to be lower than a non-
regulated profit maximizing price, since the potential investor presumably 
tries to circumvent regulation and reduce the probability of intervention, 
respectively. Thus, the mere threat of a regulator’s intervention may prevent 
supernormal profits without actual price regulation. The regulator, on the 
other hand, can influence both investment decision and the investor’s price 
via his signals on regulation probability and price. These signals can be 
considered optimal if they simultaneously allow investment and minimize the 
investor’s price. Accordingly, wrong signals by the regulator may prevent 
investments. Hence, we model an investment decision under uncertainty (of 
regulation) to develop a welfare maximizing regulation strategy.  
LITTERATURE 
Previous research on the relationship between investment and regulation 
has discussed either impacts of specific regulatory regimes or incentives of 
underinvestment due to policy uncertainty. Continuing research on dynamic 
efficiency issues of regulation discussed by Mandy & Sharkey (2003) and 
Littlechild (2003), a current work by Evans & Guthrie (2005) addresses the 
negative incentives on investment imposed by total element long run 
incremental cost (TELRIC) regulation, and finds that within such a framework 
a capital asset pricing model application identifies an allowed risk premium 
to be crucial for sustainable investments. Indeed, Evans and Guthrie's 
models give interesting insights into the investment incentives of specific 
regulatory regimes. Unfortunately, their models assume a universal service 
obligation as well as a general revenue regulation. 
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A second strand of literature discusses policy uncertainty or – more 
specifically – regulators' ex-post opportunism (potential hold-up). Recent 
work on different network industries, for example Ishi & Yan (2004), 
Saphores et al. (2004) and Dobbs (2004) confirms the hypothesis of delayed 
infrastructure investments as addressed by Teisberg (1993), who showed 
that rational firms might delay investment when facing uncertain or 
asymmetric profit and loss restrictions. However, previous research on 
investment under regulation has to a certain extend neglected welfare 
enhancing aspects of regulatory uncertainty, the issue of regulatory threats, 
which is basically the threat of governmental intervention in case of 
inadequate price levels67. The political intention is the firms restricting their 
prices voluntarily (the so called light-hand regulation approach, for an 
overview on network industries see Haucap et al. 2006). Developed by 
Glazer & McMillan (1992), there have been numerous applications on 
different network sectors (for an example of the British airport sector see 
Starkie 2001, and Acutt & Elliott 2001 for the experiences of the UK 
electricity generation industry). Brunekreeft (2004) translates the idea of 
regulatory threat to the threat of ex-post antitrust intervention, finding that 
under certain conditions the latter can work in similar fashion and also 
induce a voluntary price cap. The work on regulation by threat of intervention 
has neglected, as yet, to emphasize its relevance for investment decisions in 
network sectors68. This paper fills that void in previous research and applies 
the concept of light hand regulation on new infrastructure investment. It 
contributes to the current discussion of regulatory options for next generation 
networks and regulation's effects on dynamic efficiency and innovation (see, 
for example Baake et al. 2005), since it provides a feasible solution to the 
trade-off between static or allocative and dynamic efficiency or 
innovation/technological change.  
                                                           
67  Admittedly, Sappington (1986) deal with regulatory uncertainty, whereas from a 
different perspective. He analyses the positive effects of information asymmetries 
on firms’ investment, not the idea of putting a company under regulatory risk, as 
we do. 
68  There has been some research on a phenomenon called trigger price regulation, 
which is somewhat comparable to our approach. In a seminal article, Salant & 
Woroch (1992) introduce the phrase and show, given perfect information, the 
regulator can allow for new investments while not directly regulating. A credible 
commitment of not exploiting producer’s rents is however very sensitive to the 
symmetric information assumption, which can be considered as rather strong. 
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THE MODEL 
Applying a game theoretic model, we analyze a firm’s new generation 
network investment decision facing a possible regulatory intervention. We 
assume the regulator to be benevolent but imperfectly informed about the 
investor’s cost structure. 
 
Figure 2. Decision tree of the game-theoretical regulation model 
 
 
This figure shows the options of the market agents and the sequence of 
decision in the investment game. In a first step, the regulator signals her 
perception of a cost-covering price – the regulation price (pR) – and about 
her tolerance (d) on the firm’s pricing decision. Both can be interpreted as a 
probability of intervention function (F(p1)) depending on the firm’s price. The 
regulator’s true tolerance limit – the so-called intervention price (pR+d) – can 
be concealed to the firm, exposing the investor to regulatory risk. Thus, 
signaling the tolerance enables the regulator to – at least partially – uncover 
the true costs of the firm. 
If the regulation authority signaled the intervention price perfectly, the 
investor would set exactly that price or – in the case of an unfavourably low 
expected intervention price – refrain from investment. If the firm invests (I=Î), 
the regulator decides whether the firm’s price (p1) requires an intervention. 
Under regulation, which has the probability F(p1), the regulator intervenes 
and permits the firm to set only the regulation price pR. Thus, the firm obtains 
a profit of R(pR)- Î. If the price set by the firm lies within the regulator’s 
tolerance, it earns a profit of R(p1)- Î. 
If the investor’s expectation of the regulation price is below a profitable level, 
it will refrain from investment, earning a profit of R0. Such a situation is 
economically undesirable and should be avoided by the regulator. But due to 
her lack of information it is possible, that the regulator overestimates the 
chances and earnings and underestimates the risks and costs of the 
investment and sets the intervention price too low. 
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Without perfect announcement (an imperfect signal) the firm can, if it invests, 
 either set a price above the intervention price, so that the regulator 
intervenes and sets the regulation price or  
 set a price below the intervention price due to an effective 
regulatory threat. 
In both cases, the resulting market price is lower than or equal to the 
intervention price and therefore welfare-increasing. 
COMMENTS 
Major result of this model is that the optimal price of an investor facing the 
threat of regulation is lower than the expected intervention price. Intervention 
or actual regulation becomes unnecessary; the market price can be 
expected to be (significantly) lower than an unregulated monopoly price 
(Cournot-price). Obviously, the firm’s optimal price (and thus its profit) in this 
model rises with increasing regulation price and increasing tolerance. 
Sappington (1986) shows that given a perfectly informed regulator, firms will 
have no incentive to invest in efficiency enhancing investments since the 
resulting cost-savings would be completely transferred to consumers. 
Therefore, they suggest that the regulator may abstain from better 
information. As we consider a regulator with long-term orientation as 
introduced by Salant & Woroch (1992), these results do not directly 
contradict our analysis. The regulator in our model allows for positive 
expected returns to provide an incentive for new infrastructure installation 
rather than holding up the firm. 
In such a setting, actual regulation becomes unnecessary. The mere threat 
of regulation prevents monopolistic prices while it allows profitable 
investment – if her signals are not to restrictive and therefore foreclosing. 
On the one hand these results show that with rising uncertainty about the 
actual investment costs and market conditions a regulation authority with the 
goal of high investment activity should give either a signal of a higher 
regulation price or a higher tolerance to the investment in relation to the 
deviation from that price. On the other hand, the more the regulator knows 
the tolerance can sink and thereby set the intervention price nearer to the 
price at which the investment just amortizes. According to this model a 
convincing and purposeful regulation threat can replace an implemented 
regulation. However, it remains to be noted that in most cases the price set 
by the investor does not correspond to the economically optimal price. 
Finally there is – similar to the situation with patents and the protection of 
innovations – a political and economical tradeoff between the investment 
with more utilization of market power and non-investment. In addition should 
be mentioned that there is also the possibility that the regulation threat 
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prevents the investment if the regulation authority underrates the necessary 
investments and/or overrates the future profits and options, and thus signals 
a too small tolerance and/or sets a non-cost-cutting regulation price. 
CONCLUSION 
Recapitulating our findings, we state that as long as the regulator is 
uncertain about cost and demand structure in the market of the infrastructure 
to be enhanced, she should not be acting too intolerantly, since such 
behaviour may prevent a welfare increasing investment. These results are 
consistent with previous research on the effectiveness of regulatory threats 
in particular. Concerning the case of Deutsche Telekom, the German 
regulator should – ex ante – leave the infrastructure investment unregulated 
and signal the regulation price. This should encourage Deutsche Telekom to 
invest while preventing it from exploiting its monopolistic power. From a 
dynamic perspective, such a light-handed regulation may encourage 
additional – and competitive – infrastructure investment, increase 
technological development and economic welfare, and make regulation 
redundant in the future. Therefore, our findings show that the concept of 
regulating by the threat of intervention is not only applicable to existing 
infrastructure but also to new investments as well. 
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Abstract: This paper compares two specific competition schemes – service-based 
and infrastructure-based competition – by focusing on a firm's incentive to invest in 
network infrastructure. We show that when monopoly rent is large, infrastructure-
based competition means the initial introduction of infrastructure is undertaken earlier 
than under service-based competition. However, when both monopoly rent and the 
degree of uncertainty are small, service-based competition brings about the earlier 
initial introduction of infrastructure than under infrastructure-based competition. The 
paper includes discussion of the policy implications of these findings. 
INTRODUCTION 
Infrastructure investment is crucial to economic welfare in the long run. This 
paper addresses how infrastructure investment in telecommunication 
industries can be promoted. In particular, we examine the effect of the 
choice of competition scheme on a firm's incentive to invest in network 
infrastructure. To this end, we focus on two specific competition schemes: 
service-based competition and infrastructure-based competition. In service-
based competition, entrants can enter the market by accessing an 
incumbent's network infrastructure when desired. On the other hand, 
infrastructure-based competition requires entrants to construct their own 
infrastructure in order to enter the market. In this paper, we clarify the 
conditions under which one competition scheme would induce a firm to 
invest earlier in infrastructure than the other. 
                                                           
69  This paper is based on Hori and Mizuno (2007). 
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RELATED FINDINGS IN THE LITERATURE 
Several studies have compared competition schemes in an open access 
environment. A closely related analysis to this paper is Bourreau & Doğan 
(2005). By focusing on an incumbent's incentive for unbundling and the 
incentive to set an access charge, Bourreau & Doğan (2005) show that an 
incumbent has an incentive to set too low an access charge. As a result, the 
entrant builds its own infrastructure too late from a welfare viewpoint. 
Empirical research by Kaserman & Ulrich (2002) shows the effects of 
infrastructure-based entry versus resale entry on competition. According to 
their results, resale entry seemingly has a more drastic effect on competition 
than infrastructure-based entry. This is because resale entry reduces the 
incumbents' shares in the long-distance telecommunication market more 
than with infrastructure-based entry. Guthrie (2006) also provides valuable 
discussion about the two competition schemes, with an emphasis on their 
effects on the firm's timing of investment. 
DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Our study differs from previous work in two main ways. First, most studies on 
open access policy, with the exception of Biglaiser & Riordan (2000) and 
Pindyck (2005), do not deal with uncertainty and irreversibility, whereas we 
examine the firm's incentive for irreversible investment under uncertainty. 
Uncertainty and irreversibility are decisive for firms in network industries, 
such as telecommunications. Those involved in network industries, including 
researchers and policy makers, commonly recognize both of these elements. 
For example, Guthrie (2006) argues that the dynamics, investment 
irreversibility, and uncertainty are all essential features of regulated 
competition. 
Indeed, the net present value rule, which states that an investment should be 
undertaken only if its net present value is positive, is inappropriate for firms 
operating under uncertainty and irreversibility. This is why we employ a real 
options approach to discuss this issue. The real options approach applies 
option concepts to the valuation of real assets under uncertainty. It has 
become an important growth area in investment theory (see Dixit & Pindyck 
1994) for a basic treatment of the tools employed). Indeed, Alleman & Noam 
(1999) suggest the application of the real options approach to the 
telecommunications industry. We then examine how uncertainty affects the 
priority of the two competition schemes in terms of a firm's incentive to invest 
in telecom infrastructure. 
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A second major difference in our work is that while previous studies assume 
that firms' positions in a market are exogenous, in our model they are 
endogenously determined. This is because we would like to consider the 
firm's preemption incentive or first-mover advantage (see Fudenberg & Tirole 
1985, Katz & Shapiro 1987). In fact, telecommunication industries have 
given birth to many situations where the preemption incentive is appropriate. 
 
Figure 3. The Penetration Rates of Broadband Services 
 
Source: OECD Broadband Statistics, December 2006. 
 
 
The previous figure shows the penetration rates of broadband services, 
including fiber-optic networks, in G7 countries as of December 2006. One 
trait that separates Japan from the other countries is the high penetration of 
fiber-optic or local area network (LAN) services. In Japan, 30% of 
subscribers of broadband services utilize fiber-optic networks, compared to 
relatively few subscribers in the remaining G7. This reminds us that the 
Japanese Telecom regulatory authority employed some policies that 
stimulated investment in fiber-optic networks. Indeed, the e-Japan plan was 
set in place to ensure that broadband networks were accessible to 30 million 
households by 2001. This plan (and the following related plans) explicitly 
states that the broadband networks established throughout Japan should be 
developed with competition among the firms. Since 2001, several players—
including NTT East and West, K-Opticom, Yusen etc.—have built their own 
fiber-optic cable networks to obtain a first-mover advantage. On the other 
hand, it is argued that the US is not necessarily a well-developed country in 
the field of fiber-optic networks. As a result, in 2003 the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) adopted new rules regarding the 
network unbundling obligations of incumbent local phone carriers, with the 
aim of providing incentives for carriers to invest in broadband infrastructure. 
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Investment in mobile networks to enhance a firm's service coverage is 
another example that relates to the issue of preemption among firms. In 
mobile network markets, mandated access or mandated roaming is a policy 
issue. Interestingly, regulatory agencies have taken different decisions on 
this issue in various countries (see Hausman (2002) for a discussion). Fully 
providing several types of infrastructure in developing countries is also 
appropriate for preemption, especially when privatization and unbundling are 
simultaneous. In telecommunications, the R&D market with licensing is a 
good example that fits the issue of preemption. 
In sum, these examples suggest the importance of the study of a firm's 
preemption incentive in an open access environment. We should note that 
allowing access to a follower (i.e., an open access environment) gives a 
follower an advantage in the sense that the follower can avoid the sunk cost 
of infrastructure by accessing a leader's infrastructure with payment of an 
access charge. This follower’s advantage may weaken a firm's preemption 
incentive (i.e., it may deter the introduction of new network infrastructure in a 
market). By analyzing the effects of allowing access on the preemption 
incentive in an open access environment, we examine the priority of the two 
competition schemes in terms of the rapidity of the initial construction of 
network infrastructure. 
A THEORETICAL MODEL 
To examine this issue, Hori and Mizuno (2007) introduced a two-firm model 
with stochastically growing demand in an open access environment. No firm 
establishes its facility at the beginning. Each firm requires two types of 
facilities to serve consumers in the market: a production facility and a 
network (infrastructure) facility. Investments in these facilities are 
irreversible. Under service-based competition, a follower without a network 
can utilize the existing network for production by paying a usage access 
charge. On the other hand, under infrastructure-based competition, a 
follower needs to invest not only in a production facility, but also in a 
network. 
The demand for goods produced and the profit flows of the firms are 
assumed to grow stochastically. The building of a bypass (i.e., an additional 
network supply) is assumed to improve the quality of goods or cause a 
positive externality: this is reflected in an increase in each firm's profit flow. 
Taking a competition scheme and the level of access charge as given, each 
firm decides when to invest. When entering the market, a firm decides the 
output level, and the product market clears. When examining service-based 
competition in a stochastically demand-growing environment, it is natural to 
focus on the situation where a follower first enters with access to a leader's 
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network, and in the future, builds a bypass itself. The equilibriums under the 
two competition schemes are then derived, and we can compare the 
outcomes. 
COMPARISON OF THE TWO COMPETITION SCHEMES 
Let us report the results derived from the analysis of the theoretical model. 
 
Result 1:  Under service-based competition, a follower enters the market 
earlier and builds a bypass later than under infrastructure-
based competition. 
The latter result is explained by the replacement effect: a follower that 
already gains profit through access to the leader's network has less incentive 
to build a bypass than a potential follower that now intends to enter the 
market. The replacement effect also appears in Bourreau & Doğan (2005). In 
addition, we can verify that as the degree of uncertainty increases, the 
difference in a follower's investment timing becomes greater between the 
two competition schemes. 
Next, let us compare a leader's entry timing for the two competition 
schemes. Three elements (i.e., monopoly rent, the level of access charge, 
and the degree of uncertainty) are key factors in determining the priority of 
competition schemes in terms of a leader's investment timing. 
 
Result 2:  When monopoly rent is sufficiently large relative to duopoly 
rent, infrastructure-based competition induces a leader to 
invest earlier than under service-based competition. 
 
The intuitive reasoning is simple. Since a follower under infrastructure-based 
competition enters the market later than one under service-based 
competition, a leader under infrastructure-based competition enjoys 
monopoly rents for a longer period than under service-based competition. 
Hence, the preemption incentive of a leader under infrastructure-based 
competition is larger than under service-based competition. 
This finding suggests a relationship between the investment timing of 
infrastructure and the degree of competitiveness in a product market. In 
particular, when product market competition is severe, monopoly rent is 
sufficiently large relative to duopoly rent. In this case, infrastructure-based 
competition induces a leader to invest in infrastructure earlier than under 
service-based competition. 
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We next examine the effect of a change in the level of access charge on 
investment decisions in the two competition schemes. Concerning the 
follower's investment decision, a follower's entry under service-based 
competition is earlier than under infrastructure-based competition, with a 
bypass being built later. However, as the access charge increases, a 
follower's entry under service-based competition is later. 
The effect of the access charge on a leader's entry timing under service-
based competition was examined in Hori & Mizuno (2006). According to the 
finding therein, an increase in access charge induces a leader to enter the 
market early. That is, the incentive for preemption is enhanced by an 
increase in access charge under service-based competition. However, it is 
difficult to analytically derive a necessary and sufficient condition for service-
based competition to make a leader's entry earlier than infrastructure-based 
competition and vice versa because of nonlinearity in the effect. Hence, we 
only report the sufficient condition for service-based competition. In fact, 
when both monopoly rent and uncertainty are small, the preemption effect 
under service-based competition is stronger than under infrastructure-based 
competition. 
 
 Result 3:  When both monopoly rent and uncertainty are small, a leader 
under service-based competition enters the market earlier 
than under infrastructure-based competition. 
 
Result 3 is explained as follows. Remember that a follower's entry under 
service-based competition is earlier than under infrastructure-based 
competition. This implies that a leader under infrastructure-based 
competition can earn a monopoly rent for a longer period. As stated earlier, 
however, a decrease in uncertainty makes a follower's entry timing under 
service-based competition closer to that under infrastructure-based 
competition. That is, the difference in the period in which the leader can earn 
a monopoly rent between infrastructure-based competition and service-
based competition becomes shorter with the reduction in uncertainty. 
Moreover, for the period in which a follower accesses a leader's network, the 
leader under service-based competition can obtain access profits. The 
access profit can then compensate for the loss caused by a shorter period of 
monopoly rent under service-based competition. Therefore, a leader under 
service-based competition has a greater incentive to enter than a leader 
under infrastructure-based competition, when both the monopoly rent and 
uncertainty are small. 
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CONCLUSION: SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Taking the competition scheme and level of access charge as given, we 
examined the relationship between the choice of competition scheme and 
the investment decisions of both leaders and followers. Although all of the 
results concern which particular competition scheme can achieve earlier 
investment timing, earlier timing is not necessarily better in terms of welfare. 
In fact, it is difficult to determine which of the two competition schemes is 
better from a welfare viewpoint. 
Nevertheless, we can obtain some policy implications for the choice of 
competition scheme. According to Result 1, a follower under service-based 
competition is more proactive in entering a market because it need not incur 
the large sunk costs of building its own network. In this respect, service-
based competition realizes a competitive environment in the product market 
earlier than infrastructure-based competition. In turn, this contributes to the 
enhancement of economic welfare. This is consistent with a crucial aspect of 
service-based competition pointed out in the literature. That is, a competitive 
environment can be achieved earlier under service-based competition 
because of non-duplication of the infrastructure investment's sunk cost. In 
fact, this provides a partial rationale for the unbundling provisions of the 
1996 Telecommunications Act. 
However, service-based competition simultaneously entails the late 
construction of a bypass. This implies the later introduction of the positive 
externality generated by the prevalence of infrastructure. Because 
consumers also obtain benefit from the positive externality, service-based 
competition may be harmful. In sum, service-based competition includes 
benefits and costs from a welfare viewpoint when focusing on the follower's 
entry. Note also that the magnitude of the benefits and costs becomes larger 
as uncertainty increases. 
On the other hand, according to Results 2 & 3, service-based competition 
may deter the initial construction of network infrastructure that depends on 
the environment surrounding firms. Therefore, we cannot confirm whether 
service-based competition enhances social welfare with reference to a 
leader's entry. 
In reality, the negative effect of service-based competition on social welfare 
already appears to be recognized, particularly in telecommunications. For 
example, it is argued that the US is not necessarily a well-developed country 
in the field of fiber-optic cable networks. Several aspects of the regulatory 
regime in the 1996 Telecommunications Act, such as asymmetric regulation 
between cable TV companies and incumbent local exchange companies 
(ILEC), are considered as elements that deter investment in broadband 
networks (see Crandall & Alleman (2003)). 
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We can explain the non-development of fiber-optic cable networks by 
applying our analytical results. According to our findings, this is because the 
monopoly rent has been large in the US telecommunication industry. In fact, 
because cable TV networks were prevalent in the US broadband market, the 
advantage of the leader introducing a fiber optic cable network with a higher-
speed Internet service is larger. In addition, the demand for broadband 
services has not been readily estimated (i.e., demand is uncertain), because 
wireless and the Internet have changed the way people communicate. 
Hence, in this situation infrastructure-based competition has been superior to 
service-based competition in terms of early investment in new infrastructure. 
As a result, in 2003 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
adopted new rules regarding the network unbundling obligations of 
incumbent local phone carriers, with the aim of providing incentives for 
carriers to invest in broadband (i.e., a change in the competition scheme 
towards infrastructure-based competition). 
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Abstract: The “ladder of investment” (Cave 2006) is often cited as a relevant 
regulatory mechanism to stimulate facility-based competition in the fixed broadband 
market, but is very rarely mentioned as a means to facilitate the deployment of 
alternative infrastructures in the mobile market. In this paper, we examine the 
relevancy of this concept for the mobile industry, and we discuss whether the concept 
could be applied to encourage the development of alternative mobile facilities. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the telecommunications industry, entrants rarely have enough financial 
resources to deploy from the outset network infrastructures, which cover an 
entire territory and/or the totality of the value chain. Consequently, entrants 
tend to be gradual in both the timeframe in which they invest in the network 
elements necessary to provide telecommunications services, as well as the 
geographical areas across which they deploy their networks. To minimize 
this transitional phase and, hence, to promote investment in alternative 
infrastructures, Martin Cave (2006) has suggested, for the fixed broadband 
market, to classify the different network segments according to their level of 
replicability and to specifically regulate each segment. This doctrine is often 
referred to as the "ladder of investment".  
Implementing the ladder of investment requires two steps. First, to identify 
the replicable network segments. Second, to classify these segments 
according to their degree of replicability. In particular, a segment of the 
infrastructure is considered difficult to replicate if economies of scale, scope 
or density are important. Notice however that economies of scale or scope 
                                                           
70  The authors thank Laurent Benzoni and Gérard Pogorel for their useful remarks 
and Sara Clignet for her editorial assistance. 
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constitute a barrier to entry only when investments are irreversible and the 
environment is uncertain. 
To elaborate the following ladder of investment for the fixed broadband 
market, Martin Cave uses an historical approach71, and considerations on 
the costs of network elements. 
 
Figure 4. The ladder of investment in fixed broadband networks 
 
Source: From Cave (2006) 
 
Once the ladder has been determined, applying the "ladder of investment" 
doctrine requires identifying the positions of network operators on this ladder 
and elaborating a pricing mechanism, to induce entrants to climb the ladder 
(either based on rising access charges or on the announcement of the 
withdrawal of mandatory access after a given date).  
This article aims to analyze whether the concept of the ladder of investment, 
which is widely viewed as a relevant concept for the fixed broadband market, 
can be applied to the mobile market as well. To this end, we shall first 
construct a “ladder” for the mobile market and then, second, discuss the 
relevancy of this ladder.  
In the first section, we will begin by constructing a ladder of investment for 
the mobile market. We will develop our analysis, putting aside the 
technological and economic limits due to the scarcity of spectrum. We will 
only focus on identifying an ad hoc classification of the degree of replicability 
for the different mobile network elements. 
Two factors have encouraged regulatory authorities to apply the concept of 
the ladder of investment in the fixed broadband market: first, to help new 
entrants build gradually a customer base and, second, to help them acquire 
revenues progressively. In the second section, we will discuss whether the 
gradual acquisition of a customer base and of revenues is also essential for 
                                                           
71  Cave adopts an empirical approach and looks at the degree at which operators 
have built out competing networks. 
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the development of facility-based competition in the mobile market. The 
discussion is followed by an analysis of available regulatory tools to help 
network operators climb this ladder. The final part focuses on mobile market 
specificities. 
A LADDER OF INVESTMENT FOR THE MOBILE MARKET72  
In this section, we ignore the scarcity of spectrum and its implications, to be 
discussed later. Under this assumption, using the degree of replicability as a 
criterion for classification, we propose the following ladder of investment for 
the mobile market: 
 
Figure 5. A ladder of investment for the mobile market73 
 
 
Each ladder rung is detailed below. 
 Base Stations 
Base stations are the least easily replicable segment of the mobile network 
for two reasons. First, because of their high costs due to the large number of 
                                                           
72  The data provided in this section are from the report of the European Commission 
(June 25, 2002). 
73  Due to the constraints on access to radio spectrum, operators which do not own a 
spectrum license can only invest in the retailing and the core network. Operators 
without a license are called mobile virtual network operators (MVNO). There are 
three types of MVNOs, based on their level in the ladder of investment. Classic 
Service Providers merely resell minutes, Enhanced Service Provider own their 
own SIM cards and some network elements, whereas Full MVNOs own a full 
mobile network, except for the wireless local loop elements. 
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stations required for full territorial coverage74. Second, because of the 
economies of density associated with this investment. 
Base station costs are predominantly fixed and characterized by significant 
economies of density75; meaning that profitability depends on the size of the 
potential customer base. These economies of density could be viewed as a 
barrier to entry. However, a significant proportion of these investments is not 
specific to the technology used (for example, the facilities76) and should 
therefore not be considered as sunk costs. 
 Station Controllers (RNC / BSC)77 
During initial deployment, and when capacity constraints are not binding, a 
controller can monitor up to approximately 400 base stations. As the network 
grows, the number of base stations that a controller can monitor decreases. 
Once the network is fully deployed, a controller manages between 25 and 50 
base stations, depending on the area’s urbanism. Deployment costs 
represent about 20% of the total cost of the wireless local loop.  
It is important to note that controllers are not specific to the mobile 
technology used, and that the RNC and the BSC are interoperable. 
Interoperability, therefore, implies lower costs in the transition from the GSM 
network to the UMTS network.  
                                                           
74  The fixed broadband network’s DSLAM can be compared to the mobile network’s 
base stations. French mobile operators each own between 10,000 and 15,000 
base stations. For the fixed broadband market, a network operator has to install 
DSLAMs in each of the 12000 main distribution frames (MDF) to cover the whole 
country. 
75  Economies of density should not be considered at the base station level but 
rather for a given geographical area. Indeed, when the traffic in a given area can 
no longer be supported by a single base station, the number of base stations in 
this area should be increased. 
76  For example, during the construction of a 3G network, a 2G mobile operator can 
use part of its existing network, and approximately half the cost of facilities.  
77  The controllers are the access points for all core network services. Station 
controllers allocate resources and control radio links. BSC (Base Station 
Controller) and RNC (Radio Network Controller) are the terminologies used for a 
base station controller in 2G (GSM) and 3G (UMTS) networks, respectively. 
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 Core Network 
The cost of the core network is less important than the cost of the wireless 
local loop. It represents about 30% of total CAPEX, compared to about 70% 
for the wireless local loop. Excluding radio communications, the core 
network houses two types of network elements. 
 Fiber optic lines  
For this specific part of the network, we did not evaluate the degree of 
replicability, but rather assessed the essential aspect of the fiber optic lines 
for the deployment of a national mobile network. Our conclusion is that fiber 
optic lines are not essential to deploy a national mobile network. As such, 
fiber optic lines should not be considered in the ladder of investment and the 
decision to duplicate should be left to the operators.  
While economies of scale can be realized in the deployment of fiber optic 
lines, they cannot be deemed as an important barrier to entry. First, the 
required traffic level to congest fiber optic lines is very high. In addition, in 
the case of dark fiber rental, since traffic management is not possible, the 
risk of anti-competitive behaviour from the infrastructure owner is low. 
Finally, the liberalization of the telecommunications sector has led to a 
significant number of replicated interregional lines. Competition in this 
segment is sufficiently strong to enable mobile operators to benefit from 
competitive wholesale prices. An entrant can, therefore, consider deploying 
a mobile infrastructure without building its own wireline network.  
 Switching and subscriber control units (MSC, TMSC, HLR) 
As they have limited capacity and since operating costs increase with traffic, 
switching and subscriber control units are not subject to economies of scale. 
Further, they are not specific to the mobile technology used (they can be 
used in both GSM and UMTS networks). Risks associated with this 
investment are, therefore, limited. 
These elements of the core network are highly strategic, since this is where 
operations such as customer data collection are carried out (for example, 
HLRs provide traffic information per customer) and where call routing is 
controlled. With this type of strategic information, operators can differentiate 
their offers based on network usage and improve service quality (for 
example, with Fixed-Mobile Convergence, by routing calls from mobiles to 
fixed phones). 
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 Retailing 
Like the fixed broadband market, barriers to entry in this segment are low. 
Costs are for the most part variable, and neither investments nor expertise 
are specific to the telecommunications market. 
Different entry thresholds exist across a mobile network. A number of tasks, 
for example, can be delegated to an existing mobile network operator 
(MNO):  customer management and billing, sales, marketing or distribution. 
As such, market entry strategy may entail using a recognized brand in other 
markets, without making specific investments (e.g., the M6 mobile MVNO in 
France, from one the main private TV channels). 
To build on our mobile market ladder in view of the fixed broadband market, 
we could have introduced a similar segment to the wireline local loop (the 
“last mile” in the fixed network). Based on this logic, the final phase could 
entail the purchase of a license to operate a radio frequency.  
Our aim, however, was to build a ladder based on the replicability concept. 
As such, it would not have been relevant to include radio frequency as a 
ladder rung. Indeed, while a spectrum license is attributed by the regulator, 
replicability assumes that the investor has chosen between make or buy. We 
have consequently excluded the spectrum license from our mobile ladder. 
Note, however, that the spectrum barrier influences the role of the regulator 
in the development of facility-based competition across the mobile market. If 
operators develop their infrastructures gradually before applying for a 
spectrum license, regulation should aim at encouraging entrants to climb the 
ladder. If, however, the entrant acquires a spectrum license prior to any 
investment, regulation is not incentive-focused since attribution is based on 
disclosure requirements for investment and territory coverage.  
THE RELEVANCY OF THE LADDER OF INVESTMENT IN THE 
MOBILE MARKET 
As stated by Cave (2004)78, the objective of the ladder of investment is to 
enable entrants to gradually acquire customers and revenues. According to 
Martin Cave, the need for a gradual entry is linked to two problems faced by 
new entrants: the acquisition of a financial windfall and the creation of a 
customer base. It is interesting to analyze if these two elements, which are 
                                                           
78  Cave (2004) argues that “[the entrants] may have to acquire capital assets 
progressively, as they acquire customers and revenues…” 
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key in the concept of the ladder of investment for the fixed broadband 
market, retain their relevance in the case of the mobile market.  
 The gradual acquisition of a financial windfall  
As investments necessary to deploy a mobile network (excluding the cost of 
the license) are lower than those needed to deploy a fixed broadband 
network, generating revenues to finance future investments seems less 
critical in the mobile market than in the fixed broadband market. Moreover, 
wireless local loop investments are the most costly. To develop this network 
segment, the operator must have a license, meaning that it has filed an 
application ensuring that it has sufficient financial resources. 
 The gradual acquisition of a customer base 
The rapid acquisition of a customer base is fundamental in the mobile 
market, perhaps more than in the fixed broadband market, due to the 
importance of territorial coverage and club effects. 
Mobile consumers deem territorial coverage as key. Aside from its license 
obligations, a new entrant is therefore obliged to provide an almost complete 
geographical coverage very rapidly to compete on level playing field with 
incumbent operators, which already offer a complete coverage. This is not 
the case in the fixed broadband market; the utility of a fixed broadband user 
does not depend on the geographical coverage of its broadband provider. 
Hence, for the mobile market, the concept of the ladder should be expanded 
to account for the geographical coverage of the operators. 
In addition, in the context of club-based tariff plans,79 acquiring market share 
is difficult for new entrants. Indeed, these operators have initially a small 
customer base and consequently do not enjoy the same network effects as 
incumbents. New entrants cannot, therefore, compete with the club-based 
tariff offers of incumbents. 
                                                           
79  We refer to “club offers” as mobile contracts which offers lower prices for on-net 
calls than for off-net calls. 
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REGULATORY TOOLS 
 Regulating access charges 
To motivate entrants to climb the ladder of investment, Cave suggests two 
forms of regulatory intervention based on the access charge of the existing 
infrastructure: a rising access price or the withdrawal of mandatory access at 
a given date (often referred to as the “sunset clause”). For Cave, the tradeoff 
between these two regulatory options depends on the degree of replicability 
of the given segment: "Where replicability is relatively certain however, 
mandated withdrawal of access may be a better approach" (Cave, 2006). 
In a one-way access setting, Bourreau & Doğan (2006) show that these two 
regulatory tools are not equivalent. Sunset clause regulation implicitly 
assumes that the incumbent would charge the entrants too high a price 
when mandatory unbundling requirements are removed. If the incumbent 
historical operator prefers service-based competition to facility-based 
competition, it will however offer a relatively low access price as soon as 
access is no longer regulated to delay the advent of facility-based 
competition. In this case, the “sunset clause” would be ineffective. 
Aside from this argument, the effectiveness of the “sunset clause” to force 
entrants to climb the ladder seems less certain in the context of the mobile 
market. Indeed, given that there are generally three or four mobile network 
operators, and if there is no longer mandatory access to the MNOs, 
competition between MNOs across the wholesale market might lead to 
competitive wholesale offers to entrants. Bourreau & al. (2007), however, 
show that competition between facility-based firms can lead to non-
competitive prices in wholesale markets. If this is the case, lifting regulation 
of the wholesale market could provide entrants with incentives to climb the 
ladder. 
Generally speaking, the market for access to the MNO networks is not 
regulated; in particular wholesale prices. What we observe could then be 
interpreted as the situation that would prevail after a sunset clause. MVNOs 
currently have a narrow path on which to compete with MNOs and depend 
on the whims of incumbents. Entrants are often restricted to niche markets, 
where dominant operators confine them by controlling wholesale prices and 
maintaining uncertainty through non-fulfillment contracts80. This suggests 
                                                           
80 The contractual relationship between MNOs and MVNOs are unbalanced 
because of the lack of supervision of market 15 in the European Union (Call 
access and origination in public mobile telephone networks). Although the 
duration of the contract is generally short, an MVNO no longer benefits from 
competition once it has signed a contract with a MNO host. This is due to the high 
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that an operator which has not taken the financial resources to develop its 
network could be locked in a niche, once mandatory access has ceased. 
 Regulation of interconnection prices 
Depending on the rung of the ladder of investment, from which an entrant 
enters, it can or cannot receive interconnection revenues81. If the entrant 
receives interconnection revenues, with asymmetric interconnection 
charges82, it receives an access benefit. To the extent that the financial 
windfall argument is relevant, this can facilitate the ascent of the ladder. 
Interconnection prices for access to the entrant’s network above marginal 
cost also lead to an increase of the average marginal cost of other operators 
and, hence, of the average marginal cost of the industry. As a result, the 
total quantity offered by the industry would decrease83. From a static point of 
view, this distortion would be socially costly. 
This static inefficiency may be even greater if operators adopt a niche 
strategy, targeting a very specific clientele and therefore a small market 
share. In this case, the access margin could be viewed as a subsidy from 
dominant operators to virtual operators.  
 Sequential award of new licenses  
In the mobile market, grants of new mobile licenses could provide an 
additional tool of public intervention. For instance, new licenses could be 
offered exclusively to new entrants or to late entrants (for instance, pure 3G 
players). Such a rule would provide new players with a first-mover 
advantage over incumbent operators for the development of new 
technologies or services and the acquisition of a customer base.  
                                                                                                                             
cost of switching suppliers (due to the change of SIM cards and terminals). This 
constraint is all the more important as entrants occupy a low position in the ladder 
of investment. 
81  For example, in the fixed broadband market, unbundled-based operators receive 
interconnection revenues, which is not true of operators using bitstream access 
wholesale offers. In the mobile market, only full MVNOs receive interconnection 
revenues. 
82  Higher interconnection charges for access to the entrant’s network than to the 
incumbents’ networks. 
83  In particular, the magnitude of the reduction of demand would be high with an 
elastic demand and if the asymmetry in market shares between the entrants and 
the incumbents were low. 
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HOW THE MOBILE AND FIXED BROADBAND MARKETS 
DIFFER AND HOW THE DIFFERENCES IMPACT THE LADDER 
OF INVESTMENT 
 Spectrum: a scarce resource 
While fixed broadband operators use different types of access technologies 
(cable, power line…), the unbundling of the incumbent’s copper local loop 
has developed service-based competition in most countries. In this context, 
the theory of the ladder of investment highlights that regulatory authorities 
ambition the development of competition between different access 
infrastructures. In the mobile market, the situation is different. Mobile 
network operators use a frequency band to deliver services. Since these 
frequencies are run by the States and represent a scarce resource, the 
number of competing infrastructures is technologically limited. Public 
authorities must consequently select which operators will receive a license 
and be allowed to compete in the market. Licenses generally entail 
obligations in terms of coverage and quality of service. To the extent that the 
path of development of their network is imposed in the schedule of 
conditions, the question of the optimal incentive mechanism to stimulate 
infrastructure development is obsolete in the case of a new licensed mobile 
network operator. 
 Duplication and social desirability  
As said above, facility-based competition is the long-term goal pursued by 
most regulatory authorities. Network duplication, however, has a social cost. 
Moreover, infrastructure-based competition in the mobile market raises 
public health issues and landscape preservation.  
Before defining a ladder of investment, Cave (2006) insisted on the need to 
establish which network elements are clearly not replicable: “If it is decided, 
for example, that the local loop is a natural monopoly, then any regulatory 
approach that creates infrastructure-building incentives in this element is not 
appropriate.”  
For mobiles, this replicability analysis should not only be based on cost 
structure, but must also incorporate a societal component (health, urban 
development…). Thus, even in a hypothetical case where frequencies are no 
longer a scarce resource, and where the number of MNOs would be 
unconstrained, encouraging too much duplication of the wireless local loop 
would probably not be optimal and not just for financial reasons. 
Infrastructure sharing would probably be an appropriate alternative to 
duplication for certain network segments.  
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One possibility would be to grant collective licenses rather than individual 
licenses. For example, a group of virtual operators could be awarded a 
collective license, encouraging them to share investments in the wireless 
local loop and to deploy their own core network.  
CONCLUSION 
Our analysis suggests that the concept of the ladder of investment could be 
applied, to some extent, to the mobile market. Indeed, a mobile network can 
be divided into different network elements, which can be classified according 
to their degree of replicability – as did Cave (2006) for the fixed broadband 
market. Moreover, one of the main reasons to implement a ladder of 
investment in the fixed broadband market - in particular, to facilitate the 
gradual acquisition of a customer base - seems equally relevant in the 
mobile market.  
However, the ladder of investment for the fixed broadband market 
constitutes a regulatory response to a different situation than in the mobile 
market. Unlike the fixed broadband market that was (and sometimes, still is) 
characterized by a monopoly on the local infrastructure, in the mobile 
market, facility-based competition has been intense since market inception. 
Therefore, establishing an incentive mechanism, based on the concept of 
the ladder of investment, doesn’t appear essential. Rather, the key issue is 
to understand why facility-based competition between MNOs does not lead 
to a competitive wholesale market for MVNOs. Bourreau, Hombert, Pouyet 
and Schutz (2007) suggest that the strategic interactions between the 
wholesale market and the retail market could explain this situation, and 
propose different ways of public intervention.  
There are also technological obstacles to establish a ladder of investment for 
the mobile market. Radio frequencies constitute a limited resource. The 
number of players which can climb the ladder entirely is therefore 
technologically limited. Thus, an operator investing in the construction of a 
mobile network up to a given ladder rung would face a high degree of 
uncertainty, because the final investment in the wireless local loop depends 
on available frequencies.  
Finally, infrastructure duplication in mobile markets is not necessarily 
desirable, not only for standard cost considerations, but also for public health 
considerations or the preservation of landscape. The social desirability of a 
ladder of investment in the mobile market does not therefore appear as 
clear-cut as for the fixed broadband market. 
If, however, we ignore these remarks and assume that the ladder of 
investment is relevant in the mobile market, it would be important to account 
for fixed-mobile convergence. Indeed, players in the fixed broadband market 
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have to integrate a mobile offer84 to provide a diversified and competitive 
range of services. Operators having climbed the ladder of investment in the 
fixed broadband market benefit from economies of scope if they enter the 
mobile market. Indeed, the infrastructure that these operators own in the 
core network – e.g., transmission links – could be used to develop a mobile 
infrastructure, leading to substantial investment savings. These facilities 
could also be rented to other MNOs or MVNOs, and hence generate 
wholesale revenues. 
In addition, owning an SIP network allows these operators to provide users 
with a mobile access to their network. Some fixed broadband service 
providers could also use WIFI coverage provided by their ADSL box to 
benefit from a wireless communication network, such as mobile VoIP offers. 
This opportunity has two benefits: it would allow the convergent operator to 
depend less on host MNOs in areas where the operator has a strong 
capillarity of ADSL users and to provide more attractive VoIP offers. 
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Abstract: There is a perception, by some, that the U.S. wireless market, compared to 
its European counterparts, is failing and in need of regulatory remedies. This chapter 
tests this hypothesis by examining the evidence of market failure and finds that the 
U.S. wireless market has more choice, lower concentration, higher monthly usage and 
lower prices than in other parts of the world. In effect, increased facility-based 
competition appears to go hand-in-hand with increased consumer welfare. Therefore, 
the contention that the U.S. wireless market lags its international counterparts is not 
supported by economic data and no further regulation is needed to address this issue. 
INTRODUCTION 
A frequent claim is that the European wireless market has more choices, is 
healthier and has lower prices than the U.S. wireless market. For many 
years, statistics from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) have shown Europe to be far ahead of the U.S. in 
terms of cellular service penetration. Suggestions that the U.S. wireless 
market is slower to innovate and generally lags other parts of the world have 
contributed to a recent Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
decision to place additional rules upon bidders in the 2008 wireless spectrum 
auction. In testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, senior 
counsel for Consumers Union testified that “in Europe and Asia, wireless 
consumers have better choices” (Murray 2007). Referring to the U.S. market, 
this testimony states, “instead of innovating, the wireless industry has 
become a cozy cartel of a few dominant providers with limited device 
offerings” (Murray 2007). All of these concerns have fueled a debate over 
the need to correct the U.S. wireless market, including proposals to add 
regulations, mimicking a European-style model. 
If there is a problem, a healthy public policy debate is needed to address 
how to fix it. However, before coming to conclusions that regulatory 
remedies should be considered, a review of the empirical evidence is 
needed. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether the U.S. market 
actually lags Europe and, if so, the extent of the gap.  
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EVALUATING MARKET FAILURE 
Economic theory provides a rationale for regulation but only if markets fail 
and the remedy addressing this market failure (e.g., government regulation) 
leads to net social benefits. Therefore, in this study, the contention that the 
U.S. lags Europe will be evaluated by comparing the wireless industry’s 
structure, conduct and performance in search of actual market failure.  
The contention that the U.S. lags Europe is supported by the following 
hypothesis – the U.S. market is more concentrated than the European 
market, leading to higher consumer prices and lower penetration rates in the 
U.S. Based on this purported market failure, the end result is lower 
consumer welfare in the U.S. than in Europe. This is a testable hypothesis. 
MARKET STRUCTURE 
Data from the OECD and FCC suggest that the U.S. wireless market is not 
as concentrated as markets in Europe, or elsewhere for that matter. Data 
from the OECD show that the U.S. wireless market has a higher number of 
wireless competitors than in Europe or any other county. Therefore, 
according to publicly available information, the conclusion that Europe has 
more competitors and more choice is incorrect. This point is also supported 
by a Merrill Lynch (2007) report, as well as several consulting reports 
(Schwartz and Mini 2007, Ford & al. 2007, and Lowenstein 2007). Further, a 
CTIA (2007) report shows that the U.S. offers 700 different wireless 
handsets compared to about 190 for the U.K.  
Looking at the number of wireless operators “permitted” to provide wireless 
broadband services, the U.S. leads all European counties. Moreover, the 
“U.S. mobile operators have the flexibility to upgrade their networks to 3G on 
their existing 2G networks (cellular, PCS, SRM) spectrum,” (OECD 2007) 
while European GSM operators must rebuild their networks. This means that 
the OECD data understate the number of permitted U.S. operators, and 
explains how the U.S. is rolling out wireless broadband services so quickly 
and sometimes offering services that provide twice the speed of European 
wireless broadband services (Mossberg 2006).  
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Table 4. Number of Wireless Operators (2005) 
 MNO Licences 
Australia 4 4 
Austria 4 4 
Belgium 3 3 
Canada 17 2 
Czech Republic 3 3 
Denmark 4 4 
Finland 15 3 
France 25 3 
Germany 4 4 
Greece 4 3 
Hungary 3 3 
Iceland 3 0 
Ireland 4 3 
Italy 3 4 
Japan 17 12 
Korea 3 3 
Luxembourg 3 3 
Mexico 18 1 
Netherlands 4 4 
Norway 3 3 
Poland 3 4 
Portugal 3 3 
Slovakia 2 2 
Spain 3 4 
Sweden 4 4 
Switzerland 5 4 
Turkey 3 0 
United Kingdom 5 5 
United States  155  5+ 
Source: OECD Communications Outlook, OECD, 2007, p. 35, 2005 Data 
 
Is it possible that the U.S. market has more wireless operators, but it is 
dominated by only a few? The OECD data give the market share for the top 
3 wireless providers and show that the contention that the wireless market is 
a “cozy cartel” is less a U.S. problem than it is a European one. 
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Figure 6. Market Share - Top 3 Firms 
 
Source: OECD, ACI Calculations, 2005  
 
A final way to look at industry concentration is to use the measure widely 
accepted by the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission and many world courts – the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. We 
find that the U.S. has the lowest concentration index when compared to all of 
the OECD listed companies. In summary, the U.S. wireless market has more 
operators and is less concentrated than any other international market for 
which data are available. 
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Figure 7. HHI concentration indexes 
 
Source: OECD, ACI Calculations, 2005 
CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE 
If the U.S. market is not as concentrated as its European counterparts, could 
it still operate as a “cozy cartel,” effectively driving up consumer prices and 
restricting supply? This is also a testable hypothesis. FCC data (next figure) 
show that the U.S. has the lowest rates (measured by revenue per minute) 
of any major developed economy with the exception of Hong Kong. The FCC 
concludes “mobile calls continue to be significantly less expensive on a per 
minute basis in the United States than in Western Europe or Japan” (FCC 
2006). Therefore, not only is the U.S. less concentrated, but it offers more 
competitive prices than other countries.  
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Figure 8. Average Revenue per Minute ($) 
 
Source: FCC 
 
It is important to note that Europe uses a “calling party pays” system that 
bills customers for originating minutes, whereas, in the U.S. system, 
customers are billed for both originating and terminating minutes. This 
means that the U.S. system counts more minutes, which would affect the 
relative comparison of average monthly usage and price. Schwartz and Mini 
(2007) conducted an independent analysis correcting for differences in 
payment system and still found U.S. prices to be lower than all of the major 
European countries. They also make a correction for the prevalence of 
dormant (not active) phones in the European statistics. Their analysis also 
shows that U.S. prices have decreased faster as a percent or in absolute 
terms, compared to all major European countries (Schwartz and Mini 2007).  
Another adverse effect of market power is restriction of supply which leads to 
consumer welfare losses. However, data from the FCC show that the U.S. 
market has the highest usage. In 2005, U.S. wireless consumers talked on 
average 800 minutes per month, while consumers in some European nations 
average less than 200 minutes. In other words, the more concentrated 
European wireless markets charge consumers substantially more per minute 
which, in turn, leads to lower usage by consumers.  
Infrastructure versus Service-based Competition: the Case of Mobile Telecommunications 
- 103 – 
 
 
Figure 9. Wireless Minutes of Use per Month 
 
Source: FCC  
 
These conclusions hold up even after accounting for differences in 
measurement between Europe and the U.S. Specifically, Schwartz & Mini 
(2007) show that the average U.S. consumer uses about three times more 
minutes per month than the average European consumer. 
Another comparative observation is that the relationship between usage and 
price appears to be negatively correlated. As depicted in the chart below, as 
wireless prices increase, customer minutes decrease. U.S. consumers 
evidently benefit (as measured by consumer welfare) more from wireless 
services than their European counterparts. From these data, we conclude 
that market failure appears to be a European problem, not a U.S. problem. 
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Figure 10. More Minutes at Lower Prices 
 
Wireless minutes/month 
Source: OECD 
NON-PRICE EFFECTS 
This chapter has discussed how increased facility-based competition 
appears to go hand-in-hand with lower consumer prices and increased 
consumer welfare. However, while it is more difficult to measure, some 
anecdotal evidence suggests that increased competition also leads to non-
price effects.  
In general, increased facility-based competition in the U.S. market has made 
wireless providers very responsive to changes in consumer preferences. 
Considering that it is consumers that pay the bills and, when given market 
choices, anecdotal evidence suggests that wireless providers are indeed 
listening. Wireless consumers are now expressing more diverse needs and 
there are indications that competitors are responding by increasing the 
differentiation of services in order to meet those needs. Pricing solutions that 
attracted mainstream consumers years ago and standardized “out-of-the-
box” solutions are slowly giving way to demands for specialized solutions, 
flexibility and service differentiation.  
Facility-based competition has led to continual improvement in service 
quality. For example, the Federal Communications Commission reports that 
wireless complaints fell by 33% in 2006. Faster wireless high-speed Internet 
services are now available to hundreds of millions of consumers and 
consumers are demanding more, better and faster services, as evidenced by 
the frenzy surrounding the iPhone.  
In addition, competitors are now offering prorated early termination fees and 
are unlocking phones, which enables consumers to switch more easily 
between competitors. Wireless competitors are now opening their network to 
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allow access to any web site, as well as allowing the use any devise or 
applications. There are also many nuances that may attract some 
consumers to one service provider over others. For example, some 
providers offer flexible rollover minutes and most providers offer 30-day no-
question-asked return policies. As other competitors enter the market, 
service innovation and differentiation are likely to continue – all to the benefit 
of consumers and all without onerous regulations. In short, competition has 
given consumers the power and the market is listening. 
ONE CAVEAT: POTENTIAL PROBLEM WITH OECD PUBLISHED 
DATA 
This chapter has shown that the U.S. market has lower market 
concentration, more competitive prices and greater acceptance among 
consumers. However, these findings are counter to published international 
data on market penetration. The problem with these international statistics is 
that they do not count the same things. In the U.S., wireless subscriptions 
primarily reflect the number of handsets in operation. However, in Europe, 
the statistics reflect the number of Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards. 
Since European roaming rates are so high between countries, it is 
sometimes economical for consumers to have more than one SIM card per 
handset, to take advantage of lower in-country rates. As a result, one 
wireless customer may have several SIM cards and be counted multiple 
times in the OECD statistics. In addition, pre-paid wireless plans are more 
prevalent in Europe than in the U.S., and these customers tend to use 
wireless services much less than post-paid customers. Correction of these 
differences will decrease the reported European penetration rate relative to 
the U.S.  
CONCLUSION 
Calls for a regulatory remedy are not based on sound empirical evidence. 
The data from the OECD and FCC show that European wireless markets 
have higher concentration, higher prices and lower usage. From this 
analysis, the U.S. wireless market gives consumers more choice, offers 
more competitive prices and encourages more consumption. Compared to 
Europe, reported problems of high market concentration, high consumer 
prices, low usage and decreasing consumer welfare do not appear to be a 
U.S. problem. In summary, there is no evidence of market failure or that the 
U.S. wireless market somehow lags behind the European wireless market. In 
fact, if anything, basic comparisons of consumer welfare between these 
markets demonstrate the opposite conclusion, perhaps suggesting that 
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increased facility-based competition may be one key to the market’s 
success. 
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Abstract: A comparative analysis of European mobile market structures (in terms of 
number of operators) and performances (price, volume, penetration) is presented, in 
order to reveal an “optimal structure”. It has been shown that markets with three 
players are those that have the most success in relation to these criteria. Without 
concluding that this is a “golden number”, these results suggest to authorities that 
there is not necesseraly an economic rationale to add more operators (MNOs as well 
as MVNOs) that will have to face the persistant first movers advantages of the 
incumbents. It also indicates that granting an additional license doest not lead, in any 
circumstance, to an increase in the consumers’ surplus.  
INTRODUCTION 
The “structural” approach in industrial economics stipulates (roughtly) that 
the intensity of the competition is inversely proportional to the concentration 
of the offer. However, in the presence of scale economies, the unit costs are 
decreasing with the level of production (number of users and volume of 
traffic in the case of mobile phones). In a market where the demand is fixed, 
an increase in the number of firms limits their individual size and, thus, 
thwarts economies of scale. Thus, the dispersion of the offer (that 
guarantees the competitive intensity) therefore hinders productive 
effectiveness. 
In the various European mobile markets, the number of infrastructure 
operators varies from two (as in Norway, for example) to five (as in the 
United Kingdom). Faced with this diversity in national market structures, it 
would be helpful to empirically determine whether a “natural structure” to the 
offer is observed over the long term. In other words: can European 
experience lend itself to demonstrating an optimal structure of the mobile 
telephony market that balances, as much as possible, the contradiction 
between large-scale players’ needs (for economies of scale), and the 
necessity for numerous players in order to preserve competitive pressure? 
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Our paper is designed to highlight this question, within the context of 
European mobile telephony. The first section will address the concept of the 
“optimal market structure”, in a resolutely simple and didactical manner. The 
second section analyses the data relating to Europe’s mobile telephony 
markets (in terms of price, volume and rate of penetration), enabling the 
optimal structure to be assessed, and, most specifically, providing evidence 
for the debate concerning competition in infrastructures within the mobile 
telephony markets. 
On the basis of at least ten years’ experience in mobile markets, what can 
be said concerning the number of operators for whom granting an additional 
license no longer benefits the consumer? 
 “BACK TO BASICS”: THEORETICAL REMINDERS OF THE 
OPTIMAL MARKET STRUCTURE 
Within the context of a market open to competition, the number of firms is 
theoretically not limited (except by the profitability of entry), enabling various 
market structures, competitive intensities and levels of equilibrium prices to 
be envisioned. Theoretically, once again, if the competition is not biased, the 
increasing the number of firms on the market will cause the prices to lower.  
The standard equation therefore stipulates that:  
 
Where: 
 L =  The Lerner Index of market power85. 
 HHI =  Concentration Index86. 
                                                           
85  L= (P-Mc)/P where P = price and Mc = Marginal cost. Thus, the Lerner Index is 
greater than 1 and increases as the price exceeds the marginal cost 
(denominator in the equation). The market power is therefore measured as a 
firm’s or group of firms’ capacity to raise the price above marginal cost. In the 
standard model, equality between the price and marginal cost is the pure and 
perfect balance of competition. 
86  The HHI (Hirshman-Herfindahl Index) is a concentration index. It is calculated by 
adding the squares of market shares for all firms in the sector. For example, in a 
market with five firms who each have a market share of 20%, the HHI is: 400 + 
400 + 400 + 400 + 400 = 2000. The higher the HHI is, the higher the 
concentration, with a maximum value of 10,000 reached for a monopolized 
market. The HHI value rises when: 1/ The number of firms present is low; 2/ The 
dispersion of the sizes of firms in competition is high. 
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 e = Price demand elasticity. 
As a result, the higher the concentration, the greater the market power is, 
and the greater the risk that there will be a larger gap between the prices 
and the level of competition, which guarantees collective welfare. However, 
the maximum number of viable players over the long term on a market may 
be limited by high fixed costs. If the number of providers present on the 
market increases, the average market share will mechanically decrease, as 
well as the scale economies. 
Let us consider a standard operation of average cost: 
 
Assuming that all operators use the same technology over the long term 
(efficient operators), let’s outline the cost functions for diverse market 
structures with 1, 2, 3 or 4 players, assuming that each has an equal market 
share. 
The following figure shows (classically) that when there are few providers 
present on the market, the profit is very significant. However, exceeding a 
maximum number of players, this positive profit disappears and the long-
term survival of an “nth” operator cannot be assured (in the present case, 
n=4). On the short-term, the providers in place might prefer making room for 
this “nth” provider, which in turn leads to an increase in prices, rather than 
risking a “price war” with an uncertain outcome which furthermore would not 
increase the margin level. 
 
Figure 11. Evolution of Costs and Margins in Terms of Market Structure 
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To clarify even further, the next figure indicates the unit cost of a product, 
according to the number of providers present on a market, assuming that 
these providers have equal market share, and that the fixed costs in the 
monopoly case represent 20% of the total costs. It is noted that, in this case, 
the unit costs increase significantly according to the number of providers on 
the market. 
 
Figure 12. Evolution of average costs in terms of the number of providers on the 
market 
 
 
Inasmuch as the unit costs are more significant within the context of a 
market with many firms, these firms have the tendency to compensate for 
these costs through prices. 
Thus, two contradictory forces act according to the number of players 
present: 
 competitive pressure causes prices to decrease when the number 
of players increase... 
 …and economies of scale when the number of players decreases.  
 
Ideally, the number of players on the market that poses the best compromise 
between these two forces should be found.  
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Figure 13. Optimal market structure 
 
TRANSPOSITION TO THE MOBILE TELEPHONY MARKET IN 
EUROPE 
Concerning mobile telephony, managing this pressure is the responsibility of 
the public authorities who assign frequencies (thus designing the market 
structure), and not the result of a natural entry/exit process. Modelling the 
simultaneous impact of the competitive pressure and economies of scale on 
the prices of mobile telephone is not trivial. However, it is possible to outline 
a comparative analysis that crosses the market structures (from 2 to 5 
operators in the European case) and performance indicators. 
The following figure shows the average price per minute in European 
countries according to the number of operators present on the national 
market. Thus, consumers in countries with a 3-operator structure profit from 
lower average prices – about 0.21€ per minute. Countries with a more 
concentrated 2-operator structure, or those on the opposite end of the 
spectrum with a less concentrated 4- or 5-operator structure have higher 
average prices, from 0.23 to 0.28 €. 
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Figure 14. Average price per minute, according to the number of operators on 
the national market (in 2005)87 
 
Source: OMSYC-Quantifica data, TERA analysis 
 
 
It is noteworthy that, coherent with the price level, average consumption per 
user (traffic in minutes) is maximized with the market structure of 3 
operators. In fact, the average consumption per user in countries surveyed 
with 3 operators is 160 minutes per month, a number that falls to 109 
minutes per month with 4 operators, representing a decrease of more than 
31%. With 5 operators, average consumption falls to 105 minutes per month. 
It is also lower on a market with 2 operators. 
                                                           
87  The sample is composed of markets of the EU 15, excluding Luxemburg. Prices 
are calculated in PPP. 
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Figure 15. Average traffic per user, according to number of operators on the 
national market (in 2005) 
 
Source: OMSYC data, TERA analysis 
 
 
The comparative analysis of 14 European countries thus reveals that the 
markets with a three-operator structure present both lower average prices 
per minute, and higher average consumption per user.  
Some may object, stating that this relationship between structures and 
performance could be explained differently. In fact, in countries with a high 
number of operators (low concentration), the competitive dynamic could 
foster more widespread use of mobile phones throughout the population. 
Therefore, the greater the distribution, the more the “small” consumers must 
be reached. As these small consumers do not benefit from the best unit 
rates, the average price per minute of communication sold on the market 
may rise, while average traffic per user may decrease. 
To verify whether or not this phenomenon exists in Europe, the number of 
operators and penetration rate of mobile telephony within the population 
must be compared. From this, it is deduced (refer to next figure) that the 
increase in number of operators finally has almost no impact on the 
penetration rate; increasing from 3 to 4 operators only provides a 1.6% 
increase in penetration rate, while increasing from 4 to 5 operators only 
provides a 0.3% increase. 
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Figure 16. Average penetration rate of mobile telephony, according to the 
number of operators on the national market (in 2006)88 
 
Source: OMSYC-Quantifica data, TERA analysis 
 
 
Therefore, the higher rate levels and lower consumption volumes in 
countries where there are 4 or 5 operators can not justify the differences in 
penetration of mobile telephony within the population. 
COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
It is important, obviously, to produce very prudent comments on the basis of 
these results. First of all, because the sample is reduced, and secondly 
because factors other than prices or quantities shall be taken into account to 
judge performances (innovations in offered services, most specifically). 
We will therefore formulate a very careful conclusion: 
 The data gathered suggest that the equilibrium point between 
pressures (“economies of scale” vs. “competitive intensity”) would 
be 3 operators. 
                                                           
88  Based on the penetration rate of individuals equipped within the population, and 
not on the SIM card penetration rate, which neglects the phenomena of double or 
triple equipment. 
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 On the contrary, and proof of our caution, nothing indicates that the 
4th and 5th operators produce a perceptible positive effect for the 
user. 
 
To briefly refer to the famous Selten’s article (1973)89, this present report 
suggests that, on the European mobile markets, “2 operators are too few, 
and 4 are too many”. 
This should incite reflection relating to the European Commission’s policy 
that attempted to promote market structures with four or five players when 
third generation licenses were granted, and to any regulatory authority that 
would like to believe that, in a sector of infrastructures such as mobile 
networks, no matter what the circumstances, granting additional licenses is a 
gauge of the increased collective long-term welfare. Benzoni & Geoffron 
(2007) have produced a detailed analysis of the “first movers advantages” 
(i.e. of the first license holders) that explain this phenomenon and highlight 
the low market power of the 3th, 4th, 5th operators. 
The European history of 2nd generation mobile markets therefore bears the 
mark of a competition infrastructure biased by awarding of licenses over 
time, which in turn “cursed” the most recent entries. Though history has been 
written, the future is open, under the following conditions : 
 Authorities shall not consider that service-based competition 
(through MVNOs) suffices to correct the initial bias of infrastructure 
competition. It is likely that, no more so than the most recent 
operators who’ve entered the market, the MVNOs will not be able to 
compete with incumbent operators. It is therefore not guaranteed 
that MVNOs is an efficient to “tool” to manage pressure between 
“economies of scale” and “competition”. 
 In addition, it is important not to reproduce the errors experienced in 
the 2nd generation (GSM), for the 3rd (UMTS) and 4th generations. 
Even if it may already be too late for the UMTS. 
                                                           
89  Selten, R., 1973, “A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition where 4 are Few and 
6 are Many”, International Journal of Game Theory, 2, 141 – 201. Recent 
economic experiments place the same bar below Selten’s. Case in point: Huck S. 
& alii (2004), “Two Are Few and Four Are Many: Number Effects in Experimental 
Oligopolies”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 53, 435–446. 
Infrastructure versus Service-based Competition: the Case of Mobile Telecommunications 
- 116 – 
 
REFERENCES 
Benzoni L., Geoffron P. (eds.) (2007), “Competition and Regulation with Asymmetries 
in Mobile Markets”, Quantifica, 2007.  
Busse M. (2000), “Multimarket Contact and Price Coordination in the Cellular 
Telephony Industry”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 9, No. 3, Fall, 
287-320. 
Gebhardt G., Wambach A. (2008), “Actions to Implement the Efficient Market 
structure”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 26, Issue 3, May 
2008, Pages 846-859. 
Heil O.P., Helsen K. (2001), “Toward an understanding of price wars: Their Nature and 
How They Erupt”, International Journal of Research in Marketing, 18 2001 83–98. 
Huck S. & alii (2004), “Two Are Few and Four Are Many: Number Effects in 
Experimental Oligopolies”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 53, 435–
446. 
Klemperer P. (1989), “Price Wars Caused by Switching Costs”, Review of Economic 
Studies, 56, 405-420. 
Parker P.M, Röller, L.H. (1997), “Collusive Conduct in Duopolies: Multimarket Contact 
and Cross-Ownership in the Mobile Telephone Industry”, Rand Journal of Economics 
28, Summer, 304-322. 
Selten R. (1973), “A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where four are few and 
six are many”, International Journal of Game Theory, 2, 141–201. 
Stigler G.J. (1964), “A Theory of Oligopoly”, Journal of Political Economy, 72, 44-61. 
 
Infrastructure versus Service-based Competition: the Case of Mobile Telecommunications 
- 117 – 
 
The “Service versus Infrastructure” Debate in 
the Context of the European Mobile Markets 
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__________________________________ 
Abstract: This paper discusses the reasoning favouring infrastructure over service-
based competition in the context of the European mobile telephony sector. Using 
principally basic economics and finance toolkits, it is stressed that, because of the 
characteristics of mobile industry (a fast changing industry with high initial irreversible 
investments) and the complex nature of competition in the European mobile industry, 
infrastructure-based competition presents more “guarantees” as regards innovation 
dynamics over the long term.  
INTRODUCTION  
The controversial issue of service-based competition versus infrastructure-
based competition in telecommunications has retained the attention of 
economists, lawyers as well as regulators. Service-based competition is 
essentially believed to bring lower retail prices, more innovation at the 
“edges”, while infrastructure-based entails more investments, and hence 
more advanced technology and innovations at the “core”, including higher 
cost reduction (Bergman 2004, Henten & Skouby 2006). 
The same opposition of views re-appears in mobile services regarding 
competition between MVNOs (Mobile Virtual Network Operators) and MNOs 
(Mobile Network Operators). Some believe that there should be intervention 
in mobile markets to encourage entry of MVNOs to increase competition on 
the retail market and consumer choices, while others suggest intervention 
should be minimal. 
Certainly, these conflicting interests of both parties may call for appropriate 
regulation to harmonise both types of competition, when possible. To 
address this issue, we argue that because of the characteristics of mobile 
industry (a fast changing industry with high initial irreversible investments) 
and the complex nature of competition in this kind of industry in Europe (both 
national and pan-European players, first movers advantages,…), 
infrastructure-based competition presents more “guarantees” as regards the 
innovation dynamics over the long term.  
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OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE COMPETITION 
IN THE EUROPEAN MOBILE INDUSTRY 
It is obvious that mobile telephony is a fast changing industry, starting with 
analogue technology, following into the 1990s with the GSM technology 
boom, perceived as a successful regulatory approach in Europe90. At the 
current time of writing, many European MNOs have already rolled out 3G 
networks with much higher data transmission speeds, more powerful 
platforms, creating greater room for innovation and providing greater benefits 
for mobile users. On the cost side, the mobile industry is characterised by 
low marginal costs but huge initial investments to set up networks (base 
station level for example). More importantly, most of these investments are 
irreversible (for example the cost of digging and installing the lines to roll out 
new networks). 
This clearly leads to a number of striking implications: 
 First, from a social point of view, irreversible investment can be 
seen as an instrument of business commitment. 
 Second, scale economies exist in the mobile industry; i.e.: the more 
customers served leads to expected lower retail prices, although 
retail prices will never equal marginal costs. 
 Finally, due to market uncertainty, the risks associated with 
investments are generally higher than they are in other industries 
where costs can be reversed.  
 
In European mobile markets, infrastructure-based competition was 
introduced from the very beginning with around two competitors per country. 
Today, in each European market, there are between 3 and 5 infrastructure-
based mobile competitors. Thus, the issue of “slow introduction” of 
infrastructure-based competition (like in broadband) has not been a real 
issue for mobile markets because many mobile operators have built their 
networks in less than 2 years. Moreover, it seems that, in choosing to 
promote such infrastructure competition there has been no or few inefficient 
duplications on investments (Benzoni and Geoffron 2007). Even if, at the 
lowest level (local network), the efficiency of Base Stations (BTS) duplication 
might be questioned, site sharing offers an opportunity to inhibit this potential 
problem. 
                                                           
90  For a detailed history of Europe’s mobile telephony, one can consult Dunnewijk & 
Hultén (2007). 
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The positive results of infrastructure competition may be summarised in 
considering, as detailed in the next figures : 
 The evolution on penetration rate up to 110% in 2007. 
 The 50% decrease of prices between 2004 and 2007 for a medium 
consumer91. 
 
Figure 17. Evolution of mobile services prices in Europe 
 
Figure 18. Evolution of mobile penetration rate in Europe 
 
Source: European Commission  
 
                                                           
91  European Commission, “European Electronic Communications Regulation and 
Markets 2008” 
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Thus, such figures are consistent with analyses developed in the broadband 
where, Dispaso et al (2006) and Wallsten (2006) show that infrastructure-
based competition (‘inter-brand’ competition) is more likely to increase the 
diffusion rates rather than service-based competition (‘intra-brand’ 
competition). And, we shall consider that these results have been obtained 
with a rather low regulation level as regulatory bodies just intervene in 
subjects such as interconnection, national roaming or number portability. In 
mobile markets, regulation in Europe is far less strict than in fixed markets as 
there was more than one GSM operator from the beginning.  
Nevertheless, some limits of the infrastructure competition must be 
underlined.  
A fallacy in competition analysis is to basically observe the number of 
players in an identical market while the nature of competition has its own 
characteristics. In the mobile industry, due to fast changing technology, 
MNOs are likely to engage in competition “for” the market, as well as “in” the 
market and benefit from “first mover advantages”. This can be evident from 
the current European mobile market using GSM technology, where late 
entrants remain much smaller than the earlier entrants in terms of market 
share and profitability (Benzoni and Geoffron 2007).  
The introduction of more service-based competition through MVNO, may 
weaken moreover the later entrants without limiting the incumbents’ market 
power.  For example, compared to the previous year, the number of mobile 
service providers in EU (mobile virtual network operators, enhanced service 
providers or simple resellers) has risen to 290 in 2006, an increase of 76. 
Nevertheless « the actual decrease in the market share of the leading 
operators was relatively small between 2004 and 2006. In percentage terms, 
the decrease in the leading operator’s market share in terms of subscribers 
between 2005 and 2006 was only 0.2% while the main competitors 
increased their market share by 0.1% between 2005 and 2006 » [European 
Commission 2007].  
CONSIDERATIONS ON THE OPTIMAL REGULATION OF 
MNOS-MVNOS RELATIONSHIPS 
Regarding these results, NRAs should carefully consider any intervention to 
regulate the MNOs-MVNOs relationships: the risk to obtain an “adverse” 
result in disturbing the infrastructure competition due to the weakening of the 
later entrants shall not be neglected. The following considerations deserved 
to be taken into account in that context to appropriately balance the 
regulation of wholesale markets where MNOs and MVNOs negotiate. 
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 Innovation in the mobile industry 
In the European mobile industry, it is still unclear if service-based 
competition may sustain more innovation while mobile users benefit from 
more choices on retail services coming both from the “core” or the “edges”.  
Obviously, MVNO entries are likely to provide more innovation at the edge, 
for instance more game applications or music downloads. Innovation at the 
core includes change in technology platforms to provide better quality and 
new advanced services. With regard to mobile telephony, 3G technology 
provides better data transmission speed and service quality compared to 
GSM technology, and hence increases much consumer welfare. 
From a practical perspective, there is no obvious documented evidence of 
the substantial benefits of innovation from service-based competition. It has 
not been proven that products and services delivered by MVNOs could not 
be provided by MNOs. Indeed, some MVNOs can be basically considered as 
resellers under the auspice of their brand names, as they are unable to 
supply innovative products or operate with “lifestyle” orientations. 
 Irreversible investments and costs of delay 
As mentioned above, most infrastructure investment in the mobile industry 
can be regarded as irreversible which increases risks for MNOs as it is 
unlikely to recoup their investments in case of unfavourable market 
conditions to re-invest in other businesses. In the extreme case, improper 
regulation may lead to taking a no investment decision even when socially 
desirable (Sandbach 2006). In a more general case, MNOs may defer and 
take their investment decision when more information is gathered.  
Although a late decision to invest might be beneficial for MNOs as they can 
employ more modern technology with lower costs, consumer and social 
welfare are greatly reduced. To give an order of quantification, we can 
mention Haussman (2000) who pointed out that the ten-year delay to 
introducing voice-messaging services might cost billions of dollars to US 
citizens. 
In finding solutions for a proper methodology to regulate wholesale markets, 
real option analysis has proven to be useful in regulating wholesale tariffs. 
Much real option analysis in telecommunications has been developed and 
fundamentally shows that cost oriented wholesale tariffs do not provide 
investment incentives (Trigeorgis et al. 2000, Pindyck 2007). This is because 
MNOs bear all risks associated with infrastructure investments, and should 
be compensated with a mark-up on wholesale tariffs.  
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 Discrimination and net neutrality debate 
This topic has been controversial for both theorists and practitioners in 
telecommunications around the world. As discussed elsewhere in literature 
(Tirole 1990, for instance), some forms of discrimination can be Pareto 
optimal. In the mobile telephony context, “sellers” (MNOs) are somehow 
better informed than regulators over their “buyers” (MVNOs). For this reason, 
inappropriate intervention should constrain this ability and hence be 
detrimental to social welfare. Indeed, if innovations are great or if final retail 
products provided by an MVNO are highly differentiated, exclusory 
behaviour of the MNOs is unlikely to be the case since MNOs can increase 
their scale economy by supporting MVNOs.  
Furthermore, European regulation principles have successfully overcome 
this concern by obliging transparency in wholesale offers without being able 
to discriminate, and implement vertical separation in telecommunications 
(Cave & Crocioni 2007). 
 Cherry picking behaviour 
Broadly speaking, there is a high possibility that low access tariffs result in 
“cherry picking” activities. In particular, entrants could lure market shares by 
simply lowering retail prices without necessarily offering differentiated 
services. Put differently, regulating wholesale markets can be seen as an 
instrument to re-regulate mobile retail markets. As mentioned above, MNOs 
are better informed than regulators with respect to MVNOs’ business. One 
way to prevent this opportunistic behaviour is to allow MNOs and MVNOs to 
bargain over access fees to obtain an optimal outcome without incurring 
regulatory costs. 
 Ladder of investment 
Professor Martin Cave and his co-authors famously proposed an access 
mechanism in telecommunications that both encourage efficient entry and 
investments which is known as a “ladder of investments”. Theoretically, new 
entrants can access incumbent networks at a low access fee so they can 
operate on the market. Access fees should then gradually increase as 
entrants establish their presence on the market and be able to invest in their 
own new networks. This mechanism can promote both service-based and 
infrastructure-based competition in the long run. 
The ladder of investment theory, however, presents some limits. Some 
studies have pointed out the difficulty in implementing the “ladder of 
investment” in practice. Firstly, Oldale & Padilla (2004) argue that there may 
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be commitment problems: market players may not want to invest because of 
lower expected profits and wait to “free ride” rivals.  Secondly, even when 
there is a regulatory commitment, it is still possible that the regulatory regime 
may penalise the “good”, and compensate the “bad”, because later entrants 
have incentives to enjoy a longer beneficial regulatory period (Joao 2007). 
Later entrants do not compete very aggressively meaning that 
competitiveness may not be strengthened despite new market entry.  
With respect to the mobile industry, Bourreau & al. (2008) show that it is 
impossible to apply the “ladder of investments” theory in mobile telephony 
because of social desirability, and especially due to limited spectrum 
frequency, limiting the possibility that a MVNO becomes a full MNO. 
 Regulatory costs 
NRAs should also consider the regulatory cost that, even if sometimes 
hidden, can be high: 
 Direct regulation costs, including employment costs, market 
analysis and any direct costs needed to make decisions.  
 Indirect regulation costs can take place in many possible cases, 
including costs of taking “wrong” regulatory decision or giving the 
wrong signals and not provide sufficient incentives to market 
players. 
 Lobbying costs: as there is regulation, operators may “lobby” 
regulators or try to get more favourable regulatory decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
It is important for European regulators to harmonise both types of 
competition in the telecommunication industry. One needs, however, to be 
cautious regarding intervention in mobile telephony because of its distinct 
characteristics, and not jeopardise current 3G network deployment.  
Furthermore, infrastructure-based competition in the mobile market has not 
shown an obivous “competitive failure” and it is believed that current 
technical convergence in telecommunications will further strengthen mobile 
industry competitiveness. 
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Abstract The interregnum between successive technological generations has 
received little attention in technology studies. To understand what happens in the 
interregnum, we characterize technological change as happening within an ecosystem 
characterized by both momentum and inertia. Applying this framework to study the 
mobile communications ecosystem, we found that different parts of the ecosystem 
evolved at different rates with “collateral technologies” influencing the transition path 
that unfolded. We suggest that, rather than a distinct or unitary shift from an old to a 
new technology, transitions proceed in a zigzag manner resulting in the emergence of 
hybrid technologies. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many studies on technological cycles, discontinuities, paradigms and 
trajectories are predicated on Schumpeter’s (1934, 1942) analysis of 
creative destruction whereby waves of discontinuous technological change 
destroy old industries to create new ones (cf. Christensen 1997, Foster 
1986, Hill & Rothaermel 2003, Tushman & Anderson 1986, Utterback 1994). 
Technological evolution is usually seen as proceeding in a sequential and 
progressive manner along an S-shaped curve92. The S-curve hypothesis 
suggests that the performance of a technology, slow at first, increases at a 
faster rate, finally flattening out to be supplanted by a new technology with its 
own S-curve. 
The S-curve of technological evolution or the diffusion path of novel 
technologies (e.g. Griliches 1957) has been highly influential, especially in 
suggesting the point at which managers should shift investments from a 
mature technology to a new one. The S-curve has been used to depict the 
                                                           
92  The S curve is has also been used in the innovation literature (Rogers 2003, 
Utterback 1994) to explain the diffusion rate of most innovations. Only a small 
number of people adopt an innovation at first, and then the adoption rate 
increases sharply, followed by a slowing of the laggards adopting the innovation.  
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diffusion pattern of not just novel technologies and products, such as laser 
printing (Christensen 1997), process technologies (Karshenas & Stoneman 
1993) and mini-mills (Tushman & Anderson 1986) but also a wide range of 
innovative social practices (e.g. Rogers 2003, Strang & Soule 1998).  
Yet, those who have examined micro-processes involved in such transitions 
suggest that there is more than a simple linear shift from one technological 
system to another (Sood & Tellis 2004, 2005). Old technologies can prove 
surprisingly resilient and don’t simply get eclipsed by new ones (Henderson, 
1995). Instead, they may evolve through an “irregular step function” with big 
random improvements in performance, following long periods of dormancy 
(Sood & Tellis 2004). Also, major advances within a technology regime can 
also drive the evolution of technologies (Lawless & Anderson 1996). 
Moreover, different interrelated constituents of the socio-technical ecosystem 
evolve at different rates (Adner 2006, Hughes 1987, MacKenzie 1987) 
mediated by bottlenecks (Rosenberg 1982) and “reverse salients” (Hughes 
1983: 73). In sum, the transition from an old technology to a new one is 
neither inevitable nor sequential.  
What are the processes that may characterize inter-generational transitions? 
We address this question by analyzing the mobile communications industry 
that has often been marked by technological shifts. In particular, we study 
the dynamics in the interim period between the second and third generation 
technologies. To do so, we adopt a perspective that allows us to examine 
the diverse pulls and pushes created by constituents. Our study suggests 
that, rather than the “winner takes all” tipping effects, or the inertia caused by 
“lockouts” and high switching costs (David 1985, Schilling 2003), 
technological transitions may be characterized by both momentum and 
inertia. As a result, technological transitions are not necessarily unitary shifts 
from the old to the new, but, instead may be characterized by uneven 
movements that generate asynchronies or imbalances across the ecosystem 
during the migration process. By highlighting these processes, we offer a 
more multifaceted conceptualization of technological transitions that includes 
the institutional and ecological dynamics and carries important caveats for 
premature jumps to the next technological phase.  
How do these contradictory forces of momentum and inertia play out during 
technological transitions? Do constituents of an ecosystem operate in sync 
or are there temporal discords that emerge during various points of a 
technological transition? And, how do these processes influence migration 
paths? We address these questions by providing an in-depth account of the 
processes involved in the transition between the second and third generation 
mobile telecommunication technology. But, first, we offer a brief overview of 
our research site. 
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TECHNOGICAL EVOLUTION IN MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS 
We analyzed the mobile communications ecosystem between 1999 and 
2005. On April 19, 2000, the UK government held the first 3G spectrum 
auctions in Europe, raising an unprecedented $35 billion from the sale of five 
licenses. Soon thereafter, the spectrum auction in Germany raised almost 
$50 billion. While subsequent auction proceeds from spectrum auctions in 
Europe did not reach such surreal levels, the combined revenues from the 
sale of licenses for 3G mobile technologies raised more than $100 billion as 
many mobile operators made their biggest ever investments. The timing of 
the auctions had coincided with the peak of the dotcom boom that had not 
only made these investments seem justifiable at the time but had also 
allowed access to ‘easy money’ from willing lenders.  
Five years down the road, the demand for products and services based on 
3G technologies remained well below expectations. Many were convinced 
that the enormous prices paid to obtain these licenses were completely 
unrealistic as far as the potential for future profits was concerned, and that 
firms were saddled with the winner’s curse (Kagel & Levin 1986). Indeed, 
even just after their completion, the auctions were variously described as the 
‘wireless gamble’ (The Economist 2000) and a ‘spectrum land grab’ for a 
new and untried technology. Many mobile operators delayed rolling out 
infrastructure for 3G systems and wrote down the value of their spectrum 
licenses while some even returned these to the state at considerable loss. 
Despite the tremendous optimism that the third generation mobile 
technologies had generated at the turn of the millennium, lack of interest 
from end users kept penetration rates extremely low. Even by 2005, out of 
the almost 2 billion mobile customers worldwide, just about 2% had migrated 
to 3G systems and even those customers sparingly used the various 3G 
services. See next table for subscriber numbers for the various technological 
generations. 
Table 5. Millions of subscribers on 2G and 3G systems 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
World 1137.8 1382.9 1714.1 2177.1 
GSM (2G) 809.3 1012.0 1296.0 1709.2 
Others (1G and 2G 
and 2.5G) 
328.3 368.1 401.3 417.9 
3GSM (3G) 0.2 2.8 16.3 50 
 
In the wake of such low demand for the new technology, many operators 
decided to focus on upgrading the previous generation 2G systems to what 
came to be known as 2.5G. This interim ‘solution’ provided almost all of the 
benefits that 3G had promised, yet at a fraction of the cost and without the 
need for costly new spectrum licenses. As the label 2.5G suggests, instead 
of a smooth transition from the second to the third generation, the system 
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settled down somewhere in between, incorporating facets from both 
generations. To understand how and why this happened, we need to look far 
beyond the technologies at play. A richer understanding would entail 
studying the various constituents of the entire ecosystem in which the 
technologies are embedded (Adner 2006, Van de Ven & Garud 1993, Geels 
2002). We describe such an ecosystem for the mobile communications 
industry.  
 The Mobile Ecosystem  
At the time of the auction, the mobile ecosystem, including handsets and 
other co-specialized assets, was locked into a 2G mode that had reached 
saturation levels of penetration. For a new technological system like 3G to 
work, it would require not only new core and complementary technologies 
but also several co-specialized assets (Teece 1986). These assets include, 
for instance, new generation handsets from manufacturers (that are also 
compatible with previous generation mobile phones), new base stations and 
masts from infrastructure providers for the transmission of 3G signals and 
compelling ‘content’ (video games, websites etc. for mobile handsets) from 
application developers. As the competences of mobile firms operating under 
2G were limited to providing voice-based services, they had to enroll a wide 
range of stakeholders, such as banks and entertainment companies to 
develop new kinds of services – mobile banking and purchasing, interactive 
video games on the mobile etc.  
Since spectrum is a state-controlled resource, the ecosystem also involved 
regulators. Similarly, infomediaries – analysts and media – also played an 
important role during the transition process. Besides, environmental groups 
concerned about the potential radiation hazards from 3G systems were 
important social groups influencing the transition process93. This social group 
urged municipalities to resist allotting building permits for new sites for 3G 
transmitters. Finally, any technological ecosystem will remain isolated 
without a critical mass of users who attach various meanings to products, 
vis-à-vis their value in use. For 3G to become viable, end users would have 
to show an interest in using 3G services. Before we elaborate further on the 
roles of various actors in the mobile ecosystem, we first provide a brief 
overview of the essential characteristics of 3G technologies and the 
advantages it promised over the preceding 2G systems. 
                                                           
93  3G systems operate at higher frequencies that required the construction of 
additional masts and base stations in cities as well as more powerful handsets 
than 2G technologies. Many believe that these components posed significant 
radiation hazards. 
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 Key Characteristics of the Third Generation (3G) Wireless 
Technology  
As against the globally dominant GSM (Global System Mobile) standard in 
2G technologies, 3G technologies used the CDMA (Code division multiple 
access) radio interface standard. CDMA is far more efficient in ‘farming’ 
available spectrum space by assigning a unique code for each frequency 
channel, thereby providing more traffic per megahertz of spectrum (Funk & 
Methe 2001). Most 2G technologies, including the European-led GSM 
standard, was based on TDMA (Time division multiple access) – a 
technology that creates multiple access channels for subscribers by spacing 
frequencies in time.94 3G systems not only made more efficient use of 
spectrum but also had the capability to transmit large amount of data at 
much higher speeds by using a bigger band of spectrum as compared to 2G. 
As against 14.4 kilo bytes per second (kbps) 3G could transmit data at up to 
2000 kbps. 
Besides these differences in the core technologies surrounding the two 
generations, 3G also offered a more efficient way of transmitting wireless 
data. All third generation technologies use ‘packet based’ systems for 
sending data – a technology employed in the Internet. At the time of 
originating a data file’s transmission, the file is split up into smaller units, or 
packets, containing identifiable information, which is needed for their re-
assembly at the file’s destination. Available bandwidth usage is optimized by 
minimizing the transmission ‘latency’ (i.e. the time it takes for data to pass 
across the network). In contrast, 2G technologies use circuit-switched 
technology that sets up a dedicated connection between two callers for the 
entire duration of the communication. Even if no actual communication is 
taking place, the channel still remains unavailable to other users, creating 
inefficiencies in spectrum utilization. 
While the core 3G technology, CDMA, along with the use of packet switching 
for data transfers allow better utilization of spectrum, the need to handle 
large amounts of data also need higher spectrum capacity or bandwidth. 
Spectrum being a valuable resource meant that operators had to pay billions 
of dollars just for obtaining spectrum licenses for 3G systems, let alone build 
technological infrastructure and market the new technology. To understand 
the exorbitant prices paid for 3G licenses during many of the auctions, we 
need to look at the antecedents to the 3G auctions. This includes the context 
in which the auctions took place and the activities of various constituents in 
the run up to the auctions.  
                                                           
94  One exception was the use of CDMA in incumbent 2G systems, such as the 
CDMA-One (IS-95) that used 2G spectrum. However, with the TDMA-based GSM 
being the de facto global standard for 2G, the use of CDMA-One remained 
largely limited to North America (Funk & Methe 2001). 
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 The 3G Spectrum Auction  
Collectively, the interrelated constituents and the various social groups 
comprising the mobile ecosystem generated tremendous optimism for the 
new technology, just prior to the spectrum auctions. It was no wonder that 
the industry leapt at the chance to get a piece of the spectrum when the 
governments designated a specific bandwidth and put up licenses for sale in 
2000-2001. Overall, European operators invested over 110 billion Euros in 
what was one of the biggest investments in recorded history by any industry 
on the introduction of a new technology95. In comparison, the license fee 
from 1994-2002 for 2G spectrum was in the range of just 10 billion Euros for 
the entire European market. In the case of 3G, just in the UK auction for 
instance – the first to be held in Europe raised about $35 billion from selling 
5 licenses – 4,000% higher than the minimum price set by the UK 
government (Borgers & Dustmann 2001)96. The UK auction recorded the 
highest revenues in part because of its Anglo-Dutch design – a hybrid – that 
could capture the virtues of both the ascending (English) and sealed-bid 
(Dutch) forms (Klemperer, 2002). In this design, the auctioneer begins by 
running an ascending auction until just two bidders are willing to pay the 
current price. The two are then each required to make a ‘best and final’ 
sealed-bid offer and the winner pays his bid. This format reduces the 
incentives for firms to form consortia prior to the bidding, as they can be 
beaten in the final round. It also makes tacit collusion harder, because the 
sealed-bid stage allows firms to renege on any tacit deals without fear of 
retaliation. 
The high prices were paid despite the stringent rollout obligations attached to 
spectrum licenses. For instance, the UK regulators imposed rollout 
obligations with the condition that 3G services by each licensee were to 
cover at least 80% of the UK population by the end of 2007 (Ofcom 2000). 
As 3G required a completely new infrastructure, meeting this obligation in 
                                                           
95  While auctioning spectra licenses was unprecedented in Europe, the regulators in 
charge of 3G licenses had taken a cue from the spectacular success of spectrum 
auctions in the US. The US regulator, Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) had raised an astonishing $42 billion between 1994 and 2000, described 
as the “49 California gold rush” (Business Week, 1993). Also, some countries 
such as Japan and Sweden had decided to stick with the format of using 
administrative mechanisms (beauty contests) for allocating 3G licenses, as had 
been the case during the previous generations of mobile telephony, when these 
licenses were simply awarded to ‘deserving’ firms. 
96  While almost every incumbent operator bid for a 3G licenses, a notable exception 
was the French firm, Bouygues. Its CEO, despite intense pressures to make a 
switch to 3G chose not to apply for a license. He was later vindicated when the 
French government slashed license fees and the operator obtained a license at 
less than a quarter of the original license fee (Baker & Clifford, 2002).  
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sparse demographic distributions and terrain (providing coverage to the ‘last 
mile’) would require huge further investments in addition to the payment for 
licenses. The total projected investment for rolling out 3G network 
infrastructure from 2001-2010 in Europe was about another 250 billion 
Euros. Mobile firms nevertheless made huge investments in their 
commitment to 3G despite these tough license requirements. 
 The Auction Aftermath 
More than five years down the road, the migration had not occurred as 
intended despite a concerted effort at ‘technological push’ from many 
operators. Analysts forecast at the time of the auctions had been that the 
technology would be up and running by 2003-2004 and generate significant 
rents by 2005. Even at the end of 2005, 3G penetration levels remained 
almost insignificant. In terms of market share, out of the almost 2 billion 
mobile customers worldwide, just about 2% were on 3G systems and even 
these customers sparingly used the various 3G services. It still remained 
unclear which type of 3G data services would utilize the excess capacity and 
be popular with end-users.  
Given such low diffusion rates, an increasing number of mobile firms had to 
scale back their targets, withdraw from unattractive markets, and delay or 
even abandon 3G rollouts. The enormous sums spent at the auctions, now 
seemed an extremely unwise investment. The Financial Times summed up 
the situation in these words: “Taking into account the write-offs, bankruptcies 
and closures worldwide, probably $1,000 billion has gone up in smoke” 
(Financial Times 2001). With customers evincing little interest, and most 
analysts and investors increasingly skeptical about 3G, the future of the 
technology looked far from bright. Even some of the mobile operators that 
had invested billions began to express doubts about the economic viability of 
3G. This was evident when the chief executive of BT Cellnet, Peter Erskine 
stated: “There is recognition that too much was paid for 3G licenses.” 
 Extension of the Old Technology 
2G was upgraded to what came to be known as two-and-a-half generation 
(2.5G) or GPRS (General Packet Radio Services) through bolting on packet-
switching data transmission technology onto 2G systems. Sometimes called 
‘3G-lite’ in the industry, these 2.5G upgrades essentially allowed faster 
connections to the Internet via the mobile phone. 2.5G could handle data 
transmission speeds between 33.6 and 128 Kbps, as against a maximum of 
2000kbps for 3G, thereby lifting the performance to a level which is in the 
middle range of 2G and 3G. Thus, while 2.5G marked a significant 
improvement in 2G systems, it nevertheless operated on the limited 2G 
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spectrum and did not achieve what 3G was capable of. As an example; 
downloading a song with a 2.5G network would take over a minute as 
against 5 seconds on a 3G network. 
As the mobile ecosystem seemed to temporarily settle down around 2.5G 
technologies, a number of mobile firms with 3G licenses, such as Vodafone, 
delayed their 3G launches beyond initial promises and focused on upgrading 
their 2G networks to 2.5G. Firms without 3G licenses, such as the Danish 
operators, Sonofon and Telias also decided to focus on 2.5G and offer most 
of what were supposed to be ‘3G’ services. Many operators now 
acknowledged that the much-hyped transition to 3G was unlikely to be 
momentous and began to regard 3G as evolutionary instead of revolutionary. 
Indeed, as Dave McGlade, CEO of BT Cellnet (later known as mmO2) stated 
in 2003: “In terms of the kinds of applications our customers are going to 
use, I don’t think there is a huge difference between 2.5G and 3G” (Telecom 
Review – Conference proceedings in the 3GSM World Congress in 2003).  
While many operators chose the 2.5G route, they faced a dilemma – 
preventing the cannibalization of their customer base network in a near-
saturated market while, at the same time, also requiring them to sign up for 
new expensive 3G contracts to increase the ARPU. The situation actually 
was far more complex than having to decide between two rival basic 
technologies. According to Bob Merritt, VP of Semico Research Corp. “It is 
going to be a case of supporting 2G, 2.5G and 3G, all at the same time. This 
isn’t going to be a nice, smooth transition.”  
Worse still, was the prospect that firms that chose to upgrade to 2.5G could 
bypass 3G and make a direct leap for 4G (The Economist, 2003). These 4G 
system were expected to include new technologies such as improved 
modulation that could deliver full motion video on mobile devices. A former 
high ranking objective of a major mobile operator we interviewed suggested 
that 3G could well be a “stillborn” technology and the third generation a “lost 
generation” (Former head of technology of NTL, the second largest telecom 
in UK). Thus, it was conceivable that 3G could simply be leapfrogged by 
what was being labelled as 4G. The next figure depicts the development of 
performance for mobile technologies from 1G to 4G (projected) where each 
technology is introduced at a higher performance level than the former 
technology. 
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Figure 19. Neither fish nor fowl but 2 ½ G 
 
 
2G was upgraded to what came to be known as two-and-a-half generation (2.5G) or GPRS 
(General Packet Radio Services) through bolting on packet-switching data transmission technology 
onto 2G systems. Sometimes called ‘3G-lite’ in the industry, these 2.5G upgrades essentially 
allowed faster connections to the Internet via the mobile phone. 2.5G could handle data 
transmission speeds between 33.6 and 128 Kbps, as against a maximum of 2000kbps for 3G, 
thereby lifting the performance to a higher level than 2G but well below 3G’s performance. As 2.5G 
operated on the limited 2G spectrum, it could not achieve what 3G was capable of. Nevertheless it 
was able to close the gap in performance between the two platforms thereby generating increasing 
inertia to a move to 3G. 
DISCUSSION 
The body of work on technological transitions has done little to address real-
time transition issues at play, such as the forces that arise as a result of 
interactions between producers, users, and institutional players constituting 
a technology ecosystem. To develop a richer understanding of the dynamics 
of technological transitions, we examined recent developments in mobile 
telephony, focusing in particular, on the interregnum between two 
successive technological generations, 2G and 3G. As we have observed, the 
process of technological transition can be messy, erratic and contested, not 
necessarily driven by smooth shifts; aspects of the past technologies 
continue to matter; and new technologies with higher functionalities do not 
simply eliminate the older ones in a process of creative destruction.  
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In the light of our study of mobile telephony, we have argued for the need to 
conceptualize networks as a complex ecosystem in order to develop a richer 
understanding of how transitions unfold. We now draw on our findings to 
develop a richer imagery of technological generations.  
 Towards a richer understanding of technological transitions 
While scholars have discussed the need to take an expanded network or 
systemic perspective in conceptualizing technological transitions, the various 
elements of the system are usually seen to be operating in sync as it moves 
forward from one generation to another (e.g. Hughes 1983). However, by 
disaggregating the elements of an ecosystem, we found that, rather than in 
being sync, the different elements evolved at different rates, thereby setting 
up the transition to temporal discords. It is understandable that a delay in co-
specialized and complementary assets makes it more likely that old 
technology would catch up with the new technology. These improvements 
may come from within the industry but may also result from developments in 
related industries. For instance, in the context of mobile communications, a 
“collateral technology” (the bolting of packet switching onto existing 2G 
technology) imported from the domain of the Internet appears to have been 
the true ‘radical shift’ at a time when most constituents were preoccupied 
with core 3G technologies. By drawing on elements from the new 
technologies, this collateral technology created links between different 
industries – Internet and 2G mobile – and enabled the extension of the 
previous generation (2G). According to most industry experts, the collateral 
technology represented a bigger ground shift in mobile communications than 
core 3G technologies, despite the massive investments that went into 
developing 3G. Indeed, users did not find 3G to be dramatically different 
from 2G and most seemed satisfied with upgrades of the old technology that 
served almost all of their needs. Thus, radical technological advances are 
not necessarily ‘disruptive’ for all the constituents of an ecosystem.  
The phenomenon of how collateral technologies can revitalize previous 
generation technologies has been observed in other domains. For instance, 
improvements in steelmaking from the introduction of open-hearth furnaces 
in the late 1870’s enabled the substitution of earlier generation steam boats 
for sailing ships. Open hearth furnaces allowed the production of better steel, 
which in turn enabled boiler plates and boiler tubes to withstand higher 
pressures. As a result, more efficient steam boats could be operated 
profitably (Dattee 2007). Another example of a collateral technology to 
extend the life of an old technology can be seen with photo-lithography 
where optical lithography has shown unusual persistence as the dominant 
manufacturing technology for computer chips since the late 1960s 
(Henderson 1995). While the industry was focused on developing “next 
generation lithography” (NGL) that included technologies such as extreme 
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ultraviolet lithography (EUVL), the discovery of “enhanced liquid immersion” 
extended the life of optical lithography97 (Sydow & al. 2007). Infusing optical 
lithography with a collateral technology required only minor adjustments 
compared to EUVL for not only extending the path of optical technology but 
also substantially improving its performance. In short, collateral innovations 
in related industries can result in extending the life of the old technology and 
close its performance gap, vis-à-vis the new technology. Thus, technological 
developments in related industries also matter in processes of technological 
transitions.  
CONCLUSION 
Gaining a deeper understanding of the processes and dynamics whereby 
transitions between generations occur holds important implications for policy 
and strategy. In this regard, our paper offers important insights. First, by 
conceptualizing the journey as involving a multiplicity of heterogeneous 
elements, we expand the scope of inquiry for the sources of change driving 
the process. Sponsoring a novel technology involves large upfront 
investments that can drastically transform the social, economic, and 
organizational landscapes. With so much at stake, a thorough understanding 
of the role of multiple constituents and how collateral technologies mediate 
outcomes in transition dynamics is crucial to firms and policy-makers. 
Technological evolutions, thus, are not determined simply by a battle 
between competing technologies. Managers making technology investment 
decisions need to also pay attention to the interdependencies among various 
heterogeneous elements in a technology ecosystem, the inter-relatedness 
and spillovers that may occur among various technologies and the 
institutional dynamics that surround particular technologies. 
Second, our study shows that there is value in disaggregating these 
elements and in exploring the differential rates at which these elements 
develop. Such a disaggregation highlights potential temporal discords 
between the different elements. As the 2G/3G example shows, how these 
temporal discords play out has a profound impact on the rate and direction of 
change of the overall system. Specifically, the differential rates at which the 
new core and co-specialized assets emerge as well as the rates at which 
existing technologies improve, fueled by speculations by infomediaries such 
as the media, are parameters to watch out for during the transition process. 
                                                           
97  In enhanced liquid immersion lithography (LIL), a drop of fluid (water or oil) is 
placed between the optical lens and the wafer. Compared to air, the higher 
refractive index of fluids leads to a better image resolution. Originally used in 
microscopy to enlarge the image of the specimen, immersion is used in optical 
lithography to print miniaturized features onto silicon wafers.  
Infrastructure versus Service-based Competition: the Case of Mobile Telecommunications 
- 138 – 
 
This observation places a word of caution against unrelenting belief in the 
supremacy of a novel technology that can render their sponsors “blind with 
respect to other technological possibilities” (Dosi 1982), and the prevailing 
wisdom to abandon old technologies that are sometimes perceived as 
having reached their natural performance limits. It thus calls for more 
attention to parallel and complementary developments in both the technical 
and institutional environments that impact technological transitions.  
Future studies in technological evolution should examine multifaceted and 
complex technological ecosystems in other contexts to gain a better 
understanding of inter-generational transitions and the dynamics of the 
intervening period. What are the antecedents of momentum that causes 
premature jumps to a new technology and what generates inertial forces that 
stall the migration? When and why do various constituents of the ecosystem 
evolve at variable rates and what causes them to move in sync? Both fine-
grained qualitative accounts as well as large sample quantitative studies can 
lead to a better theory of technological transitions.  
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Mobile Virtual Network Operators:  
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__________________________________ 
Abstract: This paper describes and analyzes critical conditions for achieving net 
benefit from opening the value-chain in mobile communications by introducing mobile 
virtual network operators (MVNOs). MVNOs are radio-less network operators that 
outsource the radio part and some other network elements to radio-based mobile 
network operators. Preliminary experience from the early development phase suggest 
that MVNOs offering complex bundles of innovative value-added services will not be 
competitively sustainable as separate firms, only as more tightly integrated partners of 
radio-based mobile network operators. As the MVNO market develop into more 
mature phases, supported by more entry-friendly regulatory, technical and contractual 
practices, the number of competitively sustainable MVNOs will increase along with the 
scope of value-added services offered by these specialized firms.  
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the economic benefit from the joint 
operation of regular and virtual mobile network operators through the lenses 
of strategic transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1999a). Mobile virtual 
network operators (MVNOs) are radio-less operators that own and control at 
least some part of the mobile network, while contracting out to regular radio-
based mobile network operators (MNOs) the radio part and any remaining 
complementary network facilities and service applications that are necessary 
to provide mobile services to end users98. Prospective benefits are sharper 
upstream competition, lower supply prices and more innovative downstream 
service packaging, branding and marketing. These are benefits from 
                                                           
98  Besides owning a minimum of network elements to deliver and receive calls, 
control over a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card is recognized as a key 
requirement of an MVNO. Sufficient user “control” may, however, be achieved 
without legally owning the card’s identification code, including the mobile network 
code that would allows the MVNO subscribers to roam into the network of various 
MNOs. This can be achieved by contracting with the legal owner of the card code 
for the right to use the card for all or almost all commercial purposes. Although 
Sense uses their own SIM Toolkit and may also claim they sell their own SIM 
cards, it is still Telenor or NetCom as spectrum-licensed network operators that 
are the legal holder or “owner” of the mobile network code. In this paper service 
providers of the Sense-type are included as a kind of virtual operator because 
they represent valuable experience.  
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outsourcing that seldom can be achieved without additional transaction costs 
in terms of time-consuming negotiations, arbitration and even litigations. Net 
social benefit can therefore only be accomplished to the degree transaction 
hazards are moderate throughout the contracting period, or to the degree 
contractual safeguards are sufficient to prevent transaction costs from 
escalating. 
Until recently the prevailing opinion of incumbent operators and most 
regulators has been that the positive effects of virtual network operation 
were highly uncertain, probably minimal and definitely not big high enough to 
justify regulatory intervention99. The main reason for such skepticism seems 
to be the expected negative incentive effects that such a regulation would 
have on investment in future networks such as in 3rd generation mobile 
network (UMTS network), combined with weaker infrastructure competition. 
Although these negative investment incentive and competition effects will be 
moderated by the positive effect that such regulation will have on service 
innovations and competition in service provision, skeptics (most incumbents 
and some regulators) expect positive effects to be outweighed by negative 
ones. In particular, since the radio-based network owners stand to benefit 
less than others, virtual operation will not appear as a viable strategy until 
facilitating regulation and appropriate operating conditions have been 
established, the associated industrial dynamics sufficiently documented, and 
the radio-based network operators highly convinced about their own benefit 
from such dynamics. 
 My intention with this paper is to start a more open and critical discussion 
and evaluation of this difficult, but important question. Our choice of 
theoretical approach for such an evaluation will be presented in section 2. 
Further definition and description of the concept of virtual mobile network 
operators are covered in section 3, followed by short accounts of early and 
recent developments in section 4 and 5. Conclusions finalize the paper in 
section 6. 
A STRATEGIC TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS APPROACH 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) deals with transaction hazards caused by 
interdependency and asymmetric information and the respective governance 
structures (firm, markets, hybrid contracting) that may serve to mitigate such 
hazards. TCE can also be applied strategically to explore how different 
                                                           
99  This was the conclusion reached by the British regulator Oftel and Norwegian 
Department of Communication that recently evaluated the concept of virtual 
operators in mobile communication (Oftel 1999a and 1999b, St.meld.nr. 24 
(1999-2000)). 
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governance forms may assist in exploiting competitive advantage that can 
be derived from leading technology and best practice. As indicated above, 
the crucial MVNO question is whether network services outsourced to radio-
based operators is technologically separable from complementary services 
provided by virtual operators, and if separable, whether they still are too 
interdependent (and therefore non-redeployable) to justify full corporate 
separation.  
Technological separability will increase and interdependency will decrease to 
the degree the respective inter-firm transactions between regular and virtual 
operators are facilitated by open interface standards. For our purpose, the 
latter will include standard operating procedures not only for technical but 
also for human interaction. Such operating procedures facilitate 
interoperability between interactive facilities, programs and participating 
actors by providing a common “platform” consisting not only of shared 
language, technology and expertise, but also of shared values and norms. 
As a consequence, inter-firm communication will be improved and 
transaction costs will decline.  
Remaining hazards are mitigated by selecting among governance forms 
(firm, market, hybrid forms) characterized by different attributes (incentive, 
control, contract laws) in accordance with the following recipe: Incomplete 
and interdependent transactions carried out by bounded rational and 
opportunistic players should be organized in firms or under firm-like (hybrid) 
contracts rather than under market contracts. Compared to firms, markets 
are characterized by stronger economic incentives, weaker administrative 
control and more reliance on the court system as conflict resolution 
mechanism (Williamson 1991). Hybrid contracts such as joint ventures or 
long-term exclusive contracts are defined by intermediate value 
combinations. 
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Figure 20. The Core Issue 
 
That is, radio-less “virtual” network operators that buy basic network services 
from radio-based “non-virtual” operators will normally do this under 
incomplete contracts that specify some, but not all the obligations under 
some, but not all future conditions. Instead of specifying every possible 
future decision and condition, difficulties are dealt with, and conflicts 
resolved, as the future unfolds. This may work reasonably well under most 
ordinary supply contracts as long as problems are simple and easy to solve 
and potential losses from switching partner are small. In situations where 
problems are more difficult to solve, and switching costs are large, simple 
contracts will no longer suffice. Should one of the parties, due to possible 
failures or defects by the other party wish to exit from the relation, this may 
not only lead to time-consuming and costly conflicts, arbitration and possible 
litigation, but also to the loss of all the non-redeployable assets. To avoid 
such transaction costs, simple contracts should be replaced by more 
complex contracts with stronger safeguards, such as long-term contracts, 
joint ventures or fully integrated corporations, dependent on the level of 
contractual difficulty and the size of potential losses from separation. The 
choice of integrated corporation should consequently be reserved for the 
most difficult cases with the highest loss potentials100. 
However even under highly standardized conditions ambiguity and 
asymmetric information may still cause substantial transaction costs. Due to 
the subjectivity involved in allocating fixed cost to the use of unbundled 
network elements, correct cost-based pricing of network element usage has 
been very difficult, almost impossible. As a consequence, conflicts over 
pricing issues have been frequent, and litigations part of everyday life. 
                                                           
100  This distinction is of course similar to the distinction between autonomous and 
systemic innovation (Teece 1986, Chesbrough and Teece 1996). 
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Should the infrastructure be forced open by regulators, incumbents would 
naturally fear that revenue from the sales of network capacity would no 
longer cover total network costs, thus destroying their incentives for investing 
in new infrastructure and in developing new services. Even though the 
regulator officially prescribes and expects that the same quality and price 
should be offered external customers as internal units, this objective may 
never be fully attained, due to the many indirect ways vertically integrated 
operators may apply to reimburse and favour their own service providers. In 
turbulent times when technology standards, regulations and business 
practices are still evolving, and business partners behave opportunistically, 
causal ambiguity and asymmetric information will work in the disfavour of 
external service providers. 
Nevertheless, the growing number of separate resellers and virtual 
operators, especially in the more advances markets, suggests the opposite 
trend that vertical integrated corporations are increasingly being replaced or 
supplemented with hybrid or market contracting. Apparently, not only primary 
network services but also associated support and customer care have 
become increasingly tradable, primarily due to digitization and 
standardization of network technology. Software programs that interoperate 
across standard interfaces, increasingly handle transactions previously 
handled by humans. 
From a strategic point of view, most appropriate governance mechanisms 
should be applied (in accordance with the above recipe) to exploit most 
promising sources of competitive advantage. In particular, virtual as well as 
non-virtual operators may achieve extra profit by specializing on a narrower 
field of resources to the degree these resources are valuable, rare, inimitable 
and well organized (Barney 1997, chap. 5). Resources such as physical and 
human assets are valuable to the degree their positive effects on profit or 
value added are large. They are rare in the sense of being scarce (few 
competing suppliers), different (rather unique compared to similar assets at 
the competitors’ disposal), non-substitutable (no alternative asset or 
technology to perform the function; natural monopoly) or specific (less 
productive value for alternative users or in alternative uses). Being rare in 
the absolute sense means that no useful substitute exists (e.g. telephone 
lines before cellular and satellite) in which case the network operator may 
charge monopoly price on his services. 
Furthermore, resources such as technology, knowledge or competence may 
be difficult to imitate or copy to the degree they are invisible, tacit, sticky or 
diffused. Being easily imitable means that monopoly rent from unique 
products will be competed away rather quickly. Should patents be 
unavailable or insufficient, internal organization will at least give some 
protection against early leakage, particularly if strengthen with measures 
such as co-ownership, deferred payment, confidentiality clauses, and 
socially conditioned probity (Liebeskind 1995, Williamson 1999b). Leading 
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technology and best practice may therefore be considered “well organized” 
to the degree they are safeguarded with these and similar firm-like 
mechanisms against the hazards of leakage, opportunistic recontracting, 
expropriation and improper usage. Conversely, as technical interfaces are 
standardized, interdependencies are dissolved and early technology leakage 
eliminated, hybrid and arm’s length contracting might gradually replace 
integrated firms (fully integrated radio-based operators).   
In the following figure the arrows linking organization, essential assets and 
performance summarize these relationships. To the degree uniquely 
valuable assets (leading technology and best practice) are specific, sticky, 
tacit or leaky (“non-tradable”), these should by exploited by internal rather 
than by external service providers (i.e. by MNO’ own service providers rather 
than by MVNOs) due to the extra transaction costs involved in dealing with 
external rather than internal service providers101. Only under the opposite 
conditions would we expect MVNOs to develop into a competitive 
alternative. 
 
                                                           
101  Uniquely valuable assets correspond to the essential facility concept in the 
telecom regulation literature. The latter are facilities that (i) are controlled by a 
monopolist, (ii) are considered a necessary input for the provision of downstream 
services, and (iii) cannot be duplicated in any technically or economically feasible 
way. According to the received doctrine, appropriate candidates for regulation are 
only those facilities that are “essential” in the above sense because of the power 
abuse potential (and associated super-normal profit potential) such facilities 
represent.  
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Figure 21. The Competitiveness Issue 
 
MOBILE VIRTUAL NETWORK OPERATORS
102
 
Only MNOs are licensed to run networks using the radio spectrum. The 
scope of mobile virtual network operators depends therefore on the number 
of additional elements of the mobile network that are outsourced to MNOs. 
This would range from the minimum use of the mobile networks’ facilities to 
almost total dependence on them in which case a MVNO from a consumer 
point of view would scarcely be distinguishable from MNO’s own service 
providers. Real economic dependence, however, will only occur to the 
degree alternative MNOs are non-existent (monopoly) or to the degree 
switching between them would be prohibitively costly (due to heavy 
investment in non-redeployable assets). Only under these conditions would 
extra safeguarding mechanisms be needed beyond those provided by 
simple market contracting. 
At one extreme, all the MVNO will require is the use of the radio elements of 
the mobile networks and such fixed parts of the networks as are necessary 
to route calls between the radio elements and the first convenient points at 
which calls can leave (or join) the mobile networks on its way to (or from) the 
                                                           
102  The technical information source for this section is Oftel (1999a,b). 
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facilities of the MVNOs. This minimum amounts to no more than, firstly, the 
radio transmission link, its control functions and the mobility management 
functions that keep track of exactly where mobile handsets are located so 
that calls can be delivered to them; and secondly, some transmission and 
switching facilities needed to link the radio facilities to the points of 
interconnection either with the MVNOs’ systems direct, or with transit 
carriers. This would maximize the MVNO’s control over its customers and 
their calls. 
At the other extreme, calls from MVNOs’ customers will be handled virtually 
entirely by the mobile networks as if in fact they were calls from subscribers 
to the mobile networks. This would imply maximum use of the mobile 
operators’ facilities and minimum investments by the MVNO. In particular all 
the verification operations would be carried out by the mobile operators 
whose databases would have to be geared to receive, process and supply 
data concerning the MVNOs’ customers as well as their own. In the same 
way, the routings used for the transport and delivery of the calls after leaving 
the mobile networks to reach the terminating operators would be exactly 
those chosen for the calls originated by the mobile networks’ own customers. 
Virtually all that would be different is that the billing and service performance 
information would have to be transferred from the MNO to the MVNO. In 
fact, all the MVNO would directly control would be the SIM card which 
contain the information that identifies the user to the network, especially the 
Mobile Network Code (MNC) that identify the network issuing the SIM card, 
besides some mission-critical databases such as their own Home Location 
Register (HLR) and Authentication Centre (AUC) functions.  
From a transaction cost economics point of view, however, the critical factor 
is not the share of facilities and services outsourced to external network 
operators. The critical factor is rather the MVNO’s own investment in MNO-
specific (non-redeployable) applications and capabilities that would lock the 
MVNO to his chosen MNO for a substantial period, eliminate seamless 
network switching and create potential hold-up situations at recontracting 
intervals. Whereas network facilities and service applications are the 
hardware and software elements needed to produce and deliver telecom 
services to final users, technical interfaces are those elements that 
interconnect (more or less seamlessly) the hardware and software of the 
MVNO with those of the MNO or other complementary network operators. In 
this respect, a full and unconditional opening of the value-chain essentially 
means turning proprietary and closed interfaces into non-proprietary and 
open ones, while simultaneously offering network facilities and service 
applications that newcomers can afford to rent or buy. Under exclusive 
contracts, the value-chain will normally be closed to all except the selected 
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partner, whereas the underlying core technology with associated interfaces 
may still be more or less proprietary (Spiller 2001)103. 
Most relevant early examples of less standardized technologies were 
technology enablers such as SIM Toolkit and CAMEL that would enable 
MVNO subscribers to maintain the functionality of their handsets and their 
access to value-added services when visiting different host networks 
(MNOs)104. For example, the SIM Toolkit standard provides only a technical 
standard for communication between SIM card and handset, not for 
communication between SIM card and the mobile network (for downloading 
and service upgrading), nor for the development of the respective service 
applications. Consequently, closer collaboration will be needed for the 
service transactions between regular and virtual operators than between 
regular operator and simple resellers. As value-added services grow in 
number, complexity and importance, the MVNO will be increasingly closer 
tied to his MNO counterpart across proprietary and operator-specific (less 
open) interface standards. Besides, exchange of an increasing number of 
complementary, interdependent and interactive services among partially 
competing players will complicate pricing issues and performance monitoring 
and increase transaction hazards even further.  
To profit from virtual network operation, the price margin defined by the 
difference between final user price and network rental price must cover not 
only added transaction costs, but also the MVNO’s own production cost105. 
In this case, outsourcing and specialization may contribute both to 
production cost savings and to revenue growth. Through outsourcing of 
network elements and service applications costly duplication can be avoided, 
existing infrastructure more fully exploited, and network services provided at 
lowest possible unit cost (economies of scale). MVNOs may then gain extra 
profit if cheap transport and access services are combined with advanced 
functionality and value-added services, produced by the virtual operator’s 
                                                           
103  Except for the renting and pricing issue, opening the value-chain in telecoms is 
strikingly similar to opening the value-chain in the computer industry. In particular, 
as telecoms converge with computing, lessons from the computer industry may 
increasingly become relevant for the telecom industry.  
104 According the definitions used by Oftel (1999b): SIM (Subscriber Identification 
Module) – a small smart card device which is fitted into the mobile handset 
(usually on purchase), and is required in order to allow the user to make normal 
calls. SIM Toolkit – new GSM SIM card capability that allows operators to use the 
full computer processing power of a SIM card to create new services. CAMEL 
(Customised Applications for Mobile Network Enhanced Logic) – allows roamed 
customers to access the value added services of their home network, even if the 
visited network does not support those services. 
105  Oftel (1999b) suggests Retail-Minus - a charge based on the retail price to the 
end user minus the costs of all elements of the call which are no longer supplied 
by the mobile network operator (since they will now be supplied by the MVNO). 
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own facilities and capabilities. The frequently acclaimed synergy effects from 
consolidation may even turn negative to the degree virtual operators develop 
into a more efficient solution for new service creation and network utilization. 
Inter-firm specialization may provide additional benefits. MVNOs that rent, 
rather than own basic infrastructure, will be compelled to specialize within a 
narrower field of activities such as within intelligent facilities and more 
advanced service applications. Profit margins will generally also be higher 
from operating their own intelligent facilities and advanced applications than 
from reselling network services produced by external operators. However, 
specialization from virtual operation will not only create positive learning and 
income effects, but also increasing transaction costs when opportunistic and 
interdependent players interact across non-standard interfaces. Still, many 
virtual operators may connect with regular radio-based operators across 
rather complex and non-standardized interfaces. The more complex and the 
less standardized the interfaces, the higher the transaction hazards both due 
to more complicated pricing problems and to more consequential 
dependency relations106. Even with lower roaming prices (e.g., closer to 
average long run incremental cost), increasing competition and transaction 
costs may eradicate most of the MVNO’s profit potential. 
Summarized, both high roaming prices and high transaction costs may 
prevent MVNOs from becoming profitable. To improve their prospects, 
sources of transaction costs should be eliminated and contractual and 
regulatory safeguards enforced that prevent transaction costs from 
escalating and market power from being extended and abused. Some 
incumbents have even started to explore the conditions for MVNO-
profitability more extensively, particularly in foreign markets where the roles 
are reversed and the need for an alternative MVNO-strategy is imperative107. 
EARLY DEVELOPMENT 
The MVNO concept was pioneered by MCI in the US in the 90 and copied by 
Sense and Virgin Mobile in Europe a few years after. Then as now, to profit 
                                                           
106  To create a virtual network operator, access not only to the incumbent’s physical 
network but also to his Operational Support Systems (OSS) is required. These 
are computer databases and systems that provide services and network 
management, administration, planning and repair functions, as well as functions 
related to customer operations, such as customer care and billing. 
107  This led Telenor and BT to develop a business plan for a software-based telco, 
named Facet, which illustrate perfectly the MVNO concept (Halbo & al., 1999a,b). 
At that time, Telenor also ran its own independent (semi-virtual) mobile service 
provider, named Zalto, focusing on the youth segment.  
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from virtual operations, MVNO’s retail prices had to cover MNO’s rental 
prices, MVNO’s production costs plus any additional transaction costs 
associated with renting the MNO’s facilities. Since retail prices in the start up 
phase did not cover total production costs for smaller volumes (less than 
200.000 average voice subscribers), longer term profitability would 
essentially depend on creative marketing and innovative value-added 
services that would increase revenue, and on standard interfaces and 
appropriate contract schemes that would restrict transaction costs. Achieving 
both higher revenue and lower transaction costs under simple market 
contracts proved difficult, however, since increasing sales of innovative 
value-added services did not only increase revenue, but also required more 
complex and less standardized interfaces that increased transaction costs.  
Plausible solutions were either to specialize on “commodity” voice and data 
services transmitted across standard interfaces at minimal transaction costs, 
or to specialize on innovative value-added services transmitted across non-
standard proprietary interfaces supported by long term inter-firm contracts 
that prevented transaction costs from escalating. Under more protective and 
mutually rewarding contracts, virtual operators might develop into a more 
efficient and creative marketing force than what vertically integrated units of 
radio-based operators could achieve, thus generating extra profit not only for 
themselves, but also for their radio-based partner. Subsequently, this might 
enable MVNOs to develop competitive advantage in value-added service, 
specialized branding and marketing, and MNOs to develop competitive 
advantage in basic mobile network operations.  
RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
Recent industry developments provide at least some support to the above 
hypotheses. After being pioneered by CMI and copied by Sense and Virgin, 
the MVNO practices are now rather widespread, with a surge in the number 
of launches in the past three years. According to research by Blycroft (2007) 
there are now more then 250+ active MVNOs in the world. Of these 150+ 
are in Europe, 60+ in North America, and 40+ in the rest of the world 
(Australia, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Réunion, 
Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Ukraine, Zanzibar)108. Increasingly, 
                                                           
108  As pointed out by Buckland (2007): “Until recently, most MVNOs were similar and 
offered simple, no-frills services, often based on prepaid voice at prices 
undercutting the incumbents’ offerings. A number of companies made a success 
of this business model and there is still scope for it to be used efficiently in some 
markets, especially by organisations such as large retail groups with well-known 
brand names. However, some new MVNOs have shunned the no-frills business 
model altogether and are concentrating on offering data and content services to 
niche markets. At the same time, fixed and cable operators are increasingly 
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opening of the value-chain has also spread beyond virtual network 
operations into complementary mobile devices, applications and value-
added services, thus stimulating further MVNO launches, as illustrated in the 
US mobile media and entertainment (MME) market. Verizon Wireless’ recent 
announcement that it will begin accepting third-party applications and non-
Verizon-branded devices on its CDMA network from late 2008 is apposite109. 
These and similar announcements and initiatives by Verizon led Rehak 
(2007) to conclude that “Verizon has recognized that carriers can no longer 
compete effectively in the US market with a ‘closed-shop’ service and device 
provision model. Verizon’s decision to open up the network to new devices 
and applications is a positive development, and we believe that other 
carriers in the US market will launch similar initiatives sooner rather than 
later.” Notably, to speed up the development of the MME market, Verizon 
and similar US carriers are increasingly relying on the creative services of 
mobile virtual operators enabled and stimulated by the carriers’ own 
specialized MVNO programs (e.g.; Verizon Wireless’ Agent and MVNO 
Programs). However, to survive in increasingly more crowded MVNO 
markets, new entrants have to offer unique propositions. 
                                                                                                                             
choosing to extend their service portfolios by using the MVNO model to enter the 
mobile market.” 
109  As pointed out by Alexandra Rehak, US Research Director of Analysys, the 
global advisers on telecoms, IT and media (Rehak 2007): “Verizon’s decision 
enables the carrier to focus on its strengths by transferring some of the 
development and marketing burden to its third-party partners in exchange for 
fairly limited investment on the carrier’s part. Verizon will also be able to 
maximize its ARPU and network usage by opening up to new mobile data 
devices – particularly as the network is upgraded to 3G LTE. More critically, at 
least with regard to short-to-medium term ARPU growth, Verizon can use the new 
policy to help drive development of off-deck mobile media services, which are an 
essential part of creating an attractive mobile media and entertainment (MME) 
proposition. The top-selling content will probably always be from the top of the 
carrier deck, but customers need to discover content in other ways if the MME 
market is to achieve its full potential in the US. Off-deck providers can experiment 
and specialize in ways that would not be feasible or economical for carriers. 
Carriers will ultimately benefit by creating more opportunities for off-deck MME 
offerings to succeed, rather than short-sightedly focusing on maximizing their 
immediate revenue share”. 
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CONCLUSION   
This paper have analyzed and exemplified mechanisms and conditions that 
may turn virtual network operators into profitable businesses. To profit from 
virtual operations, MVNOs must either perform their specialized “virtual 
network operating” functions more cost efficiently or provide content service 
(e.g.; mobile media and entertainment services) of higher value than 
achievable by ordinary MNOs which, on their part, are more likely to profit 
from specializing on value-chain coordination and remaining network 
functions. Regulatory enforced mobile network access supported by 
interface standards and firm-like contractual safeguards were among the 
main factors that initially affected such MVNO profitability. As regulation and 
technical interfaces develop into more generally acceptable and reliable 
standards, less tightly integrated relations may suffice. The recent global 
surge in MVNO launches offering more content rich mobile media and 
entertainment services provides illustrative and supportive evidence.   
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Abstract: This paper studies the relationship between regulation and performance in 
the mobile telecommunications sector, taking account of the economic impact of 
telecommunications infrastructure on aggregate income and of the role of country 
institutions in promoting economic growth. We address these questions by estimating 
a system of equations for a panel of 30 low and middle-income countries over the 
1990 - 2004 period. In summary, the evidence we present confirms the positive effect 
of regulatory institutions on telecommunications penetration and also highlights the 
contribution of a more widespread mobile telecommunications infrastructure to higher 
levels of GDP per capita. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mobile communications have enjoyed impressive rates of growth across low 
and middle-income countries in recent years. The average number of 
phones per 100 population in this sample has increased from less than 1 in 
1990 to around 40 in 2004. Compared to the availability of fixed lines 
(around 17 lines per 100 population as of 2004), the success of mobile 
communications is even more staggering. 
High connection charges and long waiting lists, as well as the substantial 
investment required to develop extensive fixed networks, have held back 
traditional communications networks and favoured the expansion of mobile 
services. In addition, mobile markets have often been characterised by a 
relatively competitive market structure almost from service launch, while the 
liberalization of fixed markets has somewhat lagged behind. The importance 
of competition among mobile networks is highlighted by research published 
by the World Bank111, which found that the introduction of a second and 
                                                           
110  The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely 
those of the authors and they do not represent the view of the organizations to 
which the authors are affiliated. 
111  Gebreab (2002) relies on a dataset of 41 African countries. 
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subsequent competitors accelerates mobile penetration, while the presence 
of a state-owned telecoms incumbent in the market constrains it. 
However, the continuing success of mobile networks as an effective 
substitute to fixed services in the future is not entirely clear, as some factors 
may inhibit its further development. Firstly, while spectrum may not prove to 
be a scarce resource in the early days of network deployment, some 
countries (e.g. India) have begun to suffer from network congestion. 
Secondly, broadband services are currently based mostly on fixed networks 
(ADSL, cable or Fibre to the Premises). Although mobile voice and SMS text 
use will continue to grow at a strong rate in developing countries, it is, 
though, still unclear whether the penetration and usage of mobile data 
services will become established in these countries over the next 5 – 10 
years. For instance, 3G licences have yet to be issued in China and India. 
However, as 3.5G is being positioned as a broadband service, it may have 
the potential to capitalize on low broadband penetration in emerging 
markets. 
The key role of mobile communications lies in the transformations it brings to 
everyday life and making business, especially in the absence of reliable and 
widespread fixed telecommunications networks. In Africa, mobile phones are 
used to provide public phone access, particularly in rural areas. Moreover, 
their importance for improving information on market prices in different 
locations is documented by a variety of case studies. In a recent empirical 
paper, Jensen (2007) shows how the introduction of mobile phones has 
significantly improved market efficiency in southern India, e.g. in the fisheries 
sector. There is also much case study and anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that the same is true for a wide range of agricultural products. 
While the evidence for the economic impact of mobile communications 
appears increasingly well-established, understanding the factors leading to 
higher penetration rates appears difficult – we observe countries with very 
different socio-economic characteristics having similar proportions of mobile 
subscribers. One possible explanation may be found in the wave of telecom 
sector reform which, in the mid-90s, led many countries to commercialise 
and (in many cases) privatise their national incumbent telecom company; to 
liberalise telecom markets; to introduce competition, particularly in the 
mobile sector; and to establish separate (non-Ministry) regulatory agencies. 
Much attention has been devoted by international institutions, such as the 
World Bank, to the question of how to reform a sector so as to improve 
access to infrastructure, be it communications networks or energy and other 
utilities. Within this reform programme, the two most important issues are (a) 
the design of the market framework for the sector; and (b) the establishment 
of a separate regulator, i.e. one that is autonomous (or “independent”) both 
of the government and of the incumbent national telecom company.  
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In assessing the success of such telecom reform programmes, we need to 
be able to find out whether the presence of a separate regulator can be 
demonstrated to lead to higher access to infrastructure. In the case of mobile 
communications, this means assessing where a separate regulator leads to 
higher mobile penetration rates. This issue can be addressed in different 
ways, including case studies and purpose-designed policy audit. These 
types of study provide detailed and thorough information on specific 
countries or policies and tend to show a positive relationship (e.g. World 
Bank, 2005). However, in order to reach more general conclusions we rely 
on a formal econometric analysis of the underlying relationships between 
economic variables for a number of countries.  
In what follows, we summarize the conclusions of an econometric analysis of 
the interrelations between regulatory institutions, mobile penetration and 
GDP levels in a sample of 30 middle and low income countries over the 
period 1990-2004112. We also very briefly refer to some case study results, 
which highlight the importance of regulatory institutions in infrastructure 
sectors. 
The relationship between the existence of a separate regulator and 
infrastructure industry investment and productivity levels has been a 
particular focus of debate. This issue has been investigated in numerous 
papers, with reference both to the telecommunications and to the electricity 
sectors (See, for instance, Gutierrez 2003; Cubbin and Stern 2006). These 
studies focus on the characteristics of regulatory institutions that one would 
expect to be associated with higher performance on key outcomes such as 
access levels, investment, efficiency and growth. For telecoms, a key 
outcome is the number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants – fixed and/or 
mobile. However, this literature does not, with some exceptions, pay much 
explicit attention to the institutional setting within which the new regulatory 
agencies operate such as political structure, the rule of law or the degree of 
economic openness. We look at this both directly (i.e. with some ‘country 
governance’ variables) and indirectly (via the use of country specific fixed 
effects) which pick up the impact of unmeasured factors, including country-
specific institutional quality. 
The paper takes a fresh look at the relationship between regulation and 
performance in the telecommunications sector and, in particular, to the role 
of the institutional setting. In consequence, we take seriously the argument 
that the economic impact of telecommunications infrastructure on the growth 
of aggregate income is closely interrelated with the role of country 
institutions in promoting economic growth.  
                                                           
112  For details of the estimated model, see Maiorano & Stern (2007). 
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Our main conclusion is that our analysis provides strong additional evidence 
for the claim that a separate regulator significantly helps increase telecom 
penetration rates in developing and transition countries, in this case for 
mobile communications. Our study also provides evidence which strongly 
supports the claim that higher levels of mobile penetration increase GDP per 
capita. 
In what follows, we summarise the approach adopted in the paper in Section 
2, discuss the main results in Section 3 and make a few short concluding 
comments in Section 4. 
MAIN ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY 
The present work studies the penetration of telecommunications 
infrastructure, as measured by the number of mobile subscribers per 100 
population in 30 developing countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and Central Europe.  
Among the factors that may affect penetration, we consider the effect that 
income may have on the uptake of mobile telephone subscriptions. This is 
related to the question of whether penetration is demand-constrained or 
supply-constrained in developing countries. Case-study evidence, as well as 
the substantial waiting lists for fixed telephone lines, points to supply-side 
limits, rather than low levels of demand, as the main reason for the limited 
penetration of telecommunications services in developing countries. Hence, 
introducing an effective regulator should help encourage investment which 
will alleviate the supply bottlenecks. 
Another consideration relates to the possible feedback effects between 
penetration and income. Higher income levels may increase the demand for 
mobile services. In addition, the expansion of network infrastructure 
services, including telecommunications, plays a crucial role in economic 
development113. There is now considerable evidence that higher 
telecommunications capacity – fixed and mobile – can have sizeable effects 
on the level and rate of growth of national income114. 
The importance of the telecommunications sector in improving a country's 
income level is a major complication when analyzing the factors that 
influence telecommunications penetration rates. While it is conventional to 
assume that income is among the variables affecting the demand for 
                                                           
113  See Canning (1999) and Canning & Bennathan (2000). 
114  See Correa (2006), Esfahani & Ramirez (2003), Röller & Waverman (2001) and 
Waverman & al. (2005). 
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infrastructure capacity and services, the economic feedback impact of 
telecommunications infrastructure capacity also needs to be modelled if we 
are not to have a misleading picture. This is represented by the two-sided 
arrow in the top row of the figure below. 
 
Figure 22. Factors Potentially Affecting Infrastructure Development 
 
 
Considering the second row, the economic importance of the 
telecommunications industry has been among the factors contributing to the 
active role of governments in this sector. The reform process that has taken 
place in developed countries and in many low and middle-income countries 
aims at achieving public interest targets by a set of major policy changes, in 
which the establishment of a regulatory framework is accompanied by sector 
restructuring, the liberalization of the market and the privatization of the 
incumbent. Put at its simplest, introducing private finance and privatizing 
expanding telecommunications industries has been the main force behind 
the development of new regulatory organizations as well as, arguably, 
encouraging general improvements in country governance in the areas of 
commercial law enforcement.  
Our study concentrates on the regulatory framework for telecommunications 
per se and, in particular, on key aspects of regulatory governance (e.g. the 
existence of a separate regulator). Regulatory reform has the stated 
objective of promoting better infrastructure development, among other 
targets, by attracting investment and lowering the cost of capital. This effect 
is symbolized by the arrow in the middle panel115. 
                                                           
115  It may be argued that countries with more widespread telecommunications 
penetration are more likely to set up regulators and that therefore there may be 
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Effective regulatory frameworks need to be adapted to the specific 
circumstances of each country and, in particular, to their governance 
characteristics. This is shown in the third part of the previous. One 
interpretation of this relationship views the establishment of an independent 
regulator as a substitute for strong country institutions (e.g. strong property 
rights and competition authorities, supported by strong and independent 
commercial courts). However, an alternative and perhaps more plausible 
view is that countries with strong institutions may be more likely to engage in 
substantive reform, which will include genuinely independent and high 
quality sectoral regulatory agencies. This last relationship is represented by 
the dotted lines in the lower panel of the previous figure.  
Finally, as highlighted by widespread evidence of the positive impact of high-
quality country governance and institutions on GDP growth rates, we need to 
include the potential direct effect of country institutions on income into the 
analysis. 
The present study attempts to bring together these questions into a unified 
framework of analysis. We do this by estimating a system of equations 
including all of these factors for a panel of 30 low and middle-income 
countries over the 1990 - 2004 period.  
SUMMARY OF THE APPROACH 
In order to deal with the interactions described above and represented in 
Figure 22, a system of simultaneous equations is estimated in which the 
dependent variables (i.e. the variables whose time-path we try to explain) 
are:  
 Infrastructure development – mobile penetration rates; 
 Income – GDP per capita; and  
 Regulatory governance – whether or not countries adopt a separate 
regulator .  
Our approach assumes that these variables are endogenous, i.e. they are 
assumed to be determined within the model, as shown in Figure 22 above, 
rather than as being given from outside it. 
The basic specification consists of three equations, one for each of the three 
variables above. We estimate the equations both separately and also jointly 
                                                                                                                             
some feedback effects from infrastructure development to regulatory governance. 
In fact, this apparent feedback may instead be related to other factors, such as 
liberalization or privatization, affecting both regulatory governance and 
infrastructure development.  
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as a system. The system approach allows us to take full account of the 
feedbacks between the endogenous variables shown in Figure 22. 
In the first equation, mobile penetration rates in each country are explained 
by income (GDP per capita), regulatory governance and other variables. 
Regulatory governance, in the remainder of the paper, is proxied by a 
dummy variable indicating the establishment of a regulator as a separate 
entity from the Ministry in charge of the sector116. We also tried some other 
telecom regulatory indicators, but the ‘separate entity’ dummy variable was 
the most successful117. The dummy takes the value of 1 for any country that 
has a separate regulator in the years it was present (e.g. Kenya 1999-2004) 
and zero otherwise. 
Other variables that we include to explain mobile penetration rates include, 
firstly, the price of mobile services and of fixed services (in both cases, 
average revenue per subscriber); and, secondly, dummies for majority 
privatization of the incumbent and the liberalization of fixed long-distance 
services.  
We also include in all equations dummy variables for each country (a so-
called “fixed effects” approach) in order to control for unobserved 
characteristics and omitted variables that are specific to a given country. 
Previous work has shown that these country-specific fixed effects are 
important in providing a good explanation of telecom access rates and the 
role of regulatory institutions – a result we also find. Indeed, much of the 
effect of variations in the quality of country governance probably comes 
through via indirect effect of the individual country-specific fixed effects. 
Finally, we include year dummies to take account of time effects that are 
common across countries. 
The variables regarding sector reform are summarized in Figure 22 below. 
This simple comparison shows higher mobile penetration in countries that 
have implemented different types of reforms (telecommunications law, 
separate regulator, liberalization of long-distance services and majority 
privatization of the incumbent) compared to the others. At first glance, this 
                                                           
116  This variable should not be confused with what is reported in the ITU 
Development Database as “autonomous decision-making”. While autonomy 
involves a subjective judgement on the functioning of the regulator, our variable 
merely reflect the existence of a separate entity. 
117  These are: whether (a) the country has passed a framework law for the 
telecommunications sector; (b) the country has established a regulator as a 
separate entity from the policy maker; and (c) the regulator is not funded by the 
Government's budget. In addition, we also tried using the number of years since 
the creation of the regulator to capture the time necessary to build up staff 
numbers and competences and reputation. 
Promoting Infrastructure or Service-Based Competition in Mobile Telecommunication Markets? 
- 162 – 
 
would suggest these types of reform may well have had a positive impact on 
penetration and we test this in our estimation. 
 
Figure 23. Mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants 
 
Source: ITU, regulator’s websites 
 
 
The second equation relates income levels (GDP per head) to the 
penetration of mobile communications, a measure of country institutions118 
and other variables. The institutional characteristics considered in this study 
are: (a) protection against expropriation risk (e.g. an index of constraints to 
the executive; see Henisz 2002); (b) financial market development (e.g. 
share of credit to the private sector on GDP). The key point is to test not only 
whether separate regulation increases mobile penetration rates but also 
whether higher mobile penetration rates increase income levels. 
Finally, in the third equation, we try to explain regulatory governance (the 
adoption by countries of a separate regulator) by per capita income, whether 
or not the incumbent telecom company has been majority privatised, country 
institutions and some other variables. The other variables that we consider 
include pressure by international organizations (e.g. conditionality conditions 
imposed by international financial institutions), as proxied by multilateral 
lending. 
                                                           
118  The endogeneity of institutions is a hotly debated topic. In the model that we 
estimate, it is assumed that country institutions are pre-determined. For this 
reason, we include in the system the lagged variable, which pre-date the period 
of analysis, rather than the current level on the grounds that institutions in 
previous years cannot be affected by income levels in subsequent periods (see 
Rajan & Zingales 1998; Esfahani & Ramirez, 2003 for previous use of this 
approach). 
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KEY RESULTS 
In this Section, we summarize and interpret the results of our analysis.  
In the first equation, we estimate the impact on mobile penetration rates by 
income (GDP per capita), regulatory governance (separate regulator) and 
other variables. We find some evidence that the existence of a separate 
regulator increases penetration rates for mobile telecommunications in 
developing countries, although the precise estimate of the effect varies 
considerably, depending on the exact specification.  
Depending on the specification, we estimate that having a “separate 
regulator” increases mobile penetration rates of between 44% to around 
171%. On a conservative basis, in our sample of developing and transition 
countries, the presence of a separate regulator is associated with mobile 
penetration about 45% higher than in comparable countries without a 
separate regulator. 
Our results are less robust than in previous studies of the impact of 
regulators on fixed line penetration rates. This variability may be due to our 
relatively simplistic regulatory variable or to the possibility that the role of 
regulators is not as crucial for mobile operators as it is in the fixed market119. 
In the first equation, we also obtain estimates for the coefficient on GDP per 
capita. However, these are not statistically significant in a fixed effects 
model. This finding is in line with the observation that mobile penetration has 
boomed in poor countries even at times when income growth was negligible. 
We also find that mobile penetration rates are higher with lower mobile 
prices (as proxied by average revenue per subscriber) and also with higher 
telecom investment rates. The existence of a separate regulator is likely to 
encourage higher investment and may well help keep prices lower where 
competition is limited, so these are other channels by which a separate 
regulator may have a positive effect on mobile access in developing 
countries. 
The negative coefficient on the dummy ‘liberalization’, which indicates the 
opening to competition of long-distance services provided on fixed networks, 
seems to suggest substitutability between fixed and mobile services, which 
is particularly likely in developing countries. However, this result is not robust 
                                                           
119  In fact, in a large panel of countries, Estache & al. (2006) find that the dummy for 
a separate regulator does not have a significant effect on fixed 
telecommunications penetration. 
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as it does not hold when we estimate the model on a larger sample of low 
and middle-income countries120. 
In the second equation, income levels are explained by the penetration of 
mobile communications, a measure of country institutions and other 
variables. We find a sizeable and strongly significant impact of mobile 
telecoms infrastructure on per capita GDP in our sample. This result 
confirms the findings of other economists on the economic impact of mobile 
telecoms in developing countries (e.g. Waverman & al. 2005). 
Depending on the specific model, we estimate a coefficient on GDP per 
capita on mobile penetration which ranges from 1.3% to 4.4%. By combining 
this finding with the results for the first equation, we can conclude that, on 
average in our sample, the establishment of a separate telecoms regulator 
and the effect of that on mobile penetration is associated with GDP per 
capita that is around 0.5% higher than it would have been otherwise 
In the third equation the establishment of a separate regulator is explained 
by income, country institutions and other variables. The only significant 
variables are liberalization of fixed services and the privatization of the 
incumbent, which as expected are associated with higher probability that the 
country establishes a separate regulator. 
Surprisingly, we find no evidence of any systematic link between country 
institutions and regulatory governance, but our country governance data 
were rather less good than most of the other data we used. In addition, 
country governance variables are usually very persistent over time and, in 
our model, their effect may well have been captured by the country specific 
fixed effects included in the equations121. 
Finally, we would like to add a word of caution as to the interpretation of our 
results. Even though we tried to take account of feedback effects, we cannot 
interpret the establishment of a separate regulator as the clear-cut cause of 
higher mobile penetration. This is a common issue in empirical economics 
and especially in the literature on institutions. Moreover, the results hold on 
average, i.e. in a small interval around the sample averages, and 
extrapolating the conclusions to countries not in the sample needs to be 
                                                           
120  In a paper estimating demand for telecommunications services in developing 
countries, Garbacz & Thomson (2007) find that mobile services are not 
substitutes for fixed lines, but can be considered as complements. The effects of 
liberalization in the fixed market on mobile penetration is insignificant in a sample 
of developing countries analysed in Gasmi et al. (2006), who also find a positive 
effect of mobile competition on mobile access rates. 
121  A recent study by Gasmi, Noumba & Virto (2006) has rather better data on 
country governance and finds significant effects of some country governance 
variables on mobile penetration rates and prices in developing countries. 
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done with care, particularly since the results depend on unobservable 
country specific fixed effects. However, we have tested carefully for internal 
consistency and our results are also very similar to other econometric 
studies of the impact of telecom and electricity regulation in developing 
countries. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
We have shown in the previous section that the existence of a separate 
telecom regulator in developing and transition countries is clearly associated 
with higher mobile penetration rates – around 45% higher than without a 
separate regulator. We also find that this induced higher mobile penetration 
is consistent with around 0.5% higher GDP per capita. 
Our results are also consistent with the results from in-depth case studies. 
For instance, the impact of regulation on telecom development has been 
studied in Jamaica, in a number of countries in Africa and elsewhere and the 
results on the role of regulation are of the kind that one would expect from 
our econometric results. (See Shirley & al. (2002) for the role of regulation in 
telecom reform in Uganda and NERA (2004) on Mauritania and South 
Africa). 
The case studies also investigate the role of regulators in introducing 
competition in fixed and mobile services and whether or not regulators 
provide a clear framework for investment. These are issues that arise within 
our econometric model but which we were unable to pursue in depth. 
However, this shows how the econometric work can complement case 
studies and the results of ex post regulatory evaluations122. For telecoms in 
general and mobile in particular, they are providing similar conclusions – 
which gives a lot more confidence in the underlying policy message.  
In consequence, we conclude that having a separate regulator clearly seems 
to result in higher mobile access rates in developing countries. 
On the role of competition, in some specifications we find some substitution 
between fixed and mobile services for developing countries, as the 
liberalization of long-distance fixed networks is associated with lower mobile 
penetration123. In addition, other papers provide evidence that more 
                                                           
122 See World Bank “Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems” 
(2006) by Brown, Stern & Tenenbaum. This approach has since been applied to 
the evaluation of the Jamaican infrastructure regulator, including for telecoms and 
the development of mobile. 
123  This result is not confirmed when a wider sample of developing countries is used. 
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competition between different mobile operators increases penetration rates 
(Gebreab 2002). However, for fixed markets, there is as yet relatively little 
competition – particularly infrastructure-based competition - in developing 
countries. Hence, it is difficult at this stage to draw conclusions as to the 
impact of competition between fixed and mobile networks in this context124. 
Policy makers in developing countries and their counterparts also need to 
consider wider effects of the growth of mobile relative to fixed services. A 
key issue here is the penetration and usage rates of Internet services, 
especially broadband. Mobile broadband is both expensive and likely to take 
some years to roll out in most developing countries. 
The rapid growth of mobile usage in developing countries has yielded 
significant benefits to small producers as well as to households. It remains to 
be seen how this process will be taken forward. In particular, it is unclear 
whether the next stages of telecom (fixed and mobile) usage will be based 
on top-down roll-out of new services by existing operators. Alternatively, it is 
possible that more use will be made of a decentralised approach based on 
entry and innovation at regional and local level by new operators. The latter 
would imply a much larger role for facility based competition. If the latter 
model is adopted, the implications for regulatory design would be significant 
e.g. much more light-handed (and pro-competitive) regulation together with 
significant regional differentiation. 
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